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This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 emergence,	 functioning	 and	 evolution	 of	 voluntary,	
informal	 networks	 of	 regulators.	 Via	 a	 combination	 of	 inductive	 and	 deductive	
reasoning,	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods,	this	research	sheds	light	on	thus	far	
unexplored	 mechanisms	 of	 networked	 regulatory	 collaboration.	 These	 are:	 the	
conditions	 leading	 to	 spontaneous	 network	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 into	 an	
institutional	structure;	the	factors	determining	network	members’	ties	to	each	other;	
the	 strategies	 that	 network	 members	 deploy	 to	 ensure	 network	 survival;	 the	
conditions	facilitating	network	entrepreneurship;	and	the	role	of	informal	networks	
in	the	implementation	of	foreign	policy	agendas.		
Through	 six	 empirical	 chapters,	 divided	 in	 three	 parts,	 this	 thesis	 explains	 why	
regulators	network.	The	core	argument	is	that	regulators	use	networks	as	levers:	they	
leverage	 their	 collective	 collaboration	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 goals	 that	 are	 both	
individually	 and	 collectively	 desirable.	 The	 first	 part	 shows	 that	 they	 network	 for	
control:	regulators	form	networks	whenever	they	face	concrete	threats	to	the	scope	
of	 their	 authority	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 autonomy.	 The	 second	part	 shows	 that	
regulators	network	for	resources:	similarity	 in	the	political	economy	and	expertise	




international	 organisations	 and	 regulators	 deem	 informal	 networks	 capable	 of	

















The	 motivation	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 bring	 new	 theoretical,	 empirical	 and	
methodological	perspectives	to	the	study	of	regulatory	networks.	It	is	based	on	six	
empirical	chapters	divided	 in	three	parts	and	addressing	four	different	 literatures.	
The	 essential	motivation	 for	 such	 an	 ambitious	 undertaking	 is	 that	 the	wealth	 of	
contributions	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 examine	 them	 through	 a	 limited	 set	 of	





The	 key	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 regulators	 use	 their	 networks	 as	 levers;	





network	emergence,	way	before	endorsement	by	political	principals	 (which	 is	 the	
point	 of	 departure	 of	 most	 existing	 literature).	 I	 also	 investigate	 the	 drivers	 of	
network	 collaboration,	 i.e.	 the	 factors	 explaining	 regulators’	 specific	 ties	 to	 their	
most	 regular,	 frequent	collaborators.	Finally,	 I	explore	 the	 leverage	 that	networks	
have	 even	 outside	 their	 jurisdiction	 (which	 I	 define	 as	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 territorial	









their	 relationship	 with	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 resource	 dependency	 (Pfeffer	 and	 Salancik,	
1978),	 as	well	 as	 to	 explore	 how	 regulators	 navigate	 this	 dependency	 over	 time.	
Secondly,	 and	 relatedly,	 I	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relationship	 between	 regulators’	
institutional	 self-interest	 and	 their	 contribution	 to	 regulatory	 policy,	 which	 is	







i.e.	 which	 relationships	 they	 maintain	 on	 a	 bilateral	 basis,	 beyond	 the	 policy	
requirements	 of	 their	 institutional	 setting.	 In	 turn,	 these	 choices	 determine	 the	
structure	of	the	network.	This	structure	is	susceptible	to	change;	in	this	thesis,	I	only	





namely,	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 have	 emerged	
independently	 of	 one	 another	 and	 can	 or	 should	 be	 studied	 as	 independent	
observations.	In	this	thesis,	I	show	that	regulatory	networks	are	interdependent.	The	
histories	of	the	networks	examined	in	this	thesis	are	entwined,	and	pertain	to	foreign	











This	 thesis	 does	 not	 view	 networks	 as	 simply	 a	 metaphorical	 recourse	 to	




influence,	 advocacy)	 but	 infuses	 them	 in	 with	 a	 dynamism	 that	 has	 largely	 been	
absent	 from	 existing	 scholarship,	 where	 networks	 have	 been	 largely	 static.	 By	




The	 thesis	 draws	 on,	 and	 contributes	 to,	 several	 literature	 strands;	 from	 public	
administration	 and	 public	 policy	 to	 political	 economy,	 international	 relations	 and	
international	political	economy.	By	talking	to	these	different	literatures,	the	research	
highlights	the	breadth	of	scope	that	the	study	of	regulatory	networks	can	and	should	
























The	reason	to	 focus	on	networks	of	 regulators	of	electricity	and	gas	–	 for	brevity,	
‘energy	regulators’	–	is	that	these	networks	have	been	less	often	investigated	than	
networks	 of	 other	 infrastructure	 sectors,	 notably	 telecommunications.	 Yet,	 the	
energy	sector	is	one	of	the	most	controversial	and	politicized	of	all	sectors	subject	to	
economic	 regulation.	 In	 addition,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 energy	 infrastructure	 are	
interesting	 to	 juxtapose	 to	 the	 study	 of	 networks	 of	 institutions	 charged	 with	
regulating	it.	Energy	grids	can	cross	national	borders,	but	fall	short	of	global	reach.	
They	 link	 the	 local,	 the	 national	 and	 the	 transnational	 dimensions	 of	 regulatory	
governance.	 Moreover,	 the	 energy	 grid	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 carefully	 structured,	
constantly	 balanced	 network.	 Hence,	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	 geographical	 and	
technological	aspects	of	energy	infrastructure	feature	prominently.		
The	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 speaks	 to	 the	 public	
administration	literature	that	focuses	on	regulatory	networks	and	their	rationale.	It	
stems	 from	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 often	 emerge	
spontaneously	 (Kenis	 and	 Provan	 2008)	 and	 are	 endorsed	 by	 political	 institutions	
(e.g.	 the	 European	 Commission,	 see	 Eberlein	 and	 Newman	 2008	 or	 Coen	 and	









regulators	 from	 both	 networks),	 documentary	 and	 archival	 analysis	 (only	 in	 the	
NARUC	case).	 I	 find	 that	network	emergence	can	be	usefully	distinguished	 from	a	




political	 relevance,	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 sectors,	 regulators	 are	 alone	 in	 their	
territorial	contexts,	with	no	precedent	to	refer	to	and	no	peers.	
Hence,	 they	begin	 interacting	with	peers	 in	 their	 jurisdictional	context	 in	order	 to	
compare	and	contrast	experiences	and	learning	from	each	other.	This	learning	effort	
is	 not	 just	 motivated	 by	 professional	 aims:	 regulators	 need	 to	 establish	 their	
legitimacy	 to	make	decisions	of	 great	 distributional	 consequences	 and	build	 their	
reputation.	However,	 this	 remains	 a	 loose	 set	 of	 informal	 relationships	 driven	 by	
informational	 asymmetries	 and	 expertise.	 The	 spark	 for	 network	 consolidation	




and	horizontally	 across	 different	 institutions.	 Tensions	 for	 control	 and	primacy	 of	














and	 the	 EU,	 the	 interdependence	 across	 levels	 of	 governance	 creates	 a	 resource	










US	 regulatory	 federalism	 increasingly	 confrontational;	 in	 the	 EU	 case,	 the	
formalization	 of	 previously	 informal	 relationships,	 e.g.	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 the	 Energy	 Regulators,	 rendered	 the	








network	 structure	 by	 uncovering	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulators’	 informal	 ties	 to	 each	









I	 obtained	 replies	 from	 28	 regulatory	 authorities.	 For	 the	 missing	 one,	 I	 simply	
considered	 the	 ties	 they	 received	 as	 reciprocated.	 Respondents	 are	 all	 informed	
individuals	 at	 their	 national	 regulatory	 authority,	 because	 they	 are	 in	 charge	 of	
managing	and/or	supervising	the	external	affairs.	I	rely	on	this	data	in	both	chapters	
in	this	part.		
In	chapter	4,	 I	 formulate	several	hypotheses	as	concerns	the	drivers	of	 regulatory	
networking.	The	core	hypothesis	of	the	chapter	is	that	regulators	prefer	to	network	
with	 peers	 facing	 the	 same	 sort	 of	 sector	 structure	 and	 political	 economy.	 I	
operationalize	national	political	economies	by	relying	on	the	Varieties	of	Capitalism	
typology.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 Exponential	 Random	 Graph	 Model	 I	 develop	 in	 the	
chapter	 lend	support	 to	 the	hypothesis.	Moreover,	 the	analysis	demonstrates	 the	
importance	of	expertise	by	showing	that	certain	regulators	(those	overseeing	more	
advanced	energy	markets)	are	relatively	more	sought	after,	as	well	as	more	active,	
than	 others.	 Finally,	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 regulators	 with	 medium	 levels	 of	
resources	are	more	active	networkers	than	regulators	with	high	levels	of	resources.	




The	analysis	 reveals	 the	existence	of	a	divide	between	regulators	 from	EU-15	and	




finding	 suggests	 that	 spontaneous	 regulatory	 collaboration	 may	 lead	 to	 the	











correlate	with	the	extent	of	 their	population	 (a	proxy,	 if	 imprecise,	 for	 the	size	of	
their	 market),	 the	 institutional	 economics	 literature	 argues	 that	 each	 regulatory	
authority	needs	to	fulfil	a	range	of	expert	tasks,	whatever	the	size	of	their	market	




the	hypothesis.	 This	 suggests	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	European	 context,	 even	 though	
regulatory	coordination	within	networks	had	scarce	impact	on	convergence,	it	may	
have	had	substantial	 impact	 in	terms	of	 improving	national	regulatory	governance	
beyond	what	national	resources	would	have	allowed	for.		
The	third	and	final	part	of	the	literature	goes	back	to	comparative	historical	analysis	






thesis	 is	 very	 dense	 empirically	 and	 contributes	 to	 several	 strands	 of	 research.	
Besides	contributing	to	the	literature	on	transnational	regulatory	networks	as	tackled	
in	 the	 international	 relations	 and	 international	 political	 economy	 fields,	 it	 also	
addresses	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 aid	 and	 technical	 assistance	 through	






The	empirical	 chapters	 are	 followed	by	 a	 short	 concluding	 chapter,	where	 I	 draw	
together	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research,	 its	 contributions	 and	 its	 limitations.	 I	 also	
outline	 two	 issues	 that	 represent	 promising	 avenues	 for	 future	 investigation	 of	










tradition,	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 of	 economic	 sectors	 of	 global	




Henriksen	 and	 Ponte	 2018).	 This	 literature	 understands	 and	 analyses	 networks	
through	the	lens	of	milestone	contributions	on	neoliberal	institutionalism		(Keohane	
and	 Nye	 1974,	 Keohane	 1982,	 Keohane	 1988,	 Keohane	 1998)	 and	 international	
regimes	(Haas	1975,	Krasner	1981,	Krasner	1982)	as	alternatives	to	realism	to	bring	
order	into	the	anarchy	of	transnational	relations.	
In	 the	 same	 period,	 a	 burgeoning	 literature	 focused	 specifically	 on	 networks	 of	
European	regulators	also	emerged,	and	has	kept	developing	to	this	day	(Eberlein	and	
Grande	2005,	 Tarrant	 and	Kelemen	2007,	Coen	and	Thatcher	2008,	 Thatcher	 and	
Coen	2008,	Lavrijssen	and	Hancher	2009,	Levi-Faur	2011,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2011,	
Yesilkagit	 2011,	 Van	 Boetzelaer	 and	 Princen	 2012,	Maggetti	 2013,	 Danielsen	 and	
Yesilkagit	2014,	Egeberg,	Trondal	et	al.	2014,	Maggetti	and	Gilardi	2014,	Blauberger	
and	 Rittberger	 2015,	 Vestlund	 2015,	 Blauberger	 and	 Rittberger	 2015b,	 Mathieu	
2016).	 For	 the	 most	 part,	 the	 contributions	 in	 this	 literature	 stem	 from	 an	
acknowledgement	of	the	uniquely	peculiar	economic-political	construction	the	EU	is,	
and	therefore	tend	to	understand	and	analyse	networks	through	that	lens,	variously	









examined	 networks	 of	 European	 regulators	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sectors,	 from	 the	
environment	to	competition	policy	to	banking.	Since,	however,	infrastructure	sectors	









In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 outline	 the	 strands	 of	 literature	 that	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 and	
contributes	to.	I	begin	by	noting	that,	somehow	surprisingly,	this	rich	literature	on	
regulatory	 networks	 rarely	 relies	 on	 a	 body	 of	 knowledge,	 which	 is	 extremely	
relevant	 to	the	study	of	collaboration	between	public	administrators,	wherever	 in	
the	world:	the	political	science	literature	on	policy	networks.	I	then	survey	the	key	
tenets	 and	 findings	 of	 existing	 approaches	 to	 the	 study	 of	 regulatory	 networks.	
Subsequently,	 I	 identify	 the	main	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 concerns	 approaches,	
topics	and	methods.	 I	 then	 justify	 the	 focus	on	energy	 regulators	and	explain	 the	
different	challenges	that	they	encounter	compared	to	regulators	of	other	economic	




The	 literature	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 has	 an	 important,	 if	 rarely	 acknowledged,	
predecessor	 in	 the	 literature	on	group	politics	 (John	2012).	 In	 turn,	 the	 theory	of	







triangles”	 label	 derives	 from	 this	 literature	 and	 described	 US	 policy	 making	 as	
happening	within	 a	 triangle	 featuring	Congressional	 committees,	 bureaucrats	 and	
interest	 groups	 (Freeman	 and	 Stevens	 1987).	 This	 literature	 entered	 the	 study	of	
British	politics	via	landmark	contributions	such	as	Heclo	and	Wildavsky	(1974),	who	
studied	 the	 UK	 budgeting	 process	 and	 Richardson	 and	 Jordan	 (1979),	 who	
distinguished	 specific	 “policy	 styles”	 determining	 the	 structure	 of	 interpersonal	
relations	in	the	networks	of	public	policy	making.		




the	British,	 the	German	and	 the	Dutch	 school.	 These	 three	 schools	 differ	 in	 their	
understanding	of	the	function	of	policy	networks,	although	they	are	relatively	similar	
in	their	evaluation	of	the	desirable	outcomes	of	network	collaboration:	better	policy.	
The	 British	 school	 understands	 policy	 networks	 as	 instruments	 of	 interest	
intermediation.	Key	contributions	(Marsh	and	Rhodes	1992,	Marsh	and	Smith	2000)	





it	 considers	 essential	 to	 ensure	 productive	 network	 collaboration	 (Kenis	 and	
Schneider	 1991,	 Raab	 and	 Kenis	 2006,	 Provan	 and	 Kenis	 2008,	 Kenis	 and	 Provan	
2009)	
The	main	 criticism	addressed	 to	policy	network	 studies	 concerns	 their	 inability	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 networks	 are	 a	 determinant	 of	 policy	 decision	 and	 their	 overly	








analytical	 methods.	 At	 any	 rate,	 this	 literature	 was	 first	 in	 problematizing	 the	
complex	 patterns	 of	 informal	 networking	 among	 stakeholders,	 and	 seeking	 to	
evaluate	their	relevance	to	policy-making	and	influence	on	policy	outcomes	(O'Toole	
Jr	1997).	The	perceived	failure	of	the	policy	network	approach	to	explain	how	policy	
outcomes	 are	 due	 to	 networks	 may	 explain	 why	 contributions	 on	 transnational	





study	 of	 European	 policy	 networks:	 networks	 comprising	 all	 sorts	 of	 actors	 are	
virtually	 boundless,	 rendering	 the	 network	 concept	 unable	 to	 clearly	 specify	 its	
object.	 Sectoral	 networks	 of	 regulators,	 instead,	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 definitional	
ambiguities.	
Because	there	is	usually	one	regulatory	authority	(covering	one	or	multiple	sectors)	
per	 country,	 regulatory	 networks	 tend	 to	 be	 transnational	 –	 which	 attracted	 the	
interest	of	international	relations	scholars.	Indeed,	very	often,	literature	reviews	on	
transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 begin	 by	 mentioning	 Anne-Marie	 Slaughter’s	
(2004c)	 influential	 contribution,	 which	 acknowledged	 the	 emergence	 of	 “a	 new	
world	 order”.	 This	 contribution	 and	 the	 literature	 it	 spawned	 emerged	 at	 least	 a	
decade	 after	 the	 debate	 on	 policy	 networks	 in	 political	 science,	 and	 portrayed	
regulatory	networks	as	embodying	an	important	conceptual	shift	in	the	international	
system:	 from	 a	 system	 of	 unitary	 states	 negotiating	 within	 the	 framework	 of	
supranational	 institutions	 to	 a	 system	 of	 interactions	 among	 various	 (legislative,	
regulatory,	 judicial)	 components	 of	 the	 state,	 which	 interact	 across	 borders	 in	





and	develop	best	practices,	 besides	offering	 technical	 assistance	and	professional	
socialization	 to	 their	members.	These	 findings	are	common	to	previous	studies	of	
policy	networks.	In	her	view,	networks	are	the	response	to	the	globalization	paradox	












come	 to	 include	 a	 vast	 range	 of	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 accountability	 of	 networks	
(Slaughter	2000a,	Slaughter	2004a,	Maggetti	2010)	and	the	homogenizing	power	of	
regulatory	transfer	of	best	practices	throughout	the	world	(Raustiala	2002).	At	any	
rate,	 this	 research	 agenda	 set	 the	 foundations	 of	 continued	 academic	 and	 policy	
interest	in	understanding	transnational	networks	of	regulatory	officials.		
The	EU	pioneered	“regulation	by	networks”	as	a	mode	of	governance	when	faced	
with	 the	 conundrum	 of	 trying	 to	 achieve	 the	 extent	 of	 regulatory	 harmonization	
necessary	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 Single	 Market	 while	 avoiding	 the	 delegation	 of	
administrative	 and	 regulatory	 powers	 to	 European	 institutions	 (Sutherland	 1992,	
Hancher	1996,	Dehousse	1997).	The	European	Community’s	decision	to	encourage	
the	 coordination	 of	 regulatory	 practice	 between	 the	 representatives	 of	 national	
																																																						
1	In	her	most	recent	book	(Slaughter,	A.M.,	2017,	“The	chessboard	and	the	web:	Strategies	







Several	 contributions,	 notably	 Nicolaides	 (2004),	 Mintrom	 and	 Vergari	 (1998),	
Eberlein	 and	 Grande	 (2005),	 Eberlein	 and	 Newman	 (2008),	 Van	 Boetzelaer	 and	
Princen	(2012),	converge	on	identifying	as	the	main	rationale	of	European	Regulatory	
Networks	the	task	of	filling	the	governance	gap	between	the	national	and	the	supra-






stated	 aim	 of	 engendering	 regulatory	 convergence	 across	 the	 Member	 States	
(Maggetti	 2009,	Maggetti	 and	 Gilardi	 2011,	Maggetti	 2014,	Maggetti	 and	 Gilardi	
2014).	The	findings	of	these	contributions	show	a	mixed	record	of	effectiveness:	for	
instance,	whereas	the	network	of	European	regulators	of	securities	appears	to	have	







the	 distributional	 implications	 of	 regulatory	 harmonization	 would	 be	 politically	
damaging	(Kelemen	and	Tarrant	2011,	Tarrant	and	Kelemen	2017).	According	to	this	
view,	networks	are	created	with	the	declared	intent	not	to	achieve	convergence.	It	









increasing	 regulators’	 powers	 (Maggetti	 2013),	 even	 though	 not	 their	 budgets,	
expanding	 their	autonomy	 (Yesilkagit	2011,	Danielsen	and	Yesilkagit	2014),	create	
new	common	resources	(Vestlund	2015).	Moreover,	recent	contributions	have	taken	
an	 historical	 perspective	 on	 European	 regulatory	 networks,	 given	 that,	 although	
apparently	unable	to	bring	about	convergence,	they	have	been	operating	for	over	
two	 decades.	 These	 contributions	 have	 illustrated	 that,	 through	 their	 networks,	
national	 regulators	were	able	 to	establish	 the	dialogic	 relationship	with	European	











overwhelmingly	 on	 the	 character	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 and	 across	
bureaucratic	as	well	as	governmental	levels.	However,	these	relationships	are	usually	
phrased	in	terms	of	federalism	and	intergovernmentalism.	Childs	(2001)	and	Beecher	

























governance”	 polity	 defines	 the	 formation	 of	 coalitions	 of	 interest	 around	 certain	
“issue	areas”	(Heclo	1978),	encompassing	different	types	of	actors	placed	at	different	
governance	 levels	 (Piattoni	 2010).	 Networks	 of	 national	 regulators,	 however,	
exemplify	a	typology	of	network	governance	that	is	not	adequately	captured	by	the	
network	 governance	 metaphor	 (Piattoni	 2010).	 First	 and	 foremost,	 networks	 of	
national	regulators	gather	one	type	of	actor	(regulators)	placed	at	one	territorial	level	




These	 differences	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 MLG	 literature	 and	 the	 literature	 on	
regulatory	networks	have	rarely	met.	Yet,	the	multi-level	governance	literature	and	
the	 inter-governmental	 and	 cooperative	 federalism	 literature	 in	 the	 USA	 share	
important	commonalities	in	terms	of	the	goals	they	pursue	and	the	questions	they	
ask:	what	are	the	conditions	for	collaboration	across	levels	of	governance	to	deliver	
















the	 literature,	 networks	 never	 change	 in	 either	 shape,	 mission	 or	 rationale);	
homogeneity	(although	regulatory	authorities	are	the	same	type	of	institutions,	they	
differ	greatly	from	jurisdiction	to	jurisdiction);	passivity	(network	members	are	not	
merely	 implementing	 the	 directives	 of	 their	 political	 principals);	 and	 isolation	
(networks	 are	 often	 discussed	 as	 if	 they	 were	 isolated	 from	 their	 external	
institutional	environment).	There	needs	to	be	space	in	the	literature	for	discussing	
the	 conditions	 leading	 to	 spontaneous	network	 collaboration;	 how	and	when	 the	
rationale	 of	 network	 collaboration	may	 change;	 and	 how	 the	 differences	 among	
network	members	 in	 terms	 of	 resources,	 expertise,	 independence	 etc	may	 affect	
patterns	of	collaboration.	
	












both	 temporally	 contiguous	 and	 rapidly	 unfolding.	 In	 the	 process,	we	miss	 a	 lot.”	
(Pierson	 2003,	 p.	 178).	 Many	 contributions	 focusing	 on	 European	 Regulatory	
Networks	(ERNs)	are	clear	examples	of	these	attitude:	on	the	one	hand,	contributors	
disregard	the	voluntary	networks	of	regulators	that	preceded	the	establishment	of	
ERNs	 and	 emerged	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 bottom	 up	 initiative	 of	 national	 regulatory	
authorities	(see	for	instance	Maggetti	2013a	and	2013b);	on	the	other	hand,	virtually	
no	 contributors	 have	 seriously	 attempted	 to	 explain	 the	 persistence	 of	 these	
voluntary	networks	once	the	corresponding	European	Regulatory	Network	or	even	
the	 corresponding	 European	 Regulatory	 Agency	 had	 been	 created	 (although	 see	
Thatcher	2011).		





has	 engaged	 in	 investigation	 of	 regulatory	 networks	 in	 a	 historical	 perspective	




Second,	 I	 consider	 that	 the	 predominant	 functional	 approach	 to	 explaining	 the	
existence	 of	 regulatory	 networks	 is	 overly	 constraining	 in	 analytical	 as	 well	 as	
conceptual	 terms.	 Moreover,	 it	 attributes	 all	 the	 agency	 of	 establishing	 and	
maintaining	 networks	 to	 the	 single	 goal	 of	 achieving	 regulatory	 convergence.	
Recently,	the	literature	has	begun	shifting	its	attention	to	the	study	of	networks	from	






very	 limited	 number	 of	 cases	 in	 order	 to	 gauge	 regulators’	 perceptions	 of	 their	
networks.	 Although	 studies	 emphasising	 the	 socialization	 aspect	 of	 regulatory	











for	 discovering	 the	 rationale	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 cooperation.	 Specifically,	
this	 research	 looks	 within	 networks	 to	 find	 these	 responses,	 rather	 than	 outside	
networks,	and	investigates	their	thrust	through	the	perceptions,	the	memories	and	
the	assessments	of	regulators.	





of	 regulatory	 networks	 and	 is	 deeply	 problematic	 because,	 by	 overlooking	 the	
motivations	 of	 the	 agents	 of	 cooperation,	 it	 neglects	 its	 very	 essence.	 Relational	
patterns	within	networks	as	well	as	between	networks	and	political	referents	(in	the	
case	 of	 networks	 of	 regulators	 in	 a	 macro-regional	 or	 federal	 setting,	 like	 the	
European	 Union	 or	 the	 United	 States,	 these	 exist	 at	 both	 domestic	 and	





The	 fifth	 limitation	 of	 existing	 scholarship	 addressed	 in	 this	 thesis	 concerns	 the	
methods	of	investigation.	At	first	sight,	it	is	surprising	to	notice	that	the	vast	majority	
of	the	literature	on	regulatory	networks	does	not	rely	on	network	analysis	in	order	
to	 investigate	networks.	 In	their	 insightful	 review	of	 the	treatment	of	networks	 in	
public	administration	scholarship,	Isett,	Mergel	et	al.	(2011)	highlight	three	main	uses	





The	 utilitarian	 and	 metaphorical	 approaches	 predominate	 over	 methodological	
contributions	 on	 network	 structures.	 A	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 literature,	 however,	





convergence	 or	 harmonization.	 Yet,	 quantitative	 network	 analysis	 offers	 a	 rich	
reservoir	of	possibilities	for	the	researcher	of	networks,	allowing	for	the	discovery	of	




the	 actors	 in	 an	 attributed	 network	 (meaning	 a	 group	 where	 the	 network	 paradigm	 is	
applied)	must	acknowledge	and	accept	that	they	operate	in	a	network	for	it	to	actually	be	a	
network.”	(Isett	et	al	2011,	p.	i160).	This	necessity	has	represented	a	further	strong	reason	
to	 rely	 on	 interviews	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 research:	 transnational	 networks	 of	












sectors,	 followed	 by	 liberalization	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 promoting	 competition	 and	
accompanied	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 regulatory	 institutions.	 Socio-economic	





(Elkins,	Guzman	et	 al.	 2006)	 are	 only	 some	of	 the	 causes	 adduced	by	 scholars	 to	
explain	why	and	how,	over	 the	course	of	 two	decades,	nearly	all	 countries	of	 the	
world	 adopted	 very	 similar	 kinds	 of	 economic	 reforms,	 including	 in	 their	
infrastructure	industries.		
The	 infrastructure	 sector	 privatization	 reforms	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Thatcher	
government	in	the	late	1970s	had	enormous	impact	worldwide.	Even	though	utility	
regulation	had	been	practiced	already	for	over	a	century	in	the	USA,	it	had	always	
had	 the	 purpose	 of	 replacing,	 not	 promoting,	 competition;	 the	 British	 reforms	
introduced	 the	 notion	 of	 regulation	 promoting	 competition	 and	 markets.	 The	
accompanying	 establishment	 of	 independent	 regulatory	 authorities	 was	 also	
followed	with	great	interest	by	practitioners	and	observers	alike.	The	combination	of	
privatization,	 re-regulation	 and	 introduction	 of	 competition	 has	 entered	 the	
economics	but	also	the	public	policy	literature	under	the	notion	of	“British	model”	
(Stern	2014).		
This	 influence	 was	 primarily	 felt	 across	 the	 European	 Union.	 Before	 European	














capital	 intensity	 and	 minimum	 economic	 scale;	 non-storability	 with	 fluctuating	
demand;	 locational	 specificity	 generating	 location	 rents;	 essentiality	 for	 the	
community;	 involving	 direct	 connection	 to	 customers	 (1996,	 p.	 2).	 The	 last	 two	
characteristics,	 which	 imply	 large	 exploitative	 power	 by	 the	 producer,	 render	









considerably,	 increasing	 the	 size	 of	 the	 interconnected	network	of	 electricity	 grid	
lines	 and	 gas	 pipelines	 leads	 to	 substantial	 increases	 in	 efficiency.	 The	 strategic	
importance	of	energy	for	security	and	economic	purposes,	however,	has	determined	
the	fact	that	most	electricity	and	gas	infrastructure	systems	have	been	built	in	order	














and	economic	 issues.	These	 issues	represent	the	policy	rationale	 for	 transnational	














thoroughly	 investigated,	 such	 network	 is	 the	 Basel	 Committee	 on	 Banking	
Supervision	 (Zaring	1998,	Verdier	2009,	Zaring	2009,	Zaring	2012,	Goldbach	2015,	
Reisenbichler	2015).		








or	 financial	 and	 insurance	 sector	 regulators	 eased	 the	 task	of	 investigating	 them,	
given	the	appearance	of	reliable	longitudinal	data	on	their	membership,	decisions,	
and	 meetings.	 Transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 have	 been	 understood	 as	 the	
coordinated	 regulatory	 response	 to	 the	 mobility	 of	 capital,	 which	 would	 enable	
regulatory	forum	shopping	and	races	to	the	bottom	of	regulatory	standards.	






the	world.	 A	 considerable	 amount	 of	 research	 on	 European	Regulatory	Networks	
displays	 the	 same	 sectoral	 focus.	 However,	 the	 specificities	 of	 these	 sectors	 are	
rarely,	 if	ever,	acknowledged.	Contrary	 to	 financial	 services,	 infrastructure	sectors	
are	territorially	bound	natural	monopolies.	This	means	that	it	is	anti-economical	to	
build	two	or	more	infrastructure	systems	in	any	given	territorial	unit,	hence	affording	
a	 monopoly	 position	 to	 the	 owner	 and/or	 manager	 of	 the	 infrastructure.	 The	
conditions	at	which	this	monopoly	is	held	are	the	object	of	regulation.	
Nowadays,	 the	 telecommunications	 sector	 appears	 to	 have	nearly	 lost	 its	 natural	
monopoly	 characteristics.	 Technological	 innovation	has	 rendered	 Information	 and	
Communication	Technologies	(ICT)	markets	more	and	more	contestable.	Moreover,	
telecommunications	represent	the	 infrastructure	sector	that	 is	most	embedded	 in	
international	 institutional	 arrangements:	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organizations	 (WTO)	
agreements	 cover	 telecommunications	 services,	 and	 stipulate	 the	 obligation	 for	
countries	to	establish	a	separate	regulatory	agency	for	the	sector;	the	International	
Telecommunications	Union	(ITU)	is	the	long-standing	United	Nations	agency	for	the	
ICT	 sector,	 involving	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 and	 providing	 for	 technical	
standards.	 None	 of	 this	 applies	 to	 the	 electricity	 and	 gas	 sectors.	 The	 relevant	
infrastructures	 retain	 very	 strong	 natural	 monopoly	 characteristics.	 Liberalization	





single	world	agency	or	organization,	 comparable	 to	 the	 ITU,	exists	 for	 the	energy	
sector3.		









Moreover,	 because	 the	 provision	 of	 energy	 service	 has	 a	 very	 visible,	 direct	 and	
measurable	(through	the	bills	and	through	the	outages)	impact	on	the	quality	of	life	
of	 the	 citizenry,	 it	 has	 the	 characteristic	 of	 being	 at	 once	extremely	 complex	 and	
extremely,	immediately	political.	If	the	core	of	the	regulatory	problem	in	globalized	
financial	services	is	taming	swift	capital	mobility,	regulators	of	infrastructure	sectors	
have	 to	 tackle	 the	 opposite	 issue:	 sunk	 costs.	 In	 other	words,	 capital	 invested	 in	















rationale	 for	 network	 coordination	 for	 regulators	 of	 infrastructure	 sectors	 is,	
therefore,	 qualitatively	 different	 from	 that	 of	 regulators	 of	 financial	 services.	 The	
latter	 have	 to	 tame	 capital;	 the	 former	 have	 to	 attract	 it.	 Hence,	 the	 underlying	
determinants	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 are	 sector	 specific.	 Moreover,	 the	
inescapable	 territorial	 dimension	 of	 infrastructure	 renders	 regulatory	 authorities	
constrained	not	only	 in	their	 jurisdiction,	but	also	in	their	autonomy	from	political	













network	 and	 exchange	 information	 is	 treated	 as	 almost	 self-evident,	 plausibly	
because	the	policy	 literature	has	established	that	exchange	of	 information	among	
stakeholders	 is	conducive	to	policy	 input	 (König	and	Bräuninger	1998,	Coen	2005)	
and/or	because	the	new	institutional	economics	approach	recognized	in	asymmetric	
information	 between	 regulators	 and	 companies	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 to	









an	 external	 agent	 (that	 they	 call	 brokered).	 Within	 the	 brokered/non-brokered	




interest	 in	 the	 network	 objectives,	 takes	 up	 the	 role	 of	 lead	 organization.	 This	
member	may	provide	administration	 for	 the	network	and	underwrite	 the	 relative	
costs,	or	seek	access	to	external	funding.	In	the	third	mode,	networks	are	governed	
“by	 a	 unique	 network	 administrative	 organization	 (NAO)	 which	 may	 be	 either	
voluntarily	 established	 by	 network	members	 or	mandated	 as	 part	 of	 the	 network	
formation	 process”	 (p.	 234).	 Provan	 and	 Kenis’	 framework	 is	 parsimonious	 and	








this	 evidence	 to	 point	 to	 some	 of	 the	 motivations	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	
literature	 on	 regulatory	 networks	 but	 also	 on	 regulatory	 agencies:	 for	 instance,	 I	
expect	regulatory	networks	to	emerge	during	policy	crises	or	policy	change,	in	line	
with	assessments	reached	by	Bernstein	(1955)	and	Downs	(1967).	Interdependence	
is	 plausibly	 going	 to	 prove	 pivotal	 in	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 desirability	 of	












undergoing	 a	 process	 of	 consolidation.	 Transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 usually	
display	some	elements	of	formalization,	such	as	legal	registration	(usually	as	not-for-




The	 sociological	 literature	 on	 inter-organizational	 networks	 provides	 useful	
instruments	 to	 understand	 the	 developments	 leading	 from	 a	 phase	 of	 network	
existence	to	the	next.	In	his	study	of	inter-organizational	relationships,	Powell	(1995)	
contends	 that	 trust,	 which	 is	 necessary	 for	 networks	 to	 be	 viable	 (Uzzi	 1997),	 is	
actually	 a	 product	 of	 interaction	 rather	 than	 a	 precondition	 for	 it	 (a	 point	
underpinning	 the	 arguments	 made	 in	 Slaughter	 (2017)).	 Drawing	 from	 game	
theoretic	contributions,	Powell	affirms	that	organizations	decide	to	network	when	




requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 some	 governance	 structures	 to	 allow	 for	 constant	
monitoring	and	consultation,	leading	to	institutionalization.		
Therefore,	the	second	research	question	guiding	this	research	is:	
2. What	 explains	 the	 consolidation/formalization	 of	 transnational/trans-
jurisdictional	networks	of	energy	regulators?		
The	answers	that	are	present	in	the	literature	include	growth	in	size	and	importance,	





to	 the	 dimension	 of	 the	 network.	 They	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 consider	 whether	 the	
relationship	between	network	members	and	their	external	institutional	environment	
may	explain	the	transition	of	a	network	from	a	looser	to	a	more	consolidated	state.	
Yet,	 this	 is	 a	 plausible	 hypothesis,	 given	 that	 regulators	 exist	 within	 complex	
institutional	systems	or	regulatory	spaces	(Hancher	and	Moran	1989),	populated	by	
a	myriad	other	actors.	
One	 of	 the	 main	 goals	 of	 this	 research	 is	 investigating	 the	 concrete	 usage	 that	
individual	 regulatory	 authorities	 make	 of	 their	 network	 ties.	 In	 examining	 the	












frequent	 network	 partners,	 therefore	 pushing	 them	 to	 establish	 direct	 links	with	
those.	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 this	 hypothesis,	 I	 rely	 on	 the	 ‘Varieties	 of	 Capitalism’	
approach,	 which	 has	 recently	 been	 shown	 to	 affect	 the	 character	 of	 regulatory	
institutions	(Guardiancich	and	Guidi	2016).	I	use	the	approach	as	a	heuristic	in	the	



















Historical	 researchers	 have	made	wide	 use	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 path	 dependence	 to	
explain	the	longevity	of	institutions.	According	to	this	approach,	institutions	emerge	
when	a	path-breaking	event	 (referred	 to	 in	 this	 literature	 as	 a	 “critical	 juncture”)	
occurs,	“moving	the	pressure	on	the	status	quo	to	a	new,	much	higher	level	–	very	
close	 to	 the	 threshold	 level	 for	 major	 political	 change”	 (Pierson	 2003,	 p.	 213).	
Outcomes	at	critical	junctures	induce	path	dependent	processes,	creating	“dynamics	
of	 self-reinforcing	 or	 positive	 feedback	 processes	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	
















at	 the	“front	end”	of	 institutional	emergence	and	more	agency	at	 the	“back	end”	
(2003,	 p.	 225).	 This	 means,	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 considering	 the	 role	 that	 existing	
structures	 played	 when	 path-breaking	 events	 led	 to	 institutional	 creation,	 by	




actors	 going	 forward;	 Thelen	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 they	 may	 also	 represents	
opportunities.	This	approach	
“…helps	understanding	why,	over	time,	institutional	arrangements	may	come	






Over	 time,	 networks	 may	 evolve	 in	 response	 to	 a	 changed	 environment	 that	
confronts	them	with	new	problems	and	challenges	that	they	address	by	using	the	
existing	structure	to	new	purposes.	They	do	so	via	a	process	of	layering,	i.e.	by	either	
partially	 renegotiating	 some	 elements	 of	 their	 mandate,	 while	 leaving	 others	 in	
place;	 or	 via	 conversion,	 i.e.	 by	 redirecting	 the	 network	 to	 new	 purposes.	 These	
themes	 emerge	 in	 early	 American	 literature	 on	 “life	 cycle”	models	 of	 both	 state	









affected	 groups	 who	 begin	 pressurizing	 government	 to	 protect	 their	 interests.	
Conflict	between	these	groups	and	the	groups	to	be	regulated	ensues.	Protracted	
struggle	 ends	 when	 a	 statute	 with	 vague	 wording	 is	 passed	 and	 regulatory	
commissions	are	created.	During	its	youth,	the	regulatory	commission	operates	in	a	
conflictual	 environment	 and	 aggressively	 fulfils	 its	 mandate,	 while	 accumulating	
experience.	 Over	 time,	 the	 policy	 crisis	 giving	 rise	 to	 regulation	 dissipates	 as	 the	




Downs’	 (1967)	 life	cycle	of	bureaus	also	seeks	 to	explain	 the	ultimate	 rigidity	and	
capture	 of	 regulatory	 agencies	 by	 the	 regulated	 industry.	 Initially,	 the	 bureau	
emerges	from	the	demand	for	regulation	but	must	seek	external	support	in	order	to	
survive,	 as	 the	 groups	 supporting	 it	 conflicts	 with	 other	 groups.	 The	 bureau	 is	
vulnerable	 to	 termination	 initially,	 but	 overcomes	 its	 “survival	 threshold”	 and	
stabilizes	once	it	is	able	to	offer	useful	services	and	to	routinize	relationships	with	its	
major	 clients.	 The	 bureau	 grows	 because	 over	 time	 it	 learns	 to	 perform	 better,	
develops	 rules	and	procedures	and	records	 its	own	experience.	Competition	 from	
















Network	 expansion	 may	 entail	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 functions	 performed	 by	 the	
network,	of	 the	 issue	areas	 it	concerns	 itself	with,	or	of	 its	membership.	Network	
expansion	 may	 also	 mean	 establishing	 connections	 with	 new	 clients	 for	 new	
purposes.	 Expansion	 takes	 place	 as	 the	 networks	 continues	 to	 fulfil	 some	 of	 its	
original	tasks,	whose	usefulness	to	network	members	is	still	high	even	though	it	has	




This	 research	 revolves	 around	 a	 few	 important	 concepts,	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	
define.	In	many	places	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	I	argue	that	regulators	network	
for	 legitimacy.	 I	 also	make	 references	 to	 regulators’	 credibility	 and	 reputation	 as	
being	enhanced	by	networking.	 	Further,	 I	show	that	the	agency	of	regulators	 is	a	
crucial	 determinant	 of	 network	 structure;	 and	 that	 regulators	 can	 be	 network	
entrepreneurs.	The	topic	of	the	legitimacy	of	regulatory	decision-making	permeates	

















and	 those	on	behalf	of	whom	 it	purports	 to	govern”	 (Black	2008,	p.144).	 In	other	
words,	a	regulator	needs	to	be	perceived	to	be	legitimate	by	those	affected	by	their	
decision.	The	legal	legitimacy	inherent	in	the	statutes	of	the	regulatory	authority	is	
not	 sufficient	 for	market	 actors	 to	 deem	 the	 regulator	 legitimate;	 if	 they	 do	 not	
consider	the	regulator	legitimate,	affected	interests	have	little	incentive	to	conform	
to	the	regulator’s	decisions.	In	other	words,	regulators	need	to	possess	legitimacy	in	
order	 to	 induce	 the	 hoped-for	 behavioural	 responses	 (Black	 2008,	 p.148).	
Importantly,	regulators	are	not	just	passive	recipients	of	legitimacy	but	can	actively	
construct	 their	 own	 legitimacy	 (Black	 2008,	 p.146),	 including	 by	 forming	 and	
maintaining	 ties	 to	 organizations	 in	 their	 institutional	 environment,	 which	 are	
perceived	 to	 be	 legitimate	 by	 those	 whose	 legitimacy	 claims	 they	 want	 to	meet	
(Meyer	 and	 Rowan	 1977).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 multi-level	 governance,	 individual	
regulators	 need	 to	 establish	 their	 legitimacy	 both	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 industry	 and	 of	
domestic	and	supranational	political	institutions.	By	networking	across	jurisdictions,	
regulation	conquer	an	 intermediary	 space	between	 levels	of	governance	 (Jordana	
2017),	which	they	can	leverage	to	increase	their	legitimacy	in	both	directions.		
Furthermore,	 I	contend	that	regulators	network	 in	order	to	boost	their	credibility.	
One	 of	 the	main	 rationale	 for	 delegation	 of	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 independent	
regulatory	 bodies	 at	 national	 level	 has	 been,	 indeed,	 enhancing	 the	 credibility	 of	
regulatory	policy	(Majone	1994,	Gilardi	2002).	The	need	for	credible	regulatory	policy	
is	heightened	in	the	context	of	market	integration,	as	uncertainty	and	differences	in	
legal,	 economic	 and	 institutional	 traditions	 impose	 further	 costs	 on	 industry.	 As	 I	
show	 in	 this	 research,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 multi-level	 governance	 systems,	 the	








governance	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 policy	 strengthens	 the	 credibility	 of	 regulatory	
commitments	at	both	domestic	and	supranational	level.		
The	 notion	 of	 reputation	 is	 very	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 mechanism	 of	 regulatory	
networking	and	 the	 regulators’	 legitimacy	and	 role	 in	policy	 formulation.	 I	do	not	
tackle	 the	 link	 between	 networking	 and	 reputation	 directly.	 However,	 interviews	
suggested	 that	 regulators	 perceived	 that	 collaboration	 within	 networks	 had	
reputation-enhancing	effects	on	them.	Arguably,	reputation	is	one	of	the	main	assets	
of	regulatory	bodies.	So	important	that	regulators	with	lower	levels	of	expertise	may	
even	be	overly	generous	with	 industry	 in	order	to	prevent	 industry	from	exposing	
their	lower	competence	and	ruining	their	reputation	(Leaver	2009).	A	reputation	for	
impartial,	 informed,	expert	decision-making	has	several	positive	consequences	 for	
regulators:	 it	 enhances	 their	 legitimacy	 (Schrefler	 2012),	 it	 produces	 desirable	
behavioural	responses	in	regulated	entities	(Cambini	and	Rondi	2011),	and	it	protects	
the	 regulators’	 autonomy	 (Carpenter	 2001)	 from	 political	 interference.	 Recent	
literature	has	argued	that	regulators’	willingness	to	cooperate	with	other	institutions	
depends	 on	 their	 calculations	 of	 the	 reputational	 benefits	 of	 the	 cooperation	







word	as	meaning,	essentially,	 turf,	 i.e.	a	regulatory	authority’s	 jurisdiction	(Wilson	
1980).	I	also	use	the	words	“sphere	of	authority”	to	convey	the	same	concept.	The	
reason	why	I	use	“control”	in	the	text,	rather	than	“turf”,	is	that	“control”	is	the	word	
used	by	many	of	my	 interviewees.	All	 through	the	analysis,	 I	often	emphasise	the	










This	becomes	particularly	evident	 in	the	 last	part	of	the	thesis,	where	 I	depict	the	
emergence	of	the	network	of	Euro-Mediterranean	energy	regulators	(MedReg)	as	an	
act	of	network	entrepreneurship.		
The	historical	 reconstructions	 in	 this	 thesis	 show	 that	network	emergence	always	
appears	 to	 be	 due	 to	 the	 initiative	 of	 specific	 individuals.	 However,	 the	 case	 of	
MedReg	is	different	from	all	others.	The	other	three	regulatory	networks	studied	in	
this	 thesis	 emerged	 in	 very	 similar	 circumstances:	 radical	 reform,	 uncertainty,	





who	 possess	 considerable	 expertise	 and	 enjoy	 strong	 reputation	 (Arnold	 2014).	







in	 terms	 of	 results	 (Mahoney	 and	 Rueschemeyer	 2003).	 This	 approach	 combines	









an	 outcome	 within	 specific	 cases.	 As	 such,	 it	 finds	 its	 roots	 and	 most	 common	














tests	 confirming	 or	 disconfirming	 the	 hypothesised	mechanism	 (Mahoney,	 2012).	
Process	tracing	can	be	used	not	only	to	test	theory,	but	also	to	generate	it	(Van	Evera,	
1997;	 Beach	 and	 Pedersen,	 2012),	 raising	 issues	 of	 external	 validity,	 to	 be	 tested	
through	application	of	the	theory	generated	to	other	cases.		
From	the	standpoint	of	historical	 institutionalism,	institutions	are	characterized	by	
stability	 or	 constrained,	 adaptive	 change.	 The	 concept	 of	 path-dependence,	 as	
previously	 mentioned,	 underlies	 this	 view.	 Any	 explanation	 of	 the	 regulatory	
networks	considered	here	must	adopt	the	logic	of	path-dependence,	since	they	have	
outlived	their	initial	raisons	d'être,	sometimes	quite	considerably.	The	perspective	of	








points	 for	 new	 path-dependent	 processes	 (Collier	 and	 Collier,	 1991;	 Mahoney,	
2001a,	2001b).	“Critical	 junctures”	happen	 in	moments	of	political	 indeterminism,	
when	multiple	 courses	 of	 action	 are	 possible	 the	 usual	 structural	 constraints	 on	
action	 are	 relaxed,	 allowing	 “wilful	 actors”	 to	 shape	 circumstances	 “in	 a	 more	
voluntaristic	fashion	than	normal	circumstances	permit”	(Mahoney,	2001a,	p.	7).	
Historical	institutionalism	also	emphasizes	the	role	of	ideas	in	shaping	the	formation	
of	 institutions.	 However,	 ideas	 require	 individuals	 to	 be	 translated	 into	 an	
organization.	Hence,	agency	is	crucial	in	this	perspective.	This	is	why	I	chose	to	rely	
on	 elite	 interviews	 with	 individuals	 who	 were	 directly	 involved	 or	 well-informed	
about	the	events	retraced	in	this	research.	Elite	interviews	represent	the	necessary	
complement	to	documentary	and	archival	research	in	this	context,	as	many	of	the	
events,	 the	 actions,	 the	 choices	 made	 by	 actors	 at	 the	 inception	 of	 network	
cooperation	have	never	been	recorded,	if	not	in	some	memo	notes	buried	in	these	
actors’	desks.	Interviewees	were	selected	according	to	purposive	sampling:	my	aim	
was	 to	 talk	 to	 individuals	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 establishment	 and/or	 the	
management	of	each	of	the	networks	considered	as	well	as	to	individuals	who	are	
(or	have	been)	“simple”	network	members.	I	was	acquainted	with	several	key	actors	




among	 regulators.	 SNA	 is	 a	 powerful	 tool	 of	 analysis	 because	 it	 allows	 for	 the	
measurement	 of	 physically	 immaterial	 relationship	 structures	 that	 constitute	 the	
fabric	of	networked	cooperation.	Through	SNA,	one	can	analyse	regulatory	networks	
in	 relational	 terms	 rather	 than	 in	 organizational	 ones.	 The	 interplay	 between	
structure	 and	 agency	 that	 is	 encountered	 when	 analysing	 networks	 is	 also	






I	 gathered	 complete	 network	 data	 from	 regulators.	 I	 asked	 the	 Communication	
Officers	of	each	member	regulatory	authority	the	following	question:	“Think	of	the	







1. The	 National	 Association	 of	 Regulatory	 Utility	 Commissioners	 (NARUC)	
comprising	50	state	level	utility	regulators	from	the	United	States	of	America	
(USA).	
2. The	 Council	 of	 European	 Energy	 Regulators	 (CEER)	 comprising	 28	 full	
members	from	the	28	Member	States	of	the	European	Union	(EU).	
3. The	 Energy	 Regional	 Regulatory	 Association	 (ERRA)	 comprising	 initially	 24	
members	 from	 countries	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 and	 the	 New	
Independent	States	(CEE/NIS).	
4. The	Association	of	Mediterranean	Energy	Regulators	(MedReg)	comprising	24	
members	 from	21	countries	 in	 the	EU-defined	Euro-Mediterranean	region,	
comprising	Southern	European	Member	States,	Accession	countries	to	the	EU	
and	most	of	the	countries	comprised	in	the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy.		
The	 first	 two	networks	 are	 non-brokered	networks,	 born	 out	 of	 the	 spontaneous	
initiatives	 of	 their	members	 (Provan	 and	 Kenis	 2008).	 NARUC	 and	 CEER	 are	 long	
standing	 actors	 in	 their	 respective	 regulatory	 space	 that	 have	 had	 significant	
influence	 on	 the	 policy	 process,	 as	 the	 chapters	 will	 outline.	 Chapter	 2	 and	 3	









contrast,	 MedReg	 is	 a	 transversal	 case:	 although	 CEER	 was	 not	 involved	 in	 its	
establishment	directly,	MedReg	originated	from	the	initiative	of	a	small	group	of	EU	
energy	regulators,	who	set	 it	up	on	the	basis	of	their	experience	within	CEER.	The	








ERRA,	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 intending	 to	 enter	 the	 EU.	
MedReg,	 in	 contrast,	 did	not	 emerge	out	of	 a	policy	 crisis	 or	 a	paradigm	change,	
entailing	 uncertainty	 and	 opportunity	 structures.	 Moreover,	 the	 so-called	 “Euro-




















official	 establishment,	usually	 tracing	 it	back	 to	 the	preferences	of	either	political	
principals	 or	 supranational	 institutions.	 The	 spontaneous,	 bottom-up	 origins	 of	
regulatory	 networks	 are	 sometimes	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 but	
rarely	 investigated.	 Yet,	 understanding	 the	 rationale	 of	 spontaneous	 regulatory	
networking	across	jurisdictions	is	key	to	understanding	why	regulators	network,	or,	
more	precisely,	 how	 they	benefit	 from	networking.	 This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 in	
systems	 of	 governance,	 articulated	 across	 multiple	 levels.	 In	 these	 systems,	
regulatory	 authority	 is	 distributed	 across	 levels	 to	 regulatory	 institutions,	 whose	











facing	 similar	 uncertainty	 and	 are	 therefore	 likely	 to	 be	 facing	 similar	 challenges.	
Hence,	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 first	 question	 is	 that	 similar	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 drive	
network	formation.	Regulators	begin	networking	for	expertise,	using	each	other	as	









surrounding	 them.	 Regulatory	 decisions	 have	 distributional	 as	 well	 as	 economic	
consequences.	In	other	words,	their	decisions	create	winners	and	losers.	As	a	result,	
regulators	 face	 domestic	 opposition	 from	 interests	 that	 are	 damaged	 by	 their	
decision-making.	Hence,	as	government	seeks	to	appease	constituencies,	regulators	
face	the	concrete	threat	of	losing	their	powers	and/or	see	their	autonomy	curtailed.	
Hence,	 regulatory	 networks	 emerge	 as	 organizational	 entities	 as	 a	 result	 of	
governance	 tensions	 that	 pose	 the	 continuous	 threat	 of	 partially	 reducing	 their	
powers	or	their	authority.		
Whenever	 this	 threat	 is	 common,	 regulators	 strengthen	 their	 collaboration	 by	
consolidating	their	network	into	a	representative	body	of	all	of	the	regulators	in	their	
jurisdictional	setting	(whereas	previously	smaller	subsets	of	regulators	in	the	multi-
level	 governance	 system	 would	 gather	 more	 frequently)	 displaying	 some	 of	 the	





(federal)	 institutions	 wielding	 supranational	 regulatory	 authority	 represented	 an	
enabling	factor	for	network	consolidation	and	participation	in	the	policy	process.	This	
opportunity	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 increasing	 the	 reputation	 of	 the	 regulators	 and	 of	
further	strengthening	the	network.		
I	focus	my	analysis	on	the	empirical	cases	of	the	National	Association	of	Regulatory	






in	 1884	 and	 was	 officially	 established	 in	 1889;	 CEER	 emerged	 in	 1997	 and	 was	
officially	established	in	2000.	Both	organizations	have	risen	from	being	constituted	
as	little	more	than	informal	professional	associations	to	becoming	key	actors	in	the	





over	 time,	 increasingly	 relied	 on	 regulatory	 policy,	 substituting	 “rowing”	 the	




of	 the	 regulatory	 state	has	been	associated	with	 the	 rise	of	 federal	agencies	and,	
more	generally,	of	the	federal	layer	of	government,	in	the	European	context	the	rise	
of	the	regulatory	state	has	been	qualified	both	as	the	rise	of	the	European	layer	of	






than	 a	 formality,	 their	 real	 identities	 having	 formed	 at	 different	 stages	 in	 their	




informs	 later	 events	 (Farrell	 and	 Newman	 2010,	 Farrell	 and	 Newman	 2014).	
However,	defining	the	moment	or	the	event	triggering	the	path-dependent	sequence	




tradition	are	 sometimes	accused	of	performing	arbitrarily	 (Capoccia	 and	Kelemen	
2007).	 “Critical	 junctures”	 are	 moments	 presenting	 institutional	 actors	 with	









• The	 critical	 juncture	 must	 be	 a	 moment	 characterized	 by	 political	
indeterminism	 and	 uncertainty,	 when	 multiple	 courses	 of	 action	 are	
possible	but	only	one	is	chosen	thanks	to	circumstances	combined	with	
the	agency	of	wilful	actors.	• The	length	of	the	critical	juncture	has	to	be	much	shorter	than	the	length	
of	 the	 process	 it	 generates:	 the	 briefer	 the	 juncture	 relative	 to	 the	
outcome,	the	more	critical	it	is	(they	call	this	measure	temporal	leverage).		• In	 order	 to	 identify	 a	 critical	 juncture,	 one	 should	 enquire	 on	 the	


















among	 the	elements	needed	 for	process	 tracing,	 as	 actors’	 perceptions,	 although	
biased,	 can	 shed	 light	 on	 decisions	 as	 well	 as	 non-decisions,	 given	 anticipated	






and	present)	within	 the	network:	 chairs,	 vice-chairs,	 executive	 directors	 and	 staff	
executives.	At	the	same	time,	I	interviewed	as	many	network	members	not	holding	
official	 leadership	 or	 coordinating	 roles	 in	 the	 network	 as	 time	 and	 resources	
allowed,	in	order	to	grasp	their	perceptions	of	the	network.	Finally,	I	also	interviewed	





generated	 them.	 Their	 importance	 grew,	 perhaps	 unexpectedly,	 for	 the	 response	
they	managed	to	articulate	to	certain	events.	In	the	case	of	NARUC,	regulators	were	
facing	the	threat	of	progressive	disempowerment	because	of	the	rise	of	the	federal	
level	 of	 government;	 in	 the	 case	 of	 CEER,	 regulators	 enjoyed	 progressive	





2. The	history	of	 the	NARUC:	defending	the	turf	of	 the	
Public	Utility	Commissions.	
The	long	history	of	utility	regulation	in	the	USA	is	also	the	long	history	of	the	NARUC.	
The	NARUC	membership	consists	of	utility	 regulators	 from	the	50	states	 (plus	 the	
District	 of	 Columbia,	 Puerto	 Rico	 and	 the	 Virgin	 Islands).	 Hence,	 it	 has	 a	




Childs	 (2001)	 provides	 the	 only	 thorough	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 NARUC,	











(Kolko	 1965,	 Kerr	 1968,	 Nice	 1987,	 Himmelberg	 1994,	 Kanazawa	 and	 Noll	 1994,	
Dobbin	 1995,	Dowd	and	Dobbin	 2001).	 The	 sequence	of	 events	 leading	 from	 the	
appearance	of	railroads	to	state	regulation	comprises	technological	progress,	abuse	






intervention	establishing	a	new	 institution	 for	 the	resolution	of	controversies:	 the	
Public	Utility	Commission	(PUC).		
In	 the	 late	 1820s,	 the	 steam-powered	 locomotive	 technology	 revolutionized	
transportation	 across	 the	 American	 states.	 The	 railroad	 increased	 the	 speed	 of	
transportation	across	the	main	centres	of	commerce,	quickly	gaining	business	at	the	
expense	 of	 the	 incumbent	 water	 and	 turnpike	 transportation	 companies.	 Private	
railroad	 companies	quickly	multiplied,	 each	building	 their	own	 infrastructure.	 The	
technological	 disruption	 caused	 a	 series	 of	 abuses:	 wherever	 the	 railroads	 faced	
competition	 from	 other	 technologies	 --	 typically,	 over	 long	 distances,	 where	
competition	 from	 canal	 and	 riverboats	 kept	 prices	 low	 (Law	 and	 Long,	 2011)	 --	
customers	demanded	below-cost	service;	in	the	short	haul,	however,	railroads	had	
virtually	no	competitors	and	exploited	their	monopoly	power.		
























to	 undertaking	 an	 appraisal	 of	 the	worth	 of	 a	 company’s	 property	 and	 enforcing	
railroad	 safety	 standards.	 They	 often	 consisted	 of	 only	 one	 commissioner.	 Their	
recommendations	 about	 rates	 were	 often	 plainly	 ignored	 by	 the	 railroads.	 Their	
establishment	 had	 been	 motivated	 by	 the	 willingness	 to	 calm	 public	 unrest	
(Kanazawa	and	Noll	1994).		
These	early-established	PUCs	met	six	times	before	the	creation	of	NARUC	itself.	The	
earliest	of	 these	meetings,	held	 in	1874,	 involved	Commissioners	 from	Wisconsin,	
Illinois	and	Minnesota	(Rodgers,	p.	5).	Rodgers	does	not	comment	extensively	on	the	
content	 of	 those	 informal	 meetings.	 He	 mentions	 a	 common	 willingness	 of	 the	
regulators	to	share	experiences,	compare	and	contrast	their	powers	and	obligations,	







(ICC).	 The	 first	 president	 of	 the	 ICC,	 Judge	 Thomas	 M.	 Cooley	 of	 Michigan,	





require	 comprehensive	 information	 from	 carriers,	 as	 well	 as	 testimony;	 to	 deal	 with	





call	 upon	 the	 state	 regulators	 to	 provide	 information	 on	 the	 operations	 of	 the	
railroad	 and	 their	 regulation	 in	 the	 different	 states.	 In	 order	 to	 establish	 such	
dialogue,	 Judge	 Cooley	 convened	 the	 first	meeting	 of	 the	 Convention	 of	 Railroad	
Commissioners,	 which	 was	 to	 become	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Railroad	
Commissioners,	at	ICC	offices	on	March	5,	1889	(Rodgers,	p.	8).	Representatives	of	
21	 PUCs	 attended	 the	 Convention8.	 Judge	 Cooley	 became	 the	 association's	 first	
president.	 Hence,	 the	 ICC	 and	 NARUC	 first	 chairmen	 were	 the	 same	 person,	
representing	their	cooperative	relationship.		
The	period	during	which	these	events	unfolded	ranges	from	the	early	1890s	to	World	
War	 I	 (WWI)	 and	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Progressive	 Era.	 Progressives	
nurtured	 the	 conviction	 that	 regulation	 should	 and	 could	 be	 depoliticized	 by	
entrusting	expert	 regulatory	 commissions	with	 regulatory	powers	 to	be	exercised	
independently	of	politics	and	 industry	 (Bernstein,	1977).	These	 ideas	concurred	 in	
the	establishment,	in	1907,	of	the	first	“modern”	state	commissions,	properly	staffed	






emerged	 since	 the	 first	meeting:	 the	 first	 reports	 to	 the	 convention	 concerned	 “Uniform	
Railway	 Statistics”	 and	 “Uniformity	 in	 Reports	 from	 Railroad	 Companies”.	 A	 third	 report	
concerned	“Uniform	Classification	of	Freights”.	These	reports	resulted	in	the	promotion	of	
resolutions.	 One	 of	 them,	 initially	 recommending	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 uniform	 freight	
classification	 for	 the	 roads	 across	 the	 country,	 was	 modified	 into	 a	 lesser	 prescriptive	
formulation	 upon	 a	 roll	 call	 vote.	 Significantly,	 Rodgers	 remarked	 (p.	 10)	 “only	 State	
representatives	voted	[…]	and	each	representative	had	one	vote	irrespective	of	the	number	
of	representatives	present	from	a	State”.	Clearly,	this	kind	of	voting	system,	coupled	with	





The	Progressive	 Era-inspired	decisions	 to	 grant	more	powers	 to	 the	 ICC,	with	 the	
Hepburn	Act	of	1906	and	the	Mann-Elkins	Act	of	19109,	marked	the	beginning	of	the	
conflicted	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	 national	 regulators	 (Childs,	 2001).	
Eventually,	a	 logic	of	“pragmatic	federalism”	(Childs,	2001)	prevailed,	according	to	
which	federal	agencies	and	state	regulators	cooperated	in	the	interest	of	preserving	







PUCs	 centers	 on	 the	 Shreveport	 case10.	 Both	 Rodgers	 (1979)	 and	 Childs	 (2001),	
identify	this	case	as	crucial	in	the	history	of	PUCs.	The	Shreveport	case	represented	
the	 beginning	 of	 their	 conflicted	 relationship	with	 the	 federal	 level	 of	 regulation,	
since	then	perceived	to	be	constantly	attempting	at	depriving	them	of	their	powers.		
In	1912,	the	PUC	of	Louisiana	filed	a	complaint	with	the	ICC	against	a	Texan	railroad	





























the	 ICC	 (Childs,	2001).	This	was	 in	stark	contrast	with	the	provisions	of	 the	Act	 to	
Regulate	Commerce,	instituting	the	ICC,	which	stated	“the	provisions	of	this	act	shall	










most	 states	 and	 oversaw	 other	 utilities	 as	 well	 (i.e.	 telephone,	 electricity,	 gas)11.	
																																																						
















halt	 competitive	 activities	 and	 to	 coordinate	 their	 operations	 nationally.	 The	
companies	created	the	Railroads	War	Board	to	that	effect.	Initially,	the	ICC	tried	to	





President’s	 son-in-law	 and	 main	 advisor	 on	 the	 matter,	 became	 the	 RA	 Director	
General.	 He	 populated	 the	 RA	 with	 railroad	 executives,	 who,	 empowered	 with	
federal	 executive	 powers	 by	 the	 Federal	 Control	 Act	 of	 1918,	 set	 off	 to	 improve	













Hines,	 who	 was	 also	 a	 railroad	 executive,	 tried	 to	 re-gain	 the	 shippers’	 and	 the	
NARUC’s	support	by	increasing	their	representation	within	the	RA.	He	tried	to	co-opt	
PUCs	by	setting	up	a	Public	Service	Division,	headed	by	the	then	president	of	NARUC.	
These	 decisions	 improved	 the	 relations	 between	 state	 regulators	 and	 the	 RA;	
however,	state	regulators	were	painfully	aware	of	their	considerable	loss	of	control	
over	 the	 practice	 of	 industry	 in	 their	 state	 and	 concerned	 about	 post-war	
arrangements.		
At	the	end	of	the	war,	the	entire	regulatory	and	ownership	system	of	the	railroads	
was	 put	 under	 discussion.	 Hence,	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 opened	 for	 all	
stakeholders	to	advance	their	preferences.	More	than	thirty	plans	for	reform	were	
proposed	 to	 Congress	 (Waterman,	 1919).	 Hines	 proposed	 the	 regionalization	 of	
regulation	(and	of	PUCs)	within	the	States	under	the	aegis	of	the	ICC	(Kerr,	p.	134).	
The	 railroad	 companies	 called	 for	 the	 elimination	 of	 state	 regulation	 and	
centralization	of	regulatory	powers	at	the	federal	level	(Post,	1918;	van	Metre,	1918).	
Part	of	public	opinion	was	in	favour	of	government	ownership	(Stonex,	1919).	In	its	
1919	 annual	 report,	 the	 ICC	 recommended	 continued	 private	 ownership	 and	
operation	under	governmental	 regulation	 (Eastman,	1919;	Splawn,	1939).	The	 ICC	




cooperative	 mechanism	 for	 ratemaking,	 and	 the	 eradication	 of	 the	 Shreveport	
Doctrine.”	(Rodgers,	p.	20).	“But	the	commissioners’	most	important	role	in	the	post-
war	 legislative	 debate	 was	 to	 communicate,	 through	 the	 National	 Association	 of	












Section	1	of	 the	 Interstate	Commerce	Act	 as	 amended,	which	provide	 that	
nothing	in	the	Act	shall	impair	or	affect	the	right	of	a	state	in	the	exercise	of	
its	 powers	 to	 require	 just	 and	 reasonable	 service	 for	 intrastate	 business	
“except	insofar	as	such	requirement	is	inconsistent	with	any	lawful	order	of	
the	Commission	made	under	the	provisions	of	this	Act”.	If	the	commission	has	
power	 to	make,	 and	 does	make,	 an	 order	 against	 carriers	 prescribing	 the	












the	 Shreveport	 Doctrine	 and	 to	 prevent	 its	 reappearance	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	
subsequent	 federal	 agencies.	 According	 to	 Childs,	 state	 regulators,	 “battling	
attempts	to	centralize	regulatory	action	in	Washington”	(p.	702),	managed	to	work	
out	 a	 role	 for	 themselves	 “in	 the	 emerging	 modern	 regulatory	 state”	 (p.	 703).	
Although	 PUCs	 eventually	 lost	 their	 powers	 in	 railroad	 regulation	 following	 the	








Critical	 junctures	 are	 events	 determining	 change	 from	 the	 status	 quo	 ante	 in	
unexpected	ways.	There	were	several	definitional	moments	in	the	history	of	NARUC:	
the	 foundational	 moment,	 in	 1889;	 the	 Shreveport	 case	 in	 1912	 and	 ensuing	
doctrine;	the	period	following	WWI,	when	the	allocation	of	regulatory	competence	
over	 US	 railroads	 was	 put	 into	 question.	 However,	 not	 all	 moments	 bear	 the	
properties	of	critical	junctures	as	defined	by	Capoccia	and	Kelemen	(2007).	The	first	
two	 events	 lack	 the	 necessary	 contingency	 and	 unpredictability:	 PUCs	 had	 been	
informally	meeting	since	1874	and	it	was	Judge	Cooley	to	call	for	their	convention,	











3) Indeterminacy	 was	 high.	 A	 complex	 puzzle	 of	 preferences	 had	 emerged:	
railroads	wanted	to	keep	private	ownership	but	to	dispose	of	competition	in	
favour	of	centralized	regulation.	The	ICC	was	calling	for	an	expansion	of	 its	
own	powers	 as	well.	 Therefore,	 PUCs	were	 seriously	 at	 risk	of	 losing	 their	
competences	over	railroads.		






regulatory	 system,	 which	 is	 the	 real	 outcome	 of	 the	 struggle.	 Hence,	 the	
probability	of	NARUC	becoming	a	stable	actor	in	US	utility	regulatory	policy	
dramatically	increased	post-juncture.	
5) Contingencies	 were	 key	 in	 this	 case.	 In	 particular,	 the	 attitude	 of	 RA	
executives	during	the	war	period	brought	regulators	at	both	levels	to	form	a	
coalition	and	to	bring	shippers	on	their	side.		
Most	 importantly,	 the	 events	 surrounding	 the	 post-WWI	 struggle	 for	 regulatory	
authority	triggered	regulators’	awareness	that	conflict	over	the	degree	of	regulatory	
control	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 federal	 level	 had	 become	 inherent	 to	 the	 US	





powers	 were	 expanded.	 However,	 at	 that	 time	many	 ICC	members	 were	 former	
NARUC	 members.	 Cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 organizations	 resumed	 and	
gradually	deepened,	until	the	NARUC	managed	to	eradicate	the	Shreveport	Doctrine,	
by	 preventing	 its	 appearance	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	 subsequent	 federal	 agencies.	 The	
weapon	 PUCs	wielded	was	 the	 NARUC	 itself:	 “once	 the	 state	 commissioners	 had	
persuaded	national	regulators,	Congress,	and	the	courts	to	accept	the	cooperative	










Since	 the	 early	 1900s,	 the	 relationships	 between	 PUCs	 and	 electricity	 industry	
executives	 evolved	 in	 parallel	 to	 their	 relationships	 with	 the	 railroad	 industry.	
However,	 they	 were	 markedly	 less	 confrontational.	 Whereas	 railroad	 executives	
struggled	 to	 eliminate	 state	 level	 regulation	 of	 their	 business,	 electric	 utility	
executives	engaged	in	the	opposite	battle:	they	actively	sought	state	regulation	and	
protected	 it	 from	 federal	 and	 local	 encroachment	 already	 since	 1898,	 when	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 case	 reviewed	 the	 method	 of	 rate	 regulation	 (Anderson	 1980,	
Anderson	 1981,	 Hausman	 and	 Neufeld	 2011).	 Anderson’s	 narrative	 retraces	 the	
inception	of	 state	 regulation	of	electricity	 in	 the	simultaneous	action,	 in	 the	early	




subject	 to	 corruption,	 and	municipal	 ownership.	 As	Hausman	 and	Neufeld	 (2011)	
note,	 “state	 rate	 regulation	 did	 not	 replace	 open	 competition	 among	 utilities;	 it	
replaced	regulation	by	municipalities”	(2011,	p.	727).	State	franchises	were	contracts	

















have	 it	 exerted	 by	 a	 regulatory	 commission	 than	 by	municipal	 governments.	 The	
report	 was	 extremely	 timely,	 as	 in	 that	 same	 year	 the	 first	 “modern”	 PUCs	 (i.e.	
possessing	actual	regulatory	powers)	had	been	created	in	New	York	and	Wisconsin.	
In	Wisconsin,	a	Republican	politician	who	was	also	vice-President	of	a	local	electric	















It	 was	 the	 Progressive	 Era,	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 politics	 was	 at	 its	 peak.	 In	





at	 national	 level.	 He	 focuses	 on	 the	 case	 of	Governor	 C.	 E.	 Hughes	 of	New	 York.	








legislature	 followed	 suit.	 In	 the	 following	 six	 years	 most	 States	 created	 PUCs	 to	
regulate	electric	and	other	utilities.	Importantly,	Anderson	retrieved	most	of	its	data	




Power	 Commission	 (FPC	 –	 created	 in	 1920	 to	 regulate	 hydroelectric	 projects,	
reinforced	 in	 1935	 and	 given	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 sale	 and	 transportation	 of	











were	 NARUC’s	 proposals,	 which	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 law.	 The	 Act	 also	 provided	 for	
NARUC	to	have	office	space	in	or	close	to	the	ICC	building	in	Washington.		
The	 tension	 between	 federal	 agencies	 and	 state	 PUCs	 had	 become	 a	 permanent	
feature	 of	 American	 regulatory	 federalism.	 However,	 for	 a	 relatively	 long	 period	
between	the	end	of	the	Second	World	Was	and	the	1970s,	the	energy	sector	enjoyed	
a	 relative	 calm	 (Hausman	 and	 Neufeld,	 2011).	 As	 Anderson	 (1980)	 outlines,	 the	









Commissioners	 from	 all	 over	 the	 USA	 began	 receiving	 their	 training	 at	 the	 same	
institution,	which	enhanced	their	knowledge	of	 regulation	 in	both	 theoretical	and	





Before	 the	 1970s,	 Anderson	 writes,	 the	 job	 of	 being	 a	 state	 Public	 Utility	
Commissioner	was	placid	and	attracted	former	politicians	looking	for	an	occupation	










This	 period	 of	 calm	 ended	 once	 economies	 of	 scale	 were	 exploited	 to	 the	 then	
possible	maximum	 and	 utilities	 began	 facing	 difficulties	 in	 raising	 capital.	 The	 oil	
embargoes	 of	 the	 1970s	 gave	 a	 blow	 to	 the	 industry,	 by	 making	 rates	 soar	 and	
pushing	several	big	utilities	on	the	verge	of	bankruptcy	(Anderson,	1980).	A	sudden	
and	massive	 increase	 in	 rates	 was	 deemed	 inevitable.	 A	 conspicuous	 amount	 of	













gas	 in	 1935,	 the	 federal	 energy	 agency	 FERC	 has	 seen	 its	 jurisdiction	 constantly	
expanding,	by	allowing	it	increasing	policy	relevance	and	control.	The	introduction	of	
competitive	generation	through	the	Public	Utility	Regulatory	Policies	Act	(PURPA)	of	
1978	 and,	 in	 particular,	 through	 the	 Energy	 Act	 of	 1992	 entailed	 increased	
competencies	for	FERC	as	it	was	tasked	with	developing	new	rules	that	would	open	




the	 trend	 (Hausman	 and	Neufeld,	 2011).	 At	 any	 rate,	 over	 time	 state	 regulators’	
control	over	the	utilities	in	their	state	diminished.	Most	recently,	the	regulations	of	
the	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	 in	matters	related	to	the	environment	













both	 the	 telecommunications	 and	 electricity	 and	 gas	 sectors	 determined	 a	
diminished	 role	 of	 state	 regulation,	which	 not	 even	 the	NARUC	 could	 be	 able	 to	
reverse.		
It	 is	 in	this	context	that	the	evolution	of	NARUC	took	place.	 I	discuss	the	NARUC’s	




juncture	 in	NARUC’s	 history	 occurred	 in	 1998,	when	 the	USAID	 and	 the	US	 State	
Department	invited	the	NARUC	to	cooperate	into	a	technical	assistance	programme	























In	most	of	 the	United	States,	 the	creation	of	PUCs	predated	 the	establishment	of	
federal	agencies.	The	same	occurred	 in	 the	EU:	after	 the	 first	 regulatory	“offices”	
were	 created	 in	 the	 UK	 (Stern	 2014),	 the	 institutional	 format	 of	 the	 regulatory	




The	 key	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 cases	 is	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 regulatory	
authority	 across	 levels	 of	 governance.	 In	 the	 USA,	 which	 is	 a	 federal	 system,	
regulatory	authority	 is	vertically	split	between	the	federal	and	the	state	 level.	The	
competence	of	federal	agencies	is	limited	to	interstate	infrastructure	and	issues.	The	
competence	of	 state	 level	 regulators	 is	 confined	 to	 the	boundaries	of	 their	 state.	
However,	this	apparently	neat	separation	of	powers	does	not	prevent	the	emergence	
of	conflicts	of	authority,	because	of	the	inherent	interdependent	nature	of	the	object	
of	 regulation:	 energy	 infrastructure	 is	 a	 network	 industry.	 Hence,	 infrastructure	

















issues,	 and	 the	 repartition	 of	 the	 relative	 costs,	 are	 one	 of	 the	 longest	 standing	
matters	of	controversy	in	the	European	energy	policy	(Olmos	Camacho	and	Pérez-
Arriaga	2007).	Hence,	currently	regulatory	authority	resides	mostly	at	national	level.	










the	 agency	 of	 regulators	 within	 it,	 their	 motivations	 to	 network,	 and	 the	 CEER’s	
evolution	are	missing	from	the	literature.		
	
Before	 the	 Regulatory	 State:	 the	 role	 of	 engineers	 in	 promoting	
interconnections	and	cross	border	energy	trade.	
The	topic	of	cross	border	energy	trade	has	deep	roots	in	European	history,	as	shown	





and	 its	 tendency	 to	 self-aggrandizement,	 energy	 markets	 integration	 across	 the	
European	continent	has	been	a	longstanding	concern	of	(initially)	private	utilities	and,	




Engineers	 maintained	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 European	 power	 sector	 also	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	World	War	II.	The	following	extended	quotations	portray	the	encounter	
between	US	and	European	engineers	in	the	context	of	the	Marshall	plan.	
“In	 April,	 1949,	 a	 group	 of	 European	 engineers	 was	 welcomed	 by	 their	
American	hosts.	The	visitors	from	Europe,	most	of	them	system	operators	in	





was	 to	 expand	 generation	 capacity,	 by	 building	 national	 and	 international	
power	plants	on	 the	one	hand,	and	making	better	use	of	new	and	existing	
capacity	by	creating	European	power	pools	on	the	other.	These	power	pools,	
should	 be	 brought	 about	 by	 building	 both	 physical	 and	 institutional	
interconnections	between	countries.”	(p.	107)	
“As	an	outcome	of	these	efforts,	organizations	representing	regional	power	
pools	 eventually	 became	 the	 face	 of	 European	 cooperation.	 (…)	 European	
engineers	 clearly	 had	 differing	 opinions	 from	 American	 ERP	 officials,	 who	
argued	for	international	–	and	even	supranational	–	ownership	and	operation	
of	 power	 plants	 and	 networks.	 The	 ideas	 of	 Western	 European	 engineers	







by-side.	 To	 them,	a	European	 system	should	 consist	of	nationally	operated	
networks,	working	in	close	coordination.”	(p.	108-109)	
Producer	 organizations	 were	 the	 main	 promoters	 of	 cross	 border	 electricity	
infrastructure	 integration	 in	 Europe.	 The	 UNIPEDE	 (Union	 Internationale	 des	
Producteurs	 et	 Distributeurs	 d’Énergie	 Électrique	 i.e.	 International	 Union	 of	 the	
Producers	 and	 Distributors	 of	 Electric	 Energy),	 set	 up	 in	 1925,	 was	 the	 platform	
where	the	ideas	of	engineers	regarding	interconnection	of	European	electricity	grids	
were	 first	 voiced.	 The	UCPTE	 (Union	pour	 la	 Coordination	de	 la	 Production	 et	 du	
Transport	 de	 l’Électricité	 -	 the	 Union	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 Production	 and	
Transportation	of	Electricity)	an	informal,	regional	network	of	utility	representatives	
from	 eight	Western	 European	 countries	 established	 in	 1951	 that	 set	 up	 the	 first	
mechanisms	of	 regular	 communication	 among	utilities13.	 Both	organizations	were	
very	 influential	 in	 framing	the	debate	on	 infrastructure	 integration	across	Europe.	
They	 evolved	 into	 what	 today	 are	 the	 Eurelectric	 (the	 association	 representing	
European	electric	utilities	in	Brussels)	and	the	ENTSO-E	(the	association	of	European	
system	operators).	






technological	 interconnection	 and	 integration	 shaped	 the	 conceptualization	 of	
																																																						
13	Similar	groupings	were	created	over	the	years,	e.g.	one	gathering	Scandinavian	utilities,	
another	 gathering	 utilities’	 representatives	 from	 Spain,	 Portugal	 and	 France,	 another	 for	
utilities	from	Italy,	Austria	and	Yugoslavia.	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	remained	









and	a	preference	 for	expert	coordination	rather	 than	the	creation	of	 fully-fledged	
supranational	institutions.	On	this	background,	the	emergence	and	evolution	of	CEER	
find	their	place.	I	have	investigated	the	history	of	CEER	by	way	of	face-to-face	elite	
interviews	with	 key	 individuals	who	were	 directly	 involved	 into	 its	 establishment	














steps	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 which	 had	 undertaken	 the	 utility	 privatisation	 and	
liberalization	 process	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 had	 established	 independent	 energy	












establishment	 of	 independent	 regulatory	 authorities	 depended	 exclusively	 on	
national	governments’	initiative.		
The	 head	 of	 the	 British	 electricity	 regulatory	 authority	 (called	 Office	 of	 Energy	
Regulation,	 or	OFFER)	was	presenting	 at	 the	 conference.	At	 the	 time,	OFFER	was	
perceived	as	being	the	paradigmatic	NRA.	The	newly	established	Southern	European	
regulators	were	eager	 to	 learn	 from	 its	 experience	 (interviews	1,	 2,	 3,	 4,	 13,	 14).	
Scandinavian	 regulators,	 also	 in	 attendance,	 had	 a	 long-standing	 history	 of	
collaboration	already.	In	those	countries,	governmental	regulatory	departments	for	
infrastructure	 sectors	 were	 created	 in	 the	 early	 1900s.	 Differently	 from	 their	
Southern	European	and	British	counterparts,	which	were	constituted	as	Independent	
Regulatory	Authorities	(IRAs),	Scandinavian	regulatory	authorities	had	developed	out	
of	 former	 ministerial	 departments.	 The	 newly	 established	 Southern	 European	




United	 in	 their	 quest	 for	 benchmarks,	 and	 given	 the	 strong	 similarities	 in	 their	
national	 markets,	 the	 three	 Southern	 European	 regulators	 agreed	 to	 start	
communicating	on	 a	 regular	 basis	 to	 exchange	 information	 about	 the	 issues	 they	
faced.	They	started	meeting	quarterly,	once	in	each	country.	Their	first	joint	meeting	



















For	 these	 reasons,	 European	Commission	 officials	 began	 reaching	 out	 to	 national	
regulators.	





the	 creation	 of	 the	 Internal	 Energy	Market	 (IEM).	 He	 envisioned	 it	 as	 a	 regularly	
scheduled	 gathering	 of	 “those	 actors	 who,	 like	 itself,	 felt	 the	 need	 for	 market	












The	 Director	 General’s	 idea	 resonated	 with	 sector	 stakeholders	 and	 rapidly	
materialized	 into	what	was	called	 the	European	Electricity	Regulatory	Forum.	The	
first	meeting	of	the	Forum	was	held	in	Florence	(Italy)	in	February	1998.	Henceforth	
it	 was	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 “the	 Florence	 Forum”.	 Florence	 appeared	 as	 a	
suitably	neutral	location	because	it	hosted	a	European	apolitical	institution,	i.e.	the	
European	 University	 Institute	 (EUI15).	 The	 following	 year,	 the	 European	 Gas	
Regulatory	Forum,	or	“Madrid	Forum”,	was	set	up,	focused	on	the	gas	sector.	Now	a	
consolidated,	 taken-for-granted	 event	 concerning	 EU	 electricity	 markets	 and	
regulatory	policy	matters,	at	the	time	the	Florence	Forum	represented	a	veritable	




“…included	 senior	 representatives	 of	 national	 regulators	 or	 ministries	
responsible	 for	 electricity	 regulation,	 the	 EU	 Director	 General	 for	 Energy,	
Pablo	 Benavides,	 European	 Commission	 officials	 (DGs	 XVII	 and	 IV),	
representatives	 of	 the	 electricity	 industry	 and	 of	 major	 consumers.	 All	 EU	
Member	States	were	represented	as	well	as	Unites	States,	New	Zealand	and	
Norway.	The	main	areas	addressed	by	the	forum	covered	transmission	pricing	
methods	 and	 cost	 accounting,	 (…)	 non-discrimination	 and	 unbundling,	 and	
















Besides	 presentations	 from	 the	 European	 Commission,	 key	 Transmission	 System	
Operators	 (TSOs	 –	 from	 the	 UK,	 Sweden,	 Germany,	 Spain)	 and	 European	 and	
American	consultants,	a	roundtable	of	regulators	also	took	place	during	the	meeting.	
Participants	 included	 regulators	 from	 Italy,	 Spain,	 Portugal,	 Sweden,	 Norway,	
Finland,	Denmark,	the	UK,	and	the	US.	All	regulators	recognized	the	need	to	allow	for	
national	 diversity	 and	 to	 increase	 transparency.	 However,	 clear	 differences	 in	
approach	emerged	in	the	discussion.	According	to	the	minutes,	while	the	Portuguese	





















well	as	 representatives	 from	 international	organisations,	such	as	 the	 International	
Energy	Agency,	and	associations	representing	the	gas	industry	and	gas	and	electricity	
consumers.	While	the	meetings	of	the	Florence	Forum	took	place	every	six	months,	
the	 second	 meeting	 of	 the	 Madrid	 Forum	 took	 place	 two	 years	 after	 the	 first,	
testifying	to	the	considerable	reluctance	of	Member	States	to	openings	of	the	gas	




to	 establish,	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	 a	 new	 body	 or	 grouping	 that	 brings	
together	 representatives	 of	 all	 those	 responsible	 for	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
transmission	network	for	gas	 in	Europe.	(…)	The	objective	of	this	body	 is	to	
work,	 inter-alia	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Madrid	 Forum,	 together	 with	 the	
Commission,	 Member	 States	 and	 national	 regulators,	 to	 resolve	 issues	 of	
mutual	 concern	with	 respect	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 competitive	 internal	
European	 gas	 market,	 and	 to	 provide	 technical	 data	 regarding	 the	
transmission	 systems	 within	 Europe	 at	 the	 request	 of	 the	 Commission,	
national	Regulators,	and	the	Member	States.”		
The	second	meeting	of	 the	Florence	Forum	 in	1999	had	similarly	put	 forward	 the	
necessity	for	TSOs	to	form	an	association	to	dialogue	with	the	Commission	and	the	
association	 of	 the	 regulators.	 The	 Florence	 and	 Madrid	 Fora	 became	 important	
appointments	and	boosted	the	working	relationship	between	national	regulators	and	
the	European	Commission.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 at	 this	 stage,	 the	 CEER	 did	 not	 officially	 exist	 yet.	











aggrandizing	 strategy	 (Schmidt	 1998,	 Eberlein	 2008,	Mayer	 2008,	 Diathesopoulos	
2010,	 Torriti	 2010,	 Maltby	 2013,	 Goldthau	 and	 Sitter	 2014,	 Herweg	 2015):	 by	
transferring	the	formulation	of	energy	regulatory	policy	to	the	European	level,	the	
European	 Commission	 inherently	 transferred	more	 power	 to	 itself.	 As	 previously	
mentioned,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 scholarly	 contributions	 on	 European	 regulatory	




following	 sections	 confirm,	 that	 the	 regulators,	 similarly	 to	 the	 Commission,	
endorsed	 the	 policy	 goal	 of	 Europeanizing	 energy	 regulation	 because	 that	would	
enhance	their	institutional	role.	
	
	The	 consolidation	 of	 the	 CEER:	 the	 tensions	 of	 multi-level	
governance.	
“In	the	beginning	most	of	the	work	was	national.	There	was	so	much	
to	 do	 nationally	 (…)	 the	 CEER	 was	 a	 club,	 it	 was	 interesting	 to	 go	 there	
because	you	met	colleagues,	on	a	national	level	you	did	not	have	colleagues	
(…)	you	had	nobody	to	talk	to	and	find	out	“Oh	this	is	a	usual	problem	or	my	






















NRAs	 were	 invited	 to	 take	 stock	 of	 their	 experiences.	 Representatives	 from	 18	
institutions	 attended	 and	 gave	 a	 presentation,	 including	 NRAs	 from	 Italy,	 Spain,	






opposition	 from	 industry	 and	 government	 as	 prices	 increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 cost-
reflective	 tariffs,	 and	 government	 subsidies	 were	 phased	 out.	 A	month	 after	 the	
meeting,	in	December	1999,	during	the	fourth	meeting	of	the	Florence	Forum,	the	








European	 energy	 regulators.	 Just	 like	 European	 Energy	 Ministers	 met	 at	 the	
European	Council	in	Brussels,	regulators	“would	have	their	own	council”	(interview	





would	 not	 dissipate:	 the	 activity	 of	 regulation	 consists	 of	 imposing	 costs	 on	 (and	
creating	 benefits	 for)	 different	market	 actors	 as	 a	 result	 of	market	 design.	More	
broadly,	just	like	their	US	counterparts	had	experienced	a	century	earlier,	European	
regulators	 realized	 that	 the	 tensions	 and	 contrasts	 inherent	 in	 the	distribution	of	
regulatory	authority	across	levels	of	governance	entailed	issues	of	regulatory	control.	
They	would	 always	 face	 the	 threat	 of	 having	 their	 powers	 or	 authority	 curtailed,	
whether	“from	below”	(i.e.	by	national	governments)	or,	as	they	soon	realized,	“from	
above”	(e.g.	by	the	European	Commission).	Therefore,	they	needed	a	mechanism	of	





(OFGEM),	 which	 had	 initially	 been	 lukewarm	 towards	 the	 idea	 of	 regularly	
cooperating	 with	 their	 European	 counterparts.	 Therefore,	 in	 January	 2000,	 the	
representatives	 of	 10	 regulatory	 authorities	 met	 at	 OFGEM	 offices	 in	 London	 to	
discuss	the	form	and	the	goals	of	their	association.	On	7	March	2000,	representatives	
from	 Belgium,	 Finland,	 the	 UK,	 Ireland,	 Northern	 Ireland,	 Italy,	 Norway,	 the	
Netherlands,	Portugal,	Spain	and	Sweden	met	in	Brussels	to	sign	the	Memorandum	
of	 Understanding	 (MoU)	 establishing	 the	 Council	 of	 European	 Energy	 Regulators	
(CEER).	 Several	 interviewees	 recalled	 the	endorsement	of	 the	CEER	by	OFGEM	as	
decisive	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 association.	 The	 British	 model	 of	 energy	






in	 the	 interest	 of	 achieving	 the	 IEM.	 The	 formalization	of	 regulators’	 cooperation	
occurred	 three	 years	 later,	 in	 response	 to	 the	 first	 attempt	 of	 the	 European	




In	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 European	 Council	 launched	 a	 policy	 programme	 called	 the	




network	 could	 no	 longer	 remain	 an	 informal	 association	 of	 professionals:	 the	
constant	 interaction	 with	 the	 Commission	 required	 resources	 and	 updated	
knowledge	of	the	latest	policy	proposals.	Moreover,	providing	policy	input	required	
closeness	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 policy	 formulation.	 This	 was	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 from	
national	capitals.		
Until	 that	point,	 the	 financial	 viability	of	 the	CEER	had	been	assured	by	voluntary	
contributions:	regulators	did	not	have	fixed	dues;	they	covered	their	CEER-related	
expenses,	 which	 mainly	 consisted	 in	 travelling	 to	 meetings	 around	 Europe,	
individually	and	autonomously.	The	opportunity	to	contribute	to	the	drafting	of	the	
European	Commissions’	 legislative	proposals,	however,	represented	a	rather	more	



















the	model	 of	 the	 American	 FERC	 [Federal	 Energy	 Regulatory	 Commission];	 a	 true	
European	 regulator,	 with	 real	 powers,	 so	 that	 you	 could	 move	 from	 national	 to	
European	regulatory	agency”	(interview	4).	Therefore,	some	regulators	envisioned	a	
regulator-only	 European	 agency,	 similar	 to	 the	 USA	 FERC,	 and	 their	 careers	 as	
ascending	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 supranational	 level.	 The	 EC	 Legal	 Service,	
however,	 in	 application	 of	 the	 Meroni	 doctrine18,	 restrained	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
foreseen	regulators’	body	to	no	more	than	consultative	powers.		
																																																						
18	 The	 Meroni	 doctrine	 arose	 from	 cases	 C-9/56	 and	 C-10/56	 (Meroni	 v	 High	 Authority	
[1957/1958]	ECR	133)	and	relates	to	the	extent	to	which	EU	institutions	may	delegate	their	
tasks	to	regulatory	agencies.	The	European	Court	of	Justice	rules	that	it	"cannot	be	excluded"	
that	power	might	be	delegated	 to	bodies	whose	existence	was	not	 contemplated	by	 the	
Treaties,	 if	 doing	 so	 appears	 compatible	 with	 the	 regulatory	 powers	 conferred	 on	 the	




margin	 of	 discretion"	 is	 to	 be	 excluded	 in	 all	 cases.	
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/02/020201-03.html	This	is	to	respect	








“The	 Commission	 wanted	 to	 consolidate	 the	 CEER	 as	 advisory	
organ	to	itself.	It	was	the	regulators	who	said	“Well,	we	don’t	want	to	be	
part	 of	 something	 that	 can	 only	 be	 convened	 by	 the	 Commission…	we	











statement	 reinforces	 the	 importance	 of	 investigating	 the	 informal	 dimension	 of	
regulatory	networks,	since,	like	in	this	case,	it	may	be	the	dominant	one.	
The	CEER	and	the	ERGEG	coexisted	under	the	same	roof	between	2003	and	2011.	
These	 arrangements	 suited	 the	 circumstances	 –	 the	 Commission	 could	 barely	
devolve	any	resources	to	the	ERGEG;	the	existing	organisational	infrastructure	of	the	
CEER	 supported	 it	 entirely.	 The	 creation	 of	 the	 ERGEG	 faced	 regulators	 with	 the	
option	 of	 terminating	 the	 CEER.	 Several	NRAs	were	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 solution,	 on	
account	 that	 it	 would	 have	 reduced	 the	 expenses	 on	 travelling	 to	 Brussels	 for	
																																																						












The	 training	 of	 regulators:	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Florence	 School	 of	
Regulation.	
Since	1997,	European	energy	regulators	had	been	regularly	exchanging	information.	






was	 held	 in	 March	 2002	 in	 a	 hotel	 conference	 room	 in	 Palma	 de	Mallorca.	 The	
location	was	chosen	to	keep	participation	costs	at	a	minimum	thanks	to	low	season	
hotel	prices,	given	that	most	of	the	participants	financed	their	own	participation	out	
of	 their	 own	 pocket	 (interview	 1).	 The	 course	 was	 not	 labelled	 a	 “CEER	 training	
course”.	Not	all	members	would	be	ready	to	endorse	such	a	statement	at	that	point	
(interview	1).	The	course	was	attended	by	all	EU	regulators	as	well	as	by	the	head	of	
the	 Hungarian	 regulatory	 authority	 (interview	 3),	 which	 had	 been	 established	 in	
1994.	Hungary	was	not	an	EU	Member	State	at	that	time,	but	interactions	between	
EU	 and	 Eastern	 European	 regulators	 were	 becoming	 more	 frequent	 in	 the	 early	
2000s,	as	will	be	recalled	in	chapter	6.	
The	success	of	this	first	training	programme	prompted	European	regulators,	as	their	







Forum	meetings	 and	 still	 appeared	as	 a	 suitably	neutral	 location.	 Supported	by	 a	
communication	to	the	EUI	president	from	the	EC	vice-President	Loyola	de	Palacio,	
regulators	arranged	for	a	second	training	course	to	be	held	at	the	EUI.	The	course	
took	 place	 in	 October	 2003	 and	 represented	 the	 foundational	 moment	 for	 the	
Florence	School	of	Regulation	(FSR),	which	was	officially	created	in	2004.	The	head	
of	the	Italian	NRA,	a	professor	who	had	created	the	CEER	together	with	its	Spanish	




“…A	 strong	 unbundling	 (…)	 would	 not	 have	 found	 a	 majority	 in	
parliament	 (…),	even	 if	 the	ministry	of	economy	had	supported	 that	 (…)	 so	
early	on	I	said	it’s	not	worth	try	to	lobby	nationally	because	we	will	fail	but	at	
EU	 level	 it’s	a	different	story…	so	we	did	succeed	to	get	quite	a	number	of	
















rules,	 things	 that	we	would	not	have	been	able	 to	do	on	a	purely	national	
basis”	(interview	15).	
Preparatory	work	 for	 the	 Third	 Energy	 Package	 represented	 a	 key	opportunity	 to	
further	 market	 integration.	 Regulators	 used	 the	 opportunity	 to	 shape	 the	
institutional	 design	 of	 their	 national	markets	 by	 taking	 part	 in	 the	 formulation	of	
binding	European	legislation.	The	second	Energy	Package	had	represented	the	first	










market	 integration	 and	 liberalization	 of	 retail	 markets	 grew	 stronger,	 these	
differences	came	to	be	seen	as	hampering	the	effectiveness	of	such	coordination.	
Specifically,	 some	 regulators	 could	 not	make	 commitments	 to	 their	 counterparts,	
because	very	often	they	either	 lacked	jurisdiction	over	cross	border	 issues	or	they	
shared	 it	 with	 the	 government.	 Until	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 early	 2000s,	 most	
regulators	still	needed	government	approval	of	most	of	their	decisions.		
However,	no	entity	existed,	which	could	impose	its	decisions	on	any	of	the	actors	of	
the	 EU	 energy	 regulatory	 space.	 The	 regulators,	 together	 with	 the	 Commission,	










































European	 Commission	 institutionalized	 regulatory	 coordination,	 rendering	 the	
informal	space	of	interaction	it	previously	had	with	the	regulators	redundant.		
In	their	discussion	of	the	institutionalization	of	the	network	of	European	civil	aviation	











create	 legal	 instruments	 rather	 than	 informal	 instruments	 for	 controlling	
policy	sectors.”	(Pierre	and	Peters	2009,	p.342)	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 regulatory	 control	 over	 the	 European	 energy	
regulatory	 policy	 resulted	 in	 a	 hybrid	 agency,	 where	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
regulators	share	the	driver’s	seat.		
However,	 CEER	did	not	dissolve.	Rather,	 it	 re-invented	 itself.	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	
began	focusing	on	policy	issues,	outside	of	the	official	remit	of	ACER,	such	as	retail	







32)	 and	 potentially	 representing	 the	 European	 energy	 policy	 in	 the	 EU	
neighbourhood	(interview	21).		








them	almost	a	 year	 to	 find	another	 10	people.	We	 can	do	 this	 in	 a	week”	
(interview	25).	
“They	 [CEER	 representatives]	 really	 negotiated	with	 the	 Parliament	
and	there	are	a	lot	of	things	in	the	Third	Package	that	are	actually,	even	
our	wording…	which	the	Agency	could	not	have	done,	I	mean	it	didn’t	exist,	






interviews:	 the	meeting	 of	 the	 Italian,	 Spanish	 and	 Portuguese	 regulators	 at	 the	
conference	in	Sweden	in	1997,	which	set	in	motion	the	process;	the	endorsement	of	
the	British	NRA;	 the	 launch	of	 the	 Florence	 and	Madrid	 Fora	 in	 1998;	 the	 call	 on	
regulators	to	collaborate	with	the	European	Commission	to	speed	up	energy	market	




creation	 of	 ERGEG	 (the	 European	 Regulatory	 Network)	 in	 2003;	 and	 the	
establishment	of	the	ACER	in	2009.		





confronted	 other	 stakeholder’s	 preferences	 and	 interests	 concerning	 the	 future	
direction	of	the	European	regulatory	framework	and	realized	that	the	tensions	they	
experienced	 in	 their	 national	 context	 existed	 across	 the	 EU.	 In	 other	words,	 they	
















uncertainty,	 when	 it	 became	 the	 favoured	 option	 amongst	 several	 alternatives.	
However,	a	more	thorough	reflection	shows	that	this	impression	is	inaccurate.	In	the	







had	 to	 guide	 their	 decision-making	was	 the	White	Paper	 the	EC	had	published	 in	
1995,	 outlining	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 EU	 energy	 policy,	 and	 the	 first	 liberalization	
Directive	 for	 electricity	 markets	 (96/92/EC)	 where	 NRAs	 as	 such	 are	 not	 even	
mentioned.		
Moreover,	as	the	initial	outcome	of	the	Vasteras	meeting	in	1997	shows,	regulators	
came	 from	 national	 backgrounds	 that	were	 so	widely	 different	 that	 they	 initially	
ruled	out	 the	possibility	of	 cooperating.	 The	UK	 regulator	was	more	 interested	 in	





rapidly	 accessible	 repository	 of	 information	 on	 different	 national	 markets;	 this	
attracted	more	members	since	the	mere	existence	of	these	connections	reduced	the	
new	regulators’	uncertainty.	This	condition	led	to	the	expansion	of	the	three-node	
network	 formed	 by	 the	 three	 Southern	 European	 regulators.	 Secondly,	 by	 facing	
stakeholders	 from	 different	 Member	 States	 at	 the	 Florence	 forum,	 regulators	
realized	that	they	faced	common	challenges,	which	were	unlikely	to	vanish.	Hence,	








Having	 emerged	 in	 different	 historical	 epochs	 and	 in	 response	 to	 diametrically	
different	institutional	and	market	circumstances,	NARUC	and	CEER	have	apparently	
little	in	common.	However,	I	selected	these	two	networks	as	case	studies	because	
both	gather	 regulatory	 authorities	 embedded	 in	 a	multi-level	 governance	 system,	
that	 has	made	 the	 political	 decision	 to	 organize	 the	 provision	 of	 certain	 services	
through	 independent	 regulatory	bodies	with	delegated	authority.	 Furthermore,	 in	
both	the	USA	and	the	EU,	the	establishment	of	regulatory	authorities	derived	from	a	
radical	change	in	the	policy	paradigm	governing	the	sector:	from	competition	under	
municipal	 franchise	 in	the	former	case;	 from	state	ownership	and	management	 in	
the	latter	case.	In	both	cases,	regulatory	networks	emerged	spontaneously	from	the	
coordinated	action	of	small	groups	of	network	members	(Provan	and	Kenis	2008).	
The	 literature,	 however,	 has	 rarely	 investigated	 their	 reasons,	 and	 the	 interplay	
between	regulators’	network	initiative	and	their	surrounding	environment.			
The	question	guiding	the	analysis	in	the	foregoing	two	chapters	is,	therefore:	what	
are	 the	 conditions	 leading	 to	 network	 emergence?	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 I	
reconstructed	the	events	and	circumstances	leading	to	network	emergence	in	both	
cases.	 The	 origins	 of	 NARUC	 date	 back	 to	 the	 1880s;	 hence,	 I	 relied	 on	 archival	
sources	and	existing	literature	to	reconstruct	its	emergence.	The	origins	of	CEER	are	
much	more	 recent,	 dating	 back	 to	 the	 late	 1990s;	 hence,	 I	mostly	 relied	 on	 elite	








undergirds	 the	 emergence	 of	 both	 networks.	 Regulators	 pursued	 their	 peers’	




would	 derive	 their	 authority.	 Although	 the	 American	 process	 was	 marked	 by	
litigation,	while	the	European	process	by	informal	elite	networking	(John	2012),	the	
inception	 of	 the	 network	 was	 the	 regulators’	 response	 to	 the	 uncertainty	
surrounding	 them.	 I	distinguish	 this	early	phase	of	 regulatory	networking	 from	 its	






tensions	 inherent	 in	 the	 multi-level	 governance	 system	 will	 always	 represent	 a	





where	 the	 allocation	 of	 regulatory	 power	 across	 levels	 of	 governance	 is	 far	 from	
having	clear	boundaries,	given	the	absence	of	supranational	regulatory	authorities,	
such	as	in	the	European	Union,	the	issue	of	regulatory	control	is	even	more	politically	
complex,	 as	 regulators	 derive	 their	 legal	 authority	 from	 the	 previous	 holder	 of	
regulatory	power:	the	national	government.		
Comparative	 examination	 of	 the	 cases	 shows	 that,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	
development,	NARUC	and	CEER	faced	different	kinds	of	opposition.	 In	the	case	of	
NARUC,	railroad	industry	representatives	long	battled	to	eliminate	state	regulation;	
Public	 Utility	 Commissioners	 were	 only	 able	 to	 retain	 their	 regulatory	 power	 by	
allying	with	the	nascent	federal	agency	and	the	primary	customers	of	the	railroads:	
shippers	of	goods.	Soon	after	their	inception,	European	national	regulators	also	faced	







service	but	also	 implied	much	higher	prices.	European	 regulators’	only	 strong	ally	




implied	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 former.	 As	 discussed	 at	 the	 end	 of	
chapter	3,	however,	the	establishment	of	a	European	Agency	for	the	Coordination	of	
Energy	Regulators	changed	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	Commission	









strategy	 of	 preservation.	 I	 adopted	 Capoccia	 and	 Kelemen’s	 (2007)	 diagnostic	





moments	or	 events,	 or	 that	different	 interviewees	may	have	pointed	 to	different	
events	as	critical.	This	potential	critique	is	well	taken,	but	does	not	change	the	validity	












active	 than	 the	 rest:	 they	 attend	 all	 meetings,	 contribute	 material,	 bring	 new	
information	into	the	network,	and	eventually	shape	the	agenda.	These	regulators	are	


















within	whose	 framework	 regulatory	 officials	 interact.	 Various	 contributors	 to	 the	
literature	on	regulatory	networks,	as	well	as	policy	practitioners,	often	use	the	word	
“network”	 metaphorically,	 to	 describe	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 informal	 association	 of	





models	 afford	 the	 researcher	 considerable	 explanatory	 power	 as	 concerns	 the	
drivers	of	network	ties	and	the	determinants	of	network	structure.		
In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 research,	 the	 social	 network	 analysed	 is	 the	 network	 of	
European	national	energy	regulators.	Using	original	data	collected	between	late	2015	
and	early	2017,	in	this	part	of	the	thesis	I	investigate	the	explanatory	factors	of	their	
network	structure	and	 the	determinants	of	 their	 ties.	 I	asked	regulators	 to	 report	
their	most	frequent	and	regular	ties	as	concerns	exchange	of	information,	opinions	
and	advice.	I	gathered	data	from	all	29	European	national	energy	regulators	that	are	
members	of	 the	CEER	 (i.e.	 from	all	28	EU	Member	States	plus	Norway).	Only	one	
regulator	did	not	respond	to	my	question;	for	that	regulator,	I	considered	their	ties	




regulators	 would	 display	 a	 pattern	 of	 homophily	 (McPherson,	 Smith-Lovin	 et	 al.	
2001).	Homophily	is	the	tendency	of	individuals	to	associate	and	bond	with	similar	
others,	as	in	the	proverb	"birds	of	a	feather	flock	together".	Its	presence	has	been	




European	 regulators	 tend	 to	 network	with	 peers	 overseeing	markets	 that	 have	 a	
similar	structure	to	theirs.	Since	the	European	regulatory	policy	for	energy	markets	
is	 premised	 on	 liberalization,	 I	 further	 hypothesise	 that	 regulators	 overseeing	
markets	at	more	advanced	stages	of	liberalization	would	receive	significantly	more	
incoming	 ties,	 as	 their	 peers	 seek	 to	 learn	 from	 them.	 Furthermore,	 previous	




The	 results	 of	 the	model	 show	 that,	 indeed,	 regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	
choices	of	network	partners;	in	other	words,	they	tend	to	establish	direct	ties	with	
regulators,	facing	similar	sector	structure	and	political	economy.	Furthermore,	the	
UK	 energy	 regulatory	 authority	 emerges	 as	 overall	 more	 sought	 after	 than	 their	
peers,	 in	accordance	with	the	second	hypothesis	concerning	market	 liberalization.	
Finally,	human,	rather	than	financial,	resources	appear	to	be	associated	with	a	higher	








the	 link	 between	 resources	 and	 activism	 holds	 as	 long	 as	 regulators	 are	 not	 so	
resource-constrained	as	to	being	unable	to	devote	resources	to	networking,	or	so	
well-resourced	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 acquire	 or	 generate	 information	 in-house.	 In	 the	







This	 chapter	 stems	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 regulators	 with	 more	 outgoing	 non-
reciprocated	ties	are	information	seekers,	and	understands	them	as	proactively	using	
network	ties	to	compensate	for	lacking	resources.	
The	hypothesis	underlying	chapter	5	 is	 that	 lower	 resources	correspond	to	higher	
counts	 of	 non-reciprocated	 ties.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 lend	 support	 to	 the	







advanced	 stage	 of	 development	 are	 more	 sought	 after;	 that	 better	 resourced	
regulators	 are	 more	 sought	 after	 while	 less	 resourced	 regulators	 are	 the	 most	
proactive,	 exception	 made	 for	 regulatory	 authorities	 having	 extremely	 small	
















4. The	 drivers	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 networking:	














The	 governance	 literature	 has	 converged	 on	 the	 overarching	 understanding	 that	
transnational	 (or	 trans-governmental)	 networks	 are	 meant	 to	 improve	 the	
governance	of	economic	sectors	or	phenomena,	whose	reach	extends	beyond	any	
single	 country.	 Within	 networks,	 regulators	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 exchange	
information	and	to	coordinate	their	 regulatory	practice	 in	order	 to	 facilitate	cross	
border	 trade	and	 investment.	These	conclusions	 resonate	with	 the	stances	of	 the	
liberal	 school	 of	 international	 relations	 (Keohane	 and	 Nye	 1974,	 Keohane	 1998),	
which	 has	 emphasised	 how	 increased	 interdependence	 motivates	 transnational	
cooperation	and	coordination,	leading	to	the	creation	of	international	regimes	(Haas	





Beyond	 interdependence,	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 have	 rarely	 been	
investigated.	More	recent	explanations	have	pointed	to	the	importance	of	autonomy	







individual	 regulators	 are	 unlikely	 to	maintain	 regular	 informal	 ties	with	 each	 and	
every	one	of	their	peers;	more	plausibly,	they	sustain	bilateral	frequent	and	stable	
ties	to	a	subset	of	them,	reaching	out	to	others	more	sporadically.	
In	 this	 article,	 I	 investigate	 the	 drivers	 of	 regulatory	 networking	 by	 analysing	 the	
directed	 network	 of	 connections	 between	 the	 28	 National	 Energy	 Regulatory	
Authorities	of	EU	Member	States,	plus	Norway.	 I	develop	an	Exponential	Random	
Graph	 Model	 (ERGM)	 premised	 on	 hypotheses	 aimed	 at	 testing	 whether	 the	
Varieties	of	Capitalism	(VoC)	framework	(Hall	and	Soskice	2001,	Hancké,	Rhodes	et	
al.	 2007)	 holds	 relevance	 for	 explaining	 network	 structure.	 The	 results	 show	 that	
regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	 tie	 choices,	 which	 means	 that	 they	 tend	 to	
establish	ties	with	counterparts	that	are	similar	to	them;	namely,	this	study	finds	that	











Overall,	 these	results	 lend	support	 to	contributions	underlining	the	 importance	of	
expertise-driven	 policy	 learning	 as	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	
networking.	The	paper	confirms	the	relevance	of	the	VoC	framework	to	understand	
network	 industries	 and	 regulatory	 institutions	 and	demonstrates	 its	usefulness	 to	








necessary	 to	 compel	 all	 EU	 energy	 regulators	 to	 coordinate	with	 and	 learn	 from	









number	 of	 contributions	 employing	 the	 technique	 (Alcañiz	 2010,	 Cranmer	 and	
Desmarais	 2011,	 Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al.	 2013,	Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al.	 2013,	 Alcañiz	
2016,	Boehmke,	Chyzh	et	al.	2016,	Cranmer,	Leifeld	et	al.	2017,	Lazega,	Quintane	et	
al.	2017).	Patterns	of	regulatory	interactions	have	often	been	operationalized	using	




perceived	 influence	and	resources	 (Cranmer,	Leifeld	et	al.	2017).	Further,	 the	fact	
that	 nodes	 prefer	 to	 connect	 to	 nodes	 that	 they	 perceive	 as	 being	 similar	 to	
themselves	 in	 some	 theoretically	 or	 empirically	 relevant	 respect	 (a	 pattern	 called	
“homophily”)	 has	 often	 emerged	 as	 having	 considerable	 explanatory	 power	
(McPherson,	Smith-Lovin	et	al.	2001,	Lee,	Lee	et	al.	2012,	Maoz	2012,	Barberá	2015,	
Alcañiz	2016).		
Scholars	 have	 conceptualized	 transnational	 regulatory	 networks	 as	 the	 functional	










More	 recently,	 the	 literature	 has	 complemented	 these	 understandings	 with	
perspectives	emphasising	domestic	circumstances	and	challenges	as	motivations	for	
transnational	networking.	 In	particular,	contributors	have	highlighted	the	strategic	
use	 that	 regulators	 make	 of	 their	 networks	 to	 achieve	 more	 independence	 and	
autonomy	 (Danielsen	 and	 Yesilkagit	 2014,	 Ruffing	 2015)	 from	 government	 by	
exploiting	 the	 informational	 advantages	 deriving	 from	 transnational	 networking	
(Eberlein	and	Grande	2005,	Jordana	2017).	Additionally,	regulators	appear	to	pool	
resources	 through	networking,	 thereby	 compensating	 for	 those	 they	 lack	 (Alcañiz	
2010,	Vestlund	2015).	
However,	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 literature	 have	 thus	 far	 overlooked	 the	 rationales	




maintain	 informal,	 bilateral	 network	 ties	 beyond	 the	 official	 policy	 framework,	
because	 they	 find	 it	worthwhile.	 They	are	unlikely	 to	devote	an	equal	 amount	of	
effort	to	networking	with	each	of	their	network	counterparts;	more	plausibly,	they	
choose	their	strong	ties.	Analyses	of	the	motivations	for	these	choices	are,	however,	
lacking.	 Filling	 this	 gap	 requires	 close-up	observation	and	analysis	of	 the	 ties	 that	
each	regulator	has	within	a	network,	as	this	would	allow	for	a	clearer	grasp	of	the	









infrastructure	 sectors	 has,	 thus	 far,	 scarcely	 relied	on	 the	 richness	 of	 insight	 that	
network	theory	and	network	analysis	could	afford	it.	In	other	words,	the	literature	
has	 often	 used	 the	 term	 “network”	without	 using	 the	methods	 pertaining	 to	 the	
quantitative	analysis	of	networks.		
There	 are	 notable	 exceptions:	 several	 contributions	 have	 used	 measurements	
derived	 from	 network	 analysis	 in	 order	 to	 quantify	 influence	 and	 reputation	 of	
																																																						
19	 I	have	 included	 the	energy	 regulatory	authority	of	Norway	 in	 this	analysis	because	 the	
regulatory	authority	is	a	member	of	the	Council	of	European	Energy	Regulators	(CEER),	the	
voluntary	 network	 of	 European	 energy	 regulators,	 and	 the	 country	 has	 an	 obligation	 to	





different	 bureaucratic	 and	 political	 actors	 in	 the	 Swiss	 telecommunication	 sector	
(Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al.	 2013)	 or	 the	 independence	 and	 accountability	 of	 different	
regulatory	 authorities	 (Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Few	 contributions,	 however,	
have	investigated	the	explanatory	factors	of	the	relational	structure	connecting	the	
members	 of	 a	 network.	 Alcañiz	 (2010,	 2016)	 is	 a	 rare	 exception:	 her	 model	 of	
network	structure	finds	that	common	geographical	origins	and	lack	of	resources	drive	
the	 frequency	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation	 among	nuclear	 experts.	 At	 any	 rate,	 the	
mere	 existence	 of	 semi-formalized	 frameworks	 of	 cooperation,	 such	 as	 European	
Regulatory	 Networks,	 offers	 no	 insight	 onto	 the	 drivers	 of	 informal	 bilateral	 ties	
among	 regulators.	 Yet,	 the	 importance	 of	 trans-governmental	 networking	 for	 the	
shaping	of	EU	energy	policy	in	particular	can	hardly	be	overlooked	(Eberlein	2008,	
Kaiser	2009).		
Recent	 scholarly	 contributions	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 characteristics	 of	 network	
industries	 and	 national	 regulatory	 authorities	 are	 associated	with	 the	 “Variety	 of	
Capitalism	(VoC)”	of	the	country	(Thatcher	2007,	Guardiancich	and	Guidi	2016).	The	
VoC	 framework	 subdivides	 OECD	 countries	 according	 to	 “the	way	 in	 which	 firms	
resolve	 the	 coordination	problems	 they	 face”	 (Hall	 and	Soskice,	 2001,	p.	 7)	 in	 the	
country	 where	 they	 operate.	 The	 main	 watershed	 is	 between	 Coordinated	 and	
Liberal	 Market	 Economies	 (CMEs	 and	 LMEs).	 In	 LMEs,	 firms	 predominantly	
coordinate	 their	 activities	 via	 markets;	 transparency	 is,	 therefore,	 essential	 and	
regulatory	authorities	and	policy	are	tasked	with	ensuring	it.	In	CMEs,	firms	rely	more	




type	 of	 social-democracy,	 different	 from	 the	 coordinated	 economies	 of	 Germany	








institutions	 in	 network	 industries.	 He	 examines	 the	 cases	 of	 the	 UK,	 France	 and	
Germany	and	states	that,	while	the	1980s	UK	privatization	and	liberalization	reforms	
of	network	industries	occurred	largely	independently	from	EU	developments,	the	EU	
regulatory	 framework	 for	 network	 industries	 dovetails	 the	 LME	 paradigm,	 being	
premised	on	the	effort	 to	bring	about	competition	through	the	unbundling	of	 the	
sector,	 the	 introduction	 of	 private	 capital,	 cost-reflective	 pricing,	 market	
transparency,	and	cross-border	energy	trade.	The	EU	choice,	according	to	Thatcher	
(2007),	 forced	 all	 other	 Member	 States	 to	 converge	 towards	 the	 LME	 model	 of	
regulation	of	network	industries.	Indeed,	before	the	EU	began	legislating	on	network	
industries,	 France	 and	 Germany	 displayed	 very	 different	 approaches	 to	 those	
sectors:	 in	 France,	 the	 state	 owned	 or	 controlled	most	 of	 the	 sectoral	 firms	 and	
steered	technological	and	sector	development;	in	Germany,	industrial	associations	

















regulators	 in	 Germany	 to	 be	 less	 independent	 than	 in	 the	 UK.	 Guardiancich	 and	
Guidi’s	 (2016)	 analysis	 confirms	 these	 patterns:	 in	 the	 UK,	 where	market	 signals	
shape	market	 players’	 interactions,	 the	 independence	of	 the	 regulatory	 authority	
from	 both	 government	 and	 industry	 is	 crucial	 to	 ensure	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
regulatory	system;	in	CMEs,	strategic	coordination	among	firms	precludes	regulatory	
detachment	from	market	actors	and	government;	in	MMEs,	the	highly	discretionary	
role	of	 the	 state	 leaves	 little	 room	 for	 regulators’	autonomy.	 Indeed,	 institutional	
complementarities	 play	 a	 role	 in	 this	 regard,	 as	 market	 players	 and	 government	
demand	 of	 regulators	 to	 perform	 the	 role	 best	 suited	 to	 the	 extant	 mode	 of	
coordination.	These	contributions	show	that	 the	original	 classification	by	Hall	and	
Soskice	 (2001),	 by	 and	 large,	 is	 able	 to	 explain	 variation	 in	 national	 regulatory	








peers	 to	 seek	 them	out	as	 frequent	 interlocutors.	 Since	 the	EU	energy	 legislation	
conforms	 to	 the	 LME	variety,	 one	 should	expect	 regulators	 from	LMEs	 to	 receive	
more	incoming	ties	as	all	other	VoC	slowly	converge	(or	adapt	their	extant	mode	of	
coordination	in	network	industries)	to	the	LME	mode	of	coordination.		















that	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 encounter	 the	 same	 bottlenecks	 in	 the	 formulation	 and	
implementation	of	regulatory	policy.	The	energy	sector	is	well	suited	to	illustrate	this	
argument:	 EU	 energy	 legislation	mandates	 the	 unbundling	 (or	 separation)	 of	 the	
network	 infrastructure,	 consisting	 of	 the	 separation	 of	 high	 voltage/capacity	
(transmission)	 and	 low	 voltage/capacity	 (distribution)	 grids	 from	 the	 potentially	
competitive	segments	of	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors,	i.e.	generation/production	
and	 supply.	 Previously,	 production	 and	 investment	decisions	were	made	within	 a	
single	vertically	integrated,	usually	state-owned	energy	company.	The	unbundling	of	
generation	 of	 electricity	 (and	 gas	 production)	 from	 transmission,	 distribution	 and	
supply	 is	meant	to	ensure	that	coordination	between	energy	demand,	supply	and	











The	 economics	 literature	 has	 recognized	 that	 national	 regulators	 need	 to	 make	
informal	“regulatory	contracts”	(Stern	and	Trillas	2003,	Helm	2009,	Stern	2012)	 in	




legitimacy	 and,	 therefore,	 authority.	 Regulators	 have	 to	 conclude	 regulatory	
contracts	 that	are	acceptable	 to	all	parties,	hence	corresponding	 to	 the	prevalent	
mode	of	coordination,	while	also	fulfilling	the	objectives	of	the	EU	legislation,	which	

























the	 VoC	 of	 a	 country	 is	 virtually	 time-invariant.	 Studying	 connections	 between	
regulators	 as	 depending	on	 the	VoC	of	 their	 country	 implies	 considering	 them	as	
rather	 stationary.	 The	 data	 underlying	 this	 analysis,	 indeed,	 concerns	 regulators’	
frequent,	regular	connections.	Yet,	the	flexibility	of	informal	social	networks	is	one	
of	their	key	attributes:	participants	can	add	or	sever	links	as	opportunity	and	need	
require.	 However,	 the	 reasons	 for	 tie	 formation	 and	 elimination	 may	 be	 highly	
idiosyncratic,	 and	 last	 for	 limited	 time	 periods.	 There	 are,	 however,	 time-variant	
factors,	 which	 may	 consistently	 affect	 the	 likelihood	 of	 tie	 formation:	 resources	




with	 those	 of	 their	 peers	 in	 neighbouring	 countries	 in	 order	 to	 accomplish	 their	
ongoing	 technical	 activities.	 Less	 resourceful	 regulators,	 therefore,	 should	 use	
informal	networking	to	compensate	for	their	lacking	resources.	These	considerations	
lead	me	to	formulate	the	third	hypothesis.	













States	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 transitioning	 towards	 models	 of	 capitalism,	 and	
cluster	them	as	Emerging	Market	Economies	(EMEs).	Nölke	and	Vliegenthart	(2009)	




their	 energy	 sector.	 The	 resulting	 categorization	 differs	 from	 the	 “traditional”	
breakdown	 in	some	respects;	principally,	 in	not	considering	 Ireland	as	an	LME,	as	
done	in	Hall	and	Gingerich	(2009),	given	that	its	energy	sector	is	almost	entirely	under	
government	 control.	 I	 find	 a	 neat	 distinction	 between	 countries	 where	 the	
transmission	 and	 distribution	 segments	 are	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 different	
companies,	and	are	separate	from	generation	and	retail	(only	the	UK)	and	countries	
where	 companies	 active	 in	 distribution	 are	 also	 active	 in	 retail	 and	 sometimes	 in	
generation,	too	(as	in	most	CMEs).	In	MMEs,	the	dominance	of	formerly	state-owned	
incumbents	 has	 been	 restrained	 through	 regulation	 (as	 in	 France),	 mandatory	
divestment	(as	in	Italy	and	Greece)	or	privatizations	(as	in	Portugal	and	Spain);	still,	
these	 former	 incumbents	 have	 the	 largest	 market	 shares.	 Scandinavian	 Market	
Economies	 have	 a	 good	 level	 of	 competition	 in	 both	 generation	 and	 retail,	 even	
though	 state-controlled	 incumbents	 are	 also	 active	 in	 those	 segments,	 and	 are	
characterised	by	locally-owned	distribution	systems	and	state-owned	transmission	
systems.	The	penetration	of	foreign	capital	(mostly	from	Western	European	national	
companies)	 in	 the	 generation,	 distribution	 and	 retail	 segments	 of	 the	 electricity	
sector	 in	 several	Eastern	European	countries	 resonates	with	 their	 classification	as	









- “Government-owned”:	 Ireland,	 Croatia,	 Cyprus,	 Estonia,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	
Malta	and	Slovenia;	



















interim	 step	 towards	 the	achievement	of	 the	 IEM,	 the	European	Commission	has	





gas	 with	 the	 intent	 of	 achieving	 integrated	 regional	 markets	 for	 both.	 Frequent	
interaction	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Regional	 Initiatives	 may	 have	 engendered	
socialization	dynamics	leading	to	trust	and	thus	to	the	maintenance	of	ties	beyond	
the	official	policy	framework.	I	therefore	include	co-membership	into	the	Regional	








individual	 regulators	maintain.	 Those	 contributions	 that	 use	 the	 tools	 of	 network	
analysis	 usually	 concern	 multi-level	 and	 multi-actor	 networks	 of	 experts	 around	
specific	issue	areas,	such	as	the	environment,	and	usually	rely	on	data	concerning	co-
membership	in	cooperation	initiatives	and/or	co-attendance	of	certain	events.	The	
assumed	 link	 between	 co-membership	 and	 collaboration,	 however,	 is	 not	 self-
evident,	 as	 actors	 may	 be	 members	 of	 the	 same	 initiative	 but	 not	 collaborate	
regularly.	Very	recent	contributions	in	the	policy	studies	literature	have	resorted	to	











Communication	 Officers.	 Not	 all	 European	 energy	 regulatory	 authorities	 have	
dedicated	International	Affairs	offices,	but	all	have	staff	dedicated	to	international	
affairs,	such	as	Communication	Officers.	 I	asked	these	respondents	to	reply	to	the	








Being	 aware	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 “most	 frequent”	 may	 mean	 different	 things	 to	




advice	 or	 an	 exchange	 of	 opinions	 or	 suggestions,	 not	 just	 routine	 exchanges	 of	
information.	Moreover,	 I	complemented	the	question	with	a	request	to	name	the	
regulatory	authorities	with	which	they	are	in	contact	above	and	beyond	European	











network	consisting	of	only	 the	strong	relationships	between	the	nodes.	 If	 the	ties	
across	European	regulators	were	a	valued	network	(with	ties	having	different	weights	
depending	on	their	 importance),	the	network	studied	in	this	chapter	 is	the	one	of	
highly	 valued	 ties.	 I	 chose	 to	 focus	 on	 strong	 ties	 because	 energy	 regulatory	
cooperation	 in	 the	 EU	 has	 a	 long	 history,	 dating	 back	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	
(Vasconcelos	2005).	Moreover,	European	energy	legislation	imposes	an	obligation	on	
European	regulators	to	cooperate	within	the	European	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	
of	 Energy	 Regulators	 (ACER).	 Therefore,	 every	 European	 energy	 regulator	 is	
connected	 to	 all	 others.	 I	 was	 specifically	 interested,	 however,	 in	 the	 informal	
bilateral	ties	that	regulators	maintain	more	regularly	and	frequently.		
I	set	up	an	Exponential	Random	Graph	Model	 (ERGM)	of	the	network	of	relations	
among	European	energy	 regulators.	 ERGM	are	generative	models:	 the	underlying	













regulators.	 The	 network	 appears	 characterized	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 highly	





not	 been	 nominated	 by	 any	 of	 their	 colleagues	 as	 their	 most	 frequent	 contacts	
(hence	 have	 an	 in-degree	 of	 zero).	 Figure	 1	 also	 shows	 that	most	 of	 the	 ties	 are	
reciprocal,	which	validates	the	data,	considering	that	I	did	not	set	a	minimum	or	a	
maximum	 number	 of	 nominations	 for	 regulators.	 The	 promise	 of	 anonymity	










previous	 section	 point	 to	 homophily,	 activism	 and	 influence	 according	 to	 VoC,	
controlling	for	EU	policy	requirements,	interconnection	and	flows	across	borders.	I	
also	 include	 in	 the	model	 several	 endogenous	 dependencies	 to	 account	 for	 likely	
patterns	of	social	interaction	that	may	have	contributed	to	determine	the	network	
structure:	the	density	of	the	network;	the	reciprocity	of	ties;	and	the	transitivity	of	
ties,	whereby	 if	node	 i	 is	connected	to	 j	and	 j	 is	connected	to	k,	 there	 is	a	higher	
probability	that	i	and	k	are	also	connected.	I	also	include	dependencies	to	account	
for	 the	 centralization	 of	 the	 network,	 i.e.	 to	 verify	whether	 the	 network	 is	more	











of	 gas	 in	 2015.	 Data	 from	 UK	 government	 website	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579632/
Physical_gas_flows_across_Europe_in_2015.pdf	(last	accessed	3	November	2017).	

























recent	 data).	 Data	 from	 the	 European	 Commission	 DG	 Energy	 website	
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/single-market-progress-




















































































	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Network	density	 -4.865***	 -5.494***	 -5.477***	 -6.015***	 -5.135***	
	 (0.376)	 (0.496)	 (0.519)	 (0.576)	 (0.451)	




***	 1.178**	 1.167**	 1.143*	 1.177**	
	 (0.484)	 (0.569)	 (0.593)	 (0.564)	 (0.553)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Dependent	Market	
Economies	 0.744
**	 1.670***	 1.836***	 2.250***	 1.168***	
	 (0.319)	 (0.514)	 (0.577)	 (0.605)	 (0.440)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 0.577**	 0.800**	 0.841*	 0.928*	 0.536	
	 (0.257)	 (0.402)	 (0.444)	 (0.479)	 (0.360)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 0.586	 0.416	 0.397	 0.452	 0.911*	
	 (0.394)	 (0.507)	 (0.512)	 (0.560)	 (0.470)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 1.494*	 1.508	 1.583*	 1.625	 1.448*	
	 (0.801)	 (0.918)	 (0.917)	 (0.949)	 (0.843)	















**	 0.977**	 1.106**	 	
	 	 (0.462)	 (0.483)	 (0.502)	 	









	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 	 0.654	 0.635	 0.667	 	
	 	 (0.475)	 (0.498)	 (0.518)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Liberal	Market	Economies	 	 1.989***	 1.871***	 1.863***	 	
	 	 (0.517)	 (0.610)	 (0.615)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 	 0.993**	 0.958*	 0.974**	 	
	 	 (0.460)	 (0.492)	 (0.494)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 	 0.895*	 0.883*	 0.942*	 	
	 	 (0.492)	 (0.510)	 (0.523)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Effect	of	resources	on	outgoing	ties	
Staff	(2012)	 	 	 -0.144	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.188)	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Budget	(2012)	 	 	 0.197	 0.261*	 	
	 	 	 (0.172)	 (0.143)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Staff	size	(Full	time	equivalents,	2016):	
Large	(>170)	 	 	 	 Reference	
category	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Medium	(90-140)	 	 	 	 0.978***	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.353)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Medium-small	(50-75)	 	 	 	 -0.173	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.506)	 	




Small	(12-50)	 	 	 	 0.750	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.473)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Micro	(>12)	 	 	 	 -0.173		(0.690)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Varieties	of	Capitalism	and	outgoing	ties	
Coordinated	Market	
Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.522	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.415)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Dependent	Market	
Economies	 	 	 	 	
Reference	
category	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Government	ownership	 	 	 	 	 0.465	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.434)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Liberal	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 1.416***	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.492)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Mixed	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.059	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.458)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Nordic	Market	Economies	 	 	 	 	 0.464	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.469)	




0.361**	 0.550***	 0.578***	 0.685***	 0.501***	
(0.172)	 (0.196)	 (0.204)	 (0.219)	 (0.192)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Co-membership	in	Regional	
Initiatives	for	Gas	
0.154	 0.130	 0.101	 -0.092	 0.106	
(0.238)	 (0.246)	 (0.251)	 (0.276)	 (0.247)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Cross	border	electricity	
flows	
0.627***	 0.576***	 0.580***	 0.580***	 0.588***	
(0.191)	 (0.188)	 (0.197)	 (0.181)	 (0.171)	
	 	 	 	 	 	




	 (0.097)	 (0.096)	 (0.095)	 (0.102)	 (0.105)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Endogenous	dependencies	 	 	 	 	 	
Reciprocity	 1.967***	 1.956***	 1.899***	 1.801***	 1.905***	
	 (0.394)	 (0.383)	 (0.393)	 (0.396)	 (0.383)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Activity	 3.022**	 2.263	 2.360	 4.099*	 2.800*	
	 (1.487)	 (1.468)	 (1.451)	 (2.126)	 (1.623)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Popularity	 -0.187	 -0.158	 -0.209	 -0.418	 -0.336	
	 (0.830)	 (0.914)	 (0.886)	 (0.928)	 (0.866)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Shared	partners	 0.051	 0.061*	 0.067*	 0.077**	 0.053*	
	 (0.031)	 (0.036)	 (0.037)	 (0.036)	 (0.028)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Transitivity	 1.073***	 0.932***	 0.908***	 0.880***	 1.008***	
	 (0.218)	 (0.223)	 (0.232)	 (0.235)	 (0.234)	
	
Akaike	Inf.	Crit.	 494.559	 489.868	 492.298	 483.653	 496.646	















reference	 category	 in	 the	 models),	 bar	 regulators	 from	 countries	 where	 the	
electricity	and	gas	sectors	are	mostly	under	public	ownership	and	control.		
In	 model	 3,	 budgetary	 and	 staff	 resources	 are	 operationalized	 via	 a	 continuous	
predictor	and	refer	to	the	year	2012,	and	appear	to	not	significantly	affect	the	odds	




compared	 to	 regulators	 with	 large	 resources.	 Higher	 budgetary	 figures	 are	 also	
associated	with	higher	odds	of	outgoing	 ties,	but	 the	effect	 is	 rather	weak.	These	
results	do	not	 fully	confirm	hypothesis	 three,	which	expected	regulators	with	 low	
staff	numbers	to	send	significantly	more	outgoing	ties	than	regulators	with	higher	




to	 be	 reciprocated.	 The	 coefficient	 on	 the	 dependency	 called	 “shared	 partners”	
should	be	read	in	conjunction	with	transitivity.	Shared	partners	indicate	the	tendency	












are	 also	more	 likely	 to	 have	 shared	partners	 than	would	 be	 expected	by	 chance.	
Hence,	 in	this	network	there	 is	a	weak	tendency	to	have	connections	 in	common,	
which	 becomes	 significantly	 higher	when	 two	 regulators	 are	 connected.	 In	 other	
words,	if	two	regulators	have	a	connection	in	common,	they	have	higher	odds	to	be	
connected	 by	 a	 strong	 tie,	 as	 well.	 Finally,	 there	 are	 signs	 that	 the	 network	 is	
centralized	on	nodes	having	high	out-degree,	i.e.	having	many	outgoing	ties,	while	
the	 parameter	 for	 centralization	 of	 the	 network	 around	 highly	 influential	 nodes,	
although	positive,	fails	to	achieve	significance.	This	suggests	that	regulators	cluster	
around	active	nodes,	but	not	around	influential	ones.	Plausibly,	regulators	use	active	



















































network	 statistic	 of	 choice	 between	 the	 original	 network	 and	 the	 simulated	
networks.	 I	 calculated	 goodness	 of	 fit	 over	 a	 series	 of	 network	 characteristics:	
edgewise	 shared	partner	distribution,	minimum	geodesic	distance,	 in-degree,	and	














































































































economies.	 Secondly	 and	 simultaneously,	 the	 regulator	 from	 the	only	 LME	 in	 the	
dataset	 (the	 UK)	 has	 much	 higher	 odds	 of	 receiving	 ties,	 given	 its	 peripheral	
geographic	 location,	 than	 its	 peers.	 Given	 that	 the	 whole	 EU	 energy	 regulatory	
framework	and	relevant	legislation	are	based	on	a	LME-type	mode	of	coordination,	








appear	 significantly	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 incoming	 ties	 than	 regulators	 in	 the	
reference	 category	 (DMEs),	 bar	 regulators	 from	 countries	 where	 government	
ownership	 and	 control	 across	 the	 whole	 energy	 sector	 is	 prevalent.	 These	 two	
categories	of	regulators,	for	the	most	part,	belong	to	newer	Member	States,	which	










for	 ties	 that	 exist	 because	 of	 structural	 properties	 of	 the	 network,	 rather	 than	
homophily;	I	also	included	common	membership	in	European	Regional	Initiatives	and	
electricity	 and	 gas	 cross	 border	 flows	 in	 order	 to	 test	 the	 strength	 of	 regulators’	




show	 in	 the	 network	 structure,	 which	 is	 overall	 dense	 and	 comprises	 a	 single	
component.	Indeed,	that	any	effect	is	visible	beyond	those	controls	is	telling	of	the	








truth,	 the	British	 regulatory	 authority	 has	 repeatedly	 expressed	 concern	over	 the	
effect	that	the	lower	extent	of	liberalization	in	other	European	markets	may	have	on	












which	 splits	 regulators	 into	 groups	 according	 to	 the	 number	 of	 their	 full	 time	
equivalent	staff,	avoids	the	collinearity	driven	by	the	very	high	numbers	of	staff	of	
the	 British	 regulatory	 authority.	 Results	 show	 that	 regulators	 with	 intermediate	




bears	 pointing	 out	 that,	 perhaps	 surprisingly,	 regulatory	 authorities	 with	 large	
numbers	of	staff	are	not	necessarily	those	from	bigger	Member	States;	that	subgroup	
comprises	 regulators	 from	 the	 UK	 and	 Germany,	 but	 also	 from	Hungary	 and	 the	
Czech	Republic.	The	energy	regulatory	authority	of	a	 large	country	 like	France	has	
between	40	and	90	full	time	equivalent	staff	units,	ending	up	in	the	medium	group.	


















unconnected	 periphery.	 Core-periphery	 structures	 have	 been	 investigated	 in	 the	
literature	on	networks	(Borgatti	and	Everett	2000)	as	well	as	in	the	literature	on	the	
European	Union	 (Magone,	Laffan	et	al.	2016).	 In	 the	context	of	 the	EU,	 the	same	
concept	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 frame	 relations	 between	 “old”	 and	 “new”	Member	
States	(Bohle	and	Greskovits	2012).		
Finally,	 the	 irrelevance	 of	 gas	 in	 explaining	 the	 patterns	 of	 European	 energy	
regulators’	networking	is	a	puzzling	results	of	the	analysis.	Neither	gas	flows,	nor	gas	
regional	initiatives	appear	to	have	statistical	or	substantive	significance	with	regard	





regulatory	 networking	 at	 transnational	 level.	 Specifically,	 the	 empirical	 case	
examined	in	this	chapter	is	that	of	European	National	Energy	Regulatory	Authorities,	
tasked	with	regulating	the	electricity	and	gas	sectors	within	their	national	borders	
and	 simultaneously	 asked	 to	 coordinate	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	 regulatory	















LMEs	would	 receive	 significantly	more	 ties,	 since	 the	European	energy	 regulatory	
policy	and	legislation	are	shaped	according	to	that	mode	of	coordination.	Finally,	I	
expected	 resources	 to	 also	 matter	 for	 regulators’	 networking	 choices,	 as	 less	
resourceful	seek	to	fill	their	informational	gaps	by	linking	to	more	resourceful	ones.		
The	results	show	that	the	VoC	framework	 is	well	suited	to	 investigate	and	explain	




of	 ongoing	 convergence,	 on	 the	 background,	 however,	 of	 persisting	 dynamics	 of	
coordination	typical	of	national	political	economies,	as	found	in	Thatcher	(2007).	The	
hypothesised	 link	between	 lower	 resources	and	higher	network	activism	 failed	 to	
emerge	from	analysis:	rather,	medium	sized	regulatory	authorities	appear	as	more	
likely	to	be	active	compared	to	their	more	or	less	endowed	counterparts.	Moreover,	




validation	of	 the	data	 as	 I	 did	not	 specify	 a	minimum	or	 a	maximum	numbers	of	











onwards)	 appear	 less	 integrated	 into	 the	 network	 structure,	 suggesting	 a	 core-





of	 structured	 cooperation,	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	

























detail.	 The	analysis	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	was	not	 conclusive	on	 this	point.	 The	
hypothesis	 concerning	 regulators’	 resources	 expected	 regulators	 with	 lower	
resources	to	be	more	active	networkers,	in	the	sense	of	possessing	significantly	more	
outgoing	ties	than	their	peers.	The	analysis	 included	continuous	data	on	staff	and	
budgetary	 figures	 (dating	 back	 from	 2013)	 and	 a	 categorical	 measure	 of	 staff	
resources	 (dating	 from	2016).	The	 latter	measure	 is	 thought	 to	be	more	accurate	
since	the	data	collection	on	regulators’	ties	was	carried	out	in	2015/2016.	The	results	
of	the	Exponential	Random	Graph	Models	(ERGMs)	showed	no	significance	for	the	
continuous	 measurements.	 As	 for	 categorical	 data,	 the	 results	 showed	 that	
regulators	 with	 medium	 resources	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 active	 compared	 to	
regulators	 with	 large	 resources.	 Regulators	 with	 medium	 small,	 small	 or	 micro-
resources	were	not	significantly	more	active	than	their	peers	with	large	resources.		
I	 investigate	the	relationship	between	staff	and	budgetary	resources	and	network	
ties	 by	 testing	 the	 same	hypothesis	 of	 linear	 relationship	 between	 resources	 and	
activism,	but	by	operationalizing	network	activism	differently.	I	introduce	a	refined	














Non-reciprocated	 ties	 indicate	 an	 overall	 weaker	 relationship	 than	 reciprocated	
ones.	In	the	context	of	exchange	of	information	within	networks,	they	suggest	that	




carry	 out	 linear	 regression	 analyses	 to	 test	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 correlation	
between	 resources	 and	 activism.	 I	 then	 include	 indicators	 of	 independence	 and	




are	 significantly	 associated	 with	 higher	 network	 activism.	 The	 significance	 of	 the	
association	 is	 different,	 however,	 for	 different	 categories	 of	 budgetary	 and	 staff	
resources:	medium	and	small	 levels	of	staff	resources	and	small,	but	not	medium,	











contributions	 have	 begun	 exploring	 these	 aspects	 and	 found	 that	 network	
participation	 increases	 bureaucratic	 autonomy	 (Danielsen	 and	 Yesilkagit	 2014),	
thanks	 to	 the	 information	 exchange	 occurring	 within	 regulatory	 networks.	 Other	








higher	 staff	 numbers	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 quality	 regulation	 (Koop	 and	
Hanretty	 2017).	 Hence,	 whereas	 well-resourced	 regulators	 are	 likely	 to	 possess	
sufficient	 expertise	 and	 means	 to	 acquire	 the	 information	 they	 need,	 less	 well-
resourced	regulators	may	struggle	to	accomplish	their	tasks	while	also	staying	ahead	
of	the	information	curve.		
Although	 the	 resources	 available	 to	 a	 regulatory	 authority	 positively	 correlate	 to	






how	 regulators	 use	 them	 and	 the	 benefits	 they	 derive	 from	 them.	 This	 analysis	
suggests	 that	 regulators	 use	 their	 bilateral	 network	 ties	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	
lacking	resources.	Arguably,	European	energy	regulators’	common	embeddedness	in	






can	 attempt	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	 lacking	 resources	 via	 networking	with	more	
resourced	peers	appears	less	plausible,	since	the	assessment	of	the	worth	of	a	non-
reciprocal	tie	is,	by	definition,	unequal	between	the	two	nodes.	Finally,	the	results	of	
this	 analysis	 suggest	 that,	 if	 European	 regulatory	networks	may	have	had	uneven	







Boetzelaer	 and	 Princen	 2012,	Maggetti	 and	Gilardi	 2014,	 Bianculli,	 Jordana	 et	 al.	
2015,	Blauberger	and	Rittberger	2015).	Assessments	of	network	effectiveness	have	
















the	 international	 relations	 literature,	 however,	 have	 flagged	 the	 issue	 that	mere	
participation	 into	networks	 reveals	nothing	of	how	 individual	 regulators	use	 their	
networks	(Bach	and	Newman	2014,	Ahdieh	2015).	Network	membership	need	not	
imply	activism.	
In	 agreement	with	 that	 statement,	 this	 paper	 does	 not	 study	 networking	 among	
European	 energy	 regulators	 in	 terms,	 functional	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 European	
integration	goals;	rather,	this	chapter	studies	the	informal,	voluntary,	bilateral	ties	
that	regulators	entertain	with	each	other	besides	the	context	or	the	requirements	of	
the	 EU.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 “pick-up-the-phone”	 relationships,	 i.e.	 those	 informal	
collaboration	 ties	 that	 regulators	 maintain	 besides	 the	 meetings,	 schedules,	 and	
requirements	of	European	coordination,	with	the	precise	intent	of	consulting	each	
other	 on	matters	 of	 their	 daily,	 national	 regulatory	 practice.	 The	 interest	 of	 this	
research	 is	 exploring	 the	 inner	workings	of	 actual	 network	 relationships	 between	
national	 regulators,	which	 is	 a	prominent	gap	 in	 this	 literature	 (Mastenbroek	and	
Martinsen	2018).	
Recently,	 the	 literature	 has	 begun	 filling	 this	 gap	 by	 exploring	 the	 benefits	 that	






investigated	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 participation	 in	 European	 Regulatory	 Networks	
correlated	with	an	increase	in	the	budgetary	resources	made	available	to	national	







contrast,	 this	 contribution,	 focuses	 on	 financial	 and	 human	 resources,	 i.e.	 those	
resources	 that	 the	 regulatory	 authority	 needs	 in	 order	 to	 perform	 its	 duties,	 and	
whether	they	can	be	thought	to	affect	the	pattern	of	regulators’	networking.		
To	 assess	 the	 relationship	 between	networking	 and	 resources,	 as	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	I	consider	the	empirical	case	of	the	network	of	energy	regulators	from	EU	
Member	 States	 (plus	 Norway).	 The	 data	 consists	 of	 regulators’	 self-reported	
information	 on	 their	 most	 frequent	 and	 regular	 bilateral	 relationships	 with	 their	
European	peers	in	response	to	a	questionnaire	I	submitted	to	them	between	2015	
and	 2016.	 The	 data	 gathering	 process	 aimed	 specifically	 at	 investigating	 the	
regulators’	 perceptions	 of	 their	most	 frequent,	 regular	 collaborators	 among	 their	






peers	 are	 influential.	 Examples	 include	 Ingold,	 Varone	 et	 al	 (2013),	who	measure	
reputation	across	the	various	bureaucratic	and	political	actors	involved	in	the	Swiss	
telecommunication	 sector;	 Maggetti,	 Ingold	 et	 al	 (2013),	 who	 examine	 the	
independence	and	accountability	of	different	regulatory	authorities	in	Switzerland;	




end	 of	 many	 ties	 may	 indicate	 influence,	 while	 sending	 many	 outward	 ties	 may	
indicate	 activism	 (Desmarais	 and	 Cranmer	 2012).	 The	 two	 analytically	 distinct	
concepts	of	influence	and	activism	have	often	been	conflated	under	the	assumption	




contribution	assesses	activism	not	 in	terms	of	 the	absolute	number	of	 ties,	but	 in	
terms	of	the	number	of	outgoing	ties	that	exceed	regulators’	strongest	(i.e.	mutual)	
relationships,	 as	 this	 indicates	 additional	 effort	 to	 gather	 information	 from	 the	
network.	
In	 his	 seminal	 contribution	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 so-called	 “weak”	 ties,	 Granovetter	
(1973)	showed	that	the	vast	majority	of	his	interviewees	had	found	their	job	thanks	
to	information	received	from	the	friends	of	their	friends,	with	whom	they	had	only	





innovate	 more	 effectively	 (Aral	 2016).	 In	 Granovetter’s	 research,	 respondents	









active	 pursuit	 of	 information	 from	 peers,	 given	 one’s	 resources.	More	 resourced	
regulators	are	likely,	in	absolute	numbers,	to	have	more	ties	to	their	peers,	precisely	













effort,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 sender	 of	 the	 tie,	 to	 peruse	 its	 environment	 for	more	
information	 than	 the	 one	 available	 within	 the	 clique	 of	 their	 strong	 ties.	 I	 thus	
contend	 that	 regulators	 reporting	 non-reciprocal	 outgoing	 ties	 have	 a	 stronger	




H1:	 The	 lower	 the	 resources	 of	 the	 regulatory	 authority,	 the	 higher	 its	 network	
activism.	
The	topic	of	regulatory	independence	has	been	very	widely	discussed	and	analysed	




By	 virtue	 of	 their	 intermediary	 position	 between	 levels	 of	 governance,	 the	













premised	on	 liberalization	and	the	 introduction	of	private	capital	 in	 infrastructure	
sectors	(Jamasb	and	Pollitt	2005,	Thatcher	2007).	Hence,	regulators	overseeing	less	













EU.	 I	 specified	 that	 they	 should	 mention	 their	 most	 frequent	 informal	 contacts,	









regulators	 could	 name	 as	 their	 most	 frequent	 contacts,	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	
different	extents	of	individual	regulators’	networks.	Moreover,	I	also	left	the	precise	
frequency	of	contact	unspecified.	Regulators	were	asked	to	report	on	their	“most	
frequent”	 contacts.	 Clearly,	 the	 word	 “frequent”	 may	 mean	 different	 things	 to	
different	respondents.	Also,	different	regulators	may	engage	more	or	less	often	with	
peers	from	other	countries	based	on	a	variety	of	factors.	Then,	reciprocity	is	a	first	
good	 indicator	of	 the	 strength	of	 two	 regulators’	 relationship.	 Lack	of	 reciprocity,	
instead,	suggests	imbalance	in	the	two	regulators’	assessment	of	the	frequency	of	
the	relationship	and,	thus,	a	weaker	one.		















European	 Agency	 for	 the	 Cooperation	 of	 Energy	 Regulators	 (ACER)	 in	 201632;	 for	
																																																						







The	ACER	document	 categorising	 regulators’	 staff	 levels	 comprises	 six	 categories:	
“large”	(over	220	Full	Time	Equivalents);	“medium-large”	(between	170	and	175	FTE);	
“medium”	 (between	90	and	140	 FTE);	 “medium-small”	 (between	50	and	75	 FTE);	
“small”	(between	12	and	50	FTE)	and	“micro”	(fewer	than	12	FTE).	As	shown	in	the	
regression	model	 in	 Table	 4	 in	 the	 Appendix,	 category	 “large”	 is	 not	 significantly	
different	 from	 “medium-large”.	 Since	 the	 whole	 dataset	 only	 comprises	 29	
observations,	and	since	the	category	“medium-large”	only	comprises	two	national	
regulatory	authorities	 (from	 Italy	and	Spain),	 I	merge	 this	 category	 into	“large”	 in	
order	to	save	degrees	of	freedom.	Moreover,	I	split	regulators	in	the	“medium-small”	




(with	 7	 observations)	 and	 “micro”	 (with	 4	 observations).	 In	 further	 re-
categorizations,	I	maintained	category	“medium-small”	separate	or	merged	category	
“micro”	 into	 “small”,	 thus	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 categories	 to	 three:	 “large”,	
“medium”	and	“small”;	the	results	of	the	analysis	do	not	change.		
Although	budgetary	figures	may	have	changed	since	2013,	they	are	unlikely	to	have	
changed	very	considerably.	 Initially,	 I	categorized	budget	figures	 in	a	variable	with	
five	 levels,	 ranging	 from	 “large”	 (over	 20	 million	 euros;	 only	 3	 observations)	 to	
																																																						












very	 slightly	 and	 concur	 in	 showing	 that	 regulators	 with	 small	 (but	 not	medium)	
budgets	are	more	likely	to	be	active.		






regulation	 and	 one	 for	 gas	 regulation.	 Although	 all	 of	 the	 European	 regulatory	
authorities	that	regulate	gas	also	regulate	electricity,	their	scores	for	electricity	and	
gas	 regulation	 may	 differ36.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 include	 each	 indicator	 in	 separate	
models.	Further,	I	 include	a	measure	of	market	liberalization	(from	the	mentioned	






35	 OECD,	 (2015),	 Indicators	 of	 Sectoral	 Regulation,	 http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/indicators-sectoral-regulation.htm	(last	accessed	9	April	2018). 
36 Indeed,	 the	 Pearson’s	 correlation	 coefficient	 between	 the	 independence	 gas	 and	





To	 test	 the	 association	 between	 resources	 and	 network	 activism,	 I	 carry	 out	 an	
Analysis	of	Variance	(ANOVA)	whereby	I	regress,	firstly,	staff	levels	and	then	budget	
levels	on	network	activism.	Secondly,	I	run	Ordinary	Least	Squared	models	including	











group	 with	 much	 higher	 resources	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 European	 regulators	 only	




































variable	 related	 to	 staff	 levels,	 whatever	 the	 categorization	 used,	 is	 statistically	









	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	
(Intercept)	 -2.00*	 -1.82*	 -1.76*	 -1.35	 -1.67	
	 (0.79)	 (0.77)	 (0.81)	 (0.91)	 (0.81)	
Staff	category	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	 	 	







medium	 2.89*	 2.65*	 2.63*	 2.37	 2.42*	
	 (1.11)	 (1.09)	 (1.13)	 (1.16)	 (1.15)	
small	 3.29*	 3.18*	 2.91*	 2.39	 2.68*	
	 (1.19)	 (1.15)	 (1.22)	 (1.34)	 (1.25)	
micro	 2.25	 1.70	 1.79	 0.28	 1.69	




	 	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -0.55	
(0.47)	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.87	
(0.64)	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.74	
(0.49)		 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
R2	 0.28	 0.35	 0.32	 0.33	 0.36	
Adj.	R2	 0.20	 0.25	 0.21	 0.22	 0.24	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	
RMSE	 2.36	 2.28	 2.34	 2.32	 2.35	
	
	
The	 indicators	 for	 independence,	 while	 not	 significant	 in	 table	 1,	 are	 statistically	
significant	 in	 conjunction	with	budget	 levels	 and	 show	 that	 regulators	with	 lower	
independence	are	more	active.	 Lack	of	 significance	on	 the	staff	 coefficients	when	
regressed	 together	 with	 the	 extent	 of	 electricity	 market	 liberalization	 is	 due	 to	
collinearity:	regulators	with	smaller	staff	resources	tend	to	be	from	smaller	countries	
and	have	smaller	markets,	which,	in	turn,	tend	to	be	less	liberalized.	I	run	the	same	



















(Intercept)	 -1.10	 3.61	 4.65	 0.54	 2.39	
	 (0.80)	 (2.21)	 (2.87)	 (2.90)	 (2.48)	
Budget	levels	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	
	 	 	 	 	 	
medium	 0.90	 0.44	 0.22	 0.80	 0.04	
	 (1.13)	 (1.07)	 (1.11)	 (1.16)	 (1.25)	
small	 1.85	 3.00	 2.20	 1.48	 1.27	
	 (1.49)	 (1.47)	 (1.41)	 (1.64)	 (1.51)	
micro	 3.10*	 2.77*	 2.81*	 2.28	 2.82	
	 (1.38)	 (1.29)	 (1.31)	 (1.98)	 (1.84)	
Independence	(electricity)	 	 -1.57*	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.69)	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -1.89*	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.91)	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.39	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.66)	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.82	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.56)	
R2	 0.18	 0.32	 0.30	 0.19	 0.29	
Adj.	R2	 0.08	 0.21	 0.19	 0.06	 0.16	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	








because	 they	 assume	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 errors.	 Typically,	 network	 data	
features	interdependencies.	Methods	such	as	Exponential	Random	Graphs	Models	
(ERGMs)	have	been	devised	specifically	to	deal	with	those	interdependencies.	The	
ERGMs	 run	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 showed	 that	 regulators	 with	 medium	 staff	
resources	 appeared	 to	 have	 significantly	more	 outgoing	 ties	 than	 regulators	with	
large	 resources.	 No	 other	 category	 reported	 significant	 differences.	 I	 run	 further	
ERGM	models,	which	included	the	variables	that	proved	significant	in	the	previous	




Next,	 I	 run	 the	 same	 model	 including	 my	 re-categorization	 of	 staff	 levels	 that	
comprised	four	instead	of	five	categories.	In	both	cases,	results	are	nearly	identical	
and	 show	 that,	 all	 else	 equal,	 regulators	 with	medium	 and	 small	 staff	 levels	 are	
significantly	more	 likely	 to	have	more	outgoing	 ties	 than	 their	 peers,	 thus	 largely	
confirming	the	results	of	the	statistical	analysis	as	well	as	the	results	in	the	previous	
chapter.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 regulators	with	 large	 staff	 resources	are	 significantly	
more	likely	to	receive	more	incoming	ties	than	their	peers.	In	contrast,	ERG	models	





between	 regulators	 within	 regulatory	 networks.	 Regulatory	 networks	 are	 the	
protagonist	of	a	rich	literature	which,	however,	has	rarely	investigated	the	incentives	
driving	 ties	 across	 network	 members.	 Contributions	 on	 networks	 of	 European	













some	of	 their	 counterparts.	 The	 small	 size	of	 the	data	does	not	 allow	 for	 a	high-
powered	 analysis.	 Yet,	 the	 relationship	 between	 numbers	 of	 staff	 dedicated	 to	
energy	regulation	(i.e.	the	ACER	categorical	data)	and	network	activism	is	consistent	
and	substantive	(with	an	eta	square	above	0.50)	and,	in	the	categorization	including	
category	 “micro”	 (i.e.	 regulators	 with	 less	 than	 12	 FTE	 dedicated	 to	 energy	
regulation)	shows	a	quadratic	trend.		





they	 need	 but	 still	 they	 have	 enough	 for	 networking	 to	 be	 a	 cost-effective	
compensatory	strategy.	Additional	models	considering	the	additive	effects	of	budget	
and	 staff	 resources	 yield	 no	 significance	 for	 budget	 levels.	 There	 are	 too	 few	
observations	to	test	whether	staff	levels	matter	differently	at	different	budget	levels	
(and	 vice-versa)	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 to	 test	 for	 interaction	 effects.	 At	 any	 rate,	
budgetary	 and	 staff	 levels	 are	 very	 highly	 correlated	 (Spearman’s	 correlation	














These	are	 tremendous	 tasks;	 in	 their	 fulfilment,	 regulators	 face	great	 information	
asymmetries	with	 the	 regulated	 industry	 (Pérez-Arriaga	 2014).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
regulators	 need	 to	 preserve	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 credibility	 as	 adequately	
accomplishing	 their	 tasks;	 otherwise,	 they	 face	 government	 intervention	 and,	
potentially,	 the	curtailment	of	 their	powers.	 Faced	with	 low	 resources,	 regulators	
tackled	the	demands	of	their	profession	by	relying	on	a	further	resource:	their	peers.		
Therefore,	 the	 understanding	 of	 transnational	 regulatory	 networks’	 potential	 for	
improving	 governance	 should	 be	 extended	 beyond	 transnational	 or	 global	
governance	 to	 encompass	 governance	 improvements	 at	 national	 level.	 In	 other	
words,	transnational	regulatory	networking	may	have	important	feedback	effects	at	
national	 level,	 which	 need	 not	 necessarily	 push	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 convergence.	












The	 literature	 has	 claimed	 that	 membership	 is	 a	 regulatory	 network	 does	 not	




for	expertise.	This	paper	makes	a	 step	 in	 the	direction	of	 tackling	 this	 issue	using	
original	 data	 on	 European	 energy	 regulators’	 ties	 to	 each	 other	 (gathered	 under	
promise	of	anonymity)	and	rare	data	on	their	budgetary	and	staff	resources.		
The	 analysis	 tests	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 difference	 between	 regulators’	
outgoing	 and	 incoming	 ties,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 number	 of	 regulators’	 non-
reciprocal	ties,	and	the	extent	of	their	resources.	Non-reciprocal	ties	are	understood	




much	 like	 job-seekers	 contacted	 the	 friends	 of	 their	 friends	 in	 the	 seminal	
Granovetter’s	 article	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 weak	 ties	 for	 information	 diffusion	
(Granovetter	1973).		
Information	 is	 the	 main	 resource	 regulators	 need	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 their	 tasks.	
Resource-constrained	 regulators	 are	 less	 able	 to	 set	 the	 right	 incentives	 for	 the	




use	 their	 informal	networks	 to	 compensate	 for	 their	 scarce	 resources	 in	 terms	of	
budget	 and	 staff.	 The	 results	 lend	 support	 to	 the	 hypothesis.	 Indeed,	 regulators	




between	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 ties,	 pointing	 to	 their	 influence	 and	 popularity	
among	their	peers.		
Although	the	interdependence	created	by	the	common	membership	in	the	European	
Union	 is	 plausibly	 at	 the	 root	 of	 these	 informal	 collaboration	 patterns,	 the	
mechanism	 whereby	 regulators	 use	 networks	 as	 substitutes	 for	 their	 lacking	
resources	has	already	been	identified	elsewhere	in	the	literature	(see	Alcañiz	2016	
on	 the	 case	 of	 nuclear	 experts	 in	 Latin	 America).	 This	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	
benefits	 of	 transnational	 collaboration	 do	 not	 only	 improve	 European	 regulatory	




theory	 development	 regarding	 how	 regulators	 use	 their	 networks.	 Hence,	 this	
analysis	can	spawn	further	analyses	assessing	hypotheses	concerning	the	effect	of	
networks	on	regulatory	decision-making.	For	instance,	a	case	study	analysis	focusing	
on	 a	 relatively	 less	 resourced	 regulatory	 authority	 and	 testing	 the	 causal	 chain	
leading	 from	 network	 exchanges	 to	 actual	 decision-making	 against	 empirical	
evidence	would	represent	a	suitable	follow	up	to	this	analysis.		















the	 historical	 narrative	 to	 the	 present	 and	 from	 networks	 as	 organizations	 to	
networks	 as	 structures	 resulting	 from	 regulators’	 voluntary	 connections	 to	 one	
another.	 This	 shift	 enabled	 analysis	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 regulatory	 network	
collaboration.	 The	 explanatory	 model	 of	 network	 structure	 reveal	 that	 a	 strong	
pattern	of	homophily	drives	 regulators’	 connections.	Moreover,	 the	model	 shows	
that	regulators	overseeing	more	liberalized	markets	receive	more	incoming	ties,	but	
also	have	significantly	more	outgoing	ones.	Finally,	the	analysis	in	chapter	5	showed	












strategic	 in	 their	 usage	 of	 networks;	 moreover,	 it	 suggests	 that	 regulatory	
cooperation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 probably	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 improving	
governance	 at	 national	 level	 more	 than	 national	 resources	 alone	 would	 have	
allowed.	Discerning	 the	net	effect	of	network	collaboration	on	policy	outcomes	 is	










utilize	data	 gathered	at	 a	precise	 time	and	 therefore	providing	a	 snapshot	of	 the	
network	 of	 European	 energy	 regulators.	 Yet,	 Exponential	 Random	 Graph	Models	
such	as	the	one	developed	 in	chapter	4	are	generative	models,	which	means	that	
they	 assume	 that	 the	 observed	 network	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	 evolutionary	 process.	
Some	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 visibly	 at	 play	 in	 the	 foregoing	 two	 chapters	 may	 be	
idiosyncratic	for	individual	regulators;	for	instance,	a	given	regulatory	authority	may	
have	been	particularly	proactive	in	the	time	frame	of	the	research,	and	not	be	the	
following	 year.	 Yet,	 the	mechanisms	driving	 tie	 choices,	 such	as	homophily	 and	a	




American	 energy	 regulators.	 Although	 following	 entirely	 different	 evolutionary	
paths,	both	sets	of	cooperation	structures	replicated	themselves	by	generating	new	
networks	in	other	areas	of	the	world.	I	will	show	how,	faced	with	the	relative	decline	
of	 its	main	 function,	 the	NARUC	 resorted	 to	 a	 layering	 strategy	 by	 taking	 on	 the	
additional	mission	of	exporting	US	utility	regulation	to	the	four	corners	of	the	world.	
This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 conversion	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 CEER	 as	 the	
establishment	of	the	European	Agency	deprived	it	of	much	of	its	policy	worth;	the	














This	 third	and	 final	part	of	 the	 thesis	 consists	of	 two	chapters	 focusing	on	what	 I	
define	the	“export	of	networks”.	Exporting	networks,	 in	this	context,	refers	to	the	
attempt	 to	 foster	 regulatory	 collaboration	 in	 a	 given	 governance	 context	 by	
reproducing	 the	 informal	 network	 structure	 embedding	 successful	 regulatory	
collaboration	in	another	governance	context.	To	be	specific,	in	this	part	I	investigate	
the	 reasons	 why	 the	 US	 Agency	 for	 International	 Development	 (USAID)	 and	 the	
European	 Commission	 through	 its	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 programme	
decided	 to	 invest	 on	 fostering	 regulatory	 networked	 collaboration	 in	 foreign	
jurisdictions	as	part	of,	in	the	former	case,	a	foreign	policy	agenda	and,	in	the	latter	
case,	what	the	literature	defines	as	“external	governance”	(Manners	2002).	
Tackling	 this	 question	 across	 the	 two	 chapters	 brought	 to	 the	 fore	 two	 other	




Energy	 Regulators	 (MedReg).	 The	 analysis	 shows	 that,	 although	 via	 different	
processes,	the	NARUC	and	CEER	were	essentially	exported	to	other	regions,	in	the	
explicit	attempt	to	replicate	their	success	formula.		
Investigations	of	 the	 rationale	of	 such	network	export	yielded	 important	 research	
findings	 as	 concerns	 the	 dynamics	 of	 network	 evolution,	 the	 interdependencies	
between	networks	emerged	in	different	areas	of	the	world,	and	the	ways	in	which	
entrepreneurial	 regulators	 can	 leverage	 their	 embeddedness	 in	 the	 multi-level	





instrument	 of	 “soft”	 foreign	 policy.	 This	 finding	 partially	 echoes	 some	 earlier	
contributions,	such	as	Raustiala	(2002),	who	argues	that	networks	can	be	synergistic	
with	more	 formal	policy	programmes	 in	 implementing	 regulatory	 transfer	of	best	
practices	 from	 more	 developed	 to	 less	 developed	 markets.	 Raustiala	 (2002),	
however,	was	concerned	with	regulatory	compliance	and	more	effective	regulatory	
enforcement.	 In	 this	 setting,	 instead,	 the	 policy	 goals	 are	 primarily	 political.	 In	
pointing	explicitly	 to	 foreign	policy	motivations,	 I	exclude	alternative	explanations	
that,	although	plausible,	are	unlikely	to	be	the	main	driver	of	network	establishment	





or	 institutional	 solutions	become	accepted	wisdom	they	diffuse	across	 the	world.	
This	 diffusion	 process	 can	 result	 from	 different	 mechanisms.	 The	 four	 main	
mechanisms	 identified	 in	 the	 (rational-choice-inspired)	 literature	 are	 coercion,	






to	 do	 so	 (Henisz,	 Zelner	 et	 al.	 2005).	 A	more	 constructivist	 explanation	 of	 policy	
diffusion	 relies	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 sociology	 and	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 institutional	
isomorphism	(Powell	and	DiMaggio	1983)	and	emphasises	the	symbolic	properties	


















a	 security	 threat	 to	 the	 donor.	 As	 the	 next	 chapter	 shows,	 this	was	 the	 thinking	
underlying	the	USAID	efforts	to	shift	the	governance	paradigm	of	the	energy	sector	
in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	the	aftermath	of	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union.	
This	 included	 the	 establishment	 of	 regulatory	 authorities,	 according	 to	 a	 well-
established	 “recipe”	 of	 infrastructure	 sector	 governance	 that	 international	
organizations	 worldwide	 espoused	 in	 those	 years	 (Henisz,	 Zelner	 et	 al.	 2005).	
Fostering	regulatory	networking,	however,	was	not	part	of	that	recipe.	The	USAID	
decided	 to	 foster	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 network	 of	 energy	 regulators	 in	 the	 area	
autonomously,	 and	 for	 two	 reasons:	 the	 experience	 of	 NARUC	 had	 shown	 that	
regulatory	 networks	 can	 foster	 learning	 across	 members,	 and,	 in	 the	 context	 of	
technical	assistance,	 they	were	a	cost-effective	alternative	to	schooling	regulators	
individually	on	the	economics	of	energy	markets;	also,	a	direct	link	to	regulators	in	






in	other	regions	of	 the	world	where	 it	was	operating,	 in	partnership	with	NARUC,	
ever	since.	





European	 Commission.	 MedReg	 was	 the	 result	 of	 a	 bold	 display	 of	 policy	
entrepreneurialism	 by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 European	 regulators,	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	
European	eastward	enlargement	of	2004	and,	most	importantly,	its	signature	of	the	
Energy	Community	Treaty	in	2005.	The	Treaty,	signed	with	South	Eastern	European	






















assistance	 programmes.	 In	 a	 recent	 contribution,	 Broome	 and	 Seabrooke	 (2015)	
show	 that	 international	 financial	 institutions	 (IFIs	 -	 in	particular,	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund	and	the	World	Bank)	use	technical	assistance	programmes	to	foster	
the	emergence	of	 “sympathetic	 interlocutors”	 in	 recipient	 countries	by	 socializing	










out	 to	establish	 informal	collaborative	 relationships	 to	corroborate	 their	decision-
making	 and	 reduce	 the	 uncertainty	 they	 are	 exposed	 to;	 that	 symbiotic	
interdependence	drives	collaboration	between	different	levels	of	governance,	as	in	
the	 case	 of	 USAID	 and	 ERRA,	 when	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 one’s	 agenda	 entails	 the	
strengthening	of	the	other.	Moreover,	it	shows	that	the	evolutionary	phase	of	one	
network	can	represent	the	emergence	of	another,	as	in	the	case	of	NARUC	and	ERRA,	
and	 that	 experience	 of	 network	 collaboration	 is	 a	 valuable	 asset	 in	 regulators’	
relationships	 to	 their	 political	 principals.	 Finally,	 chapter	 7	 shows	 how	 well-




6. The	 establishment	 of	 the	 network	 of	 energy	






NARUC,	 representing	a	 second	critical	 juncture	 (Collier	and	Collier	1991,	Capoccia	
and	Kelemen	2007).	In	1998,	the	US	bilateral	aid	agency	(USAID)	proposed	to	NARUC	
a	cooperative	agreement	to	deliver	the	goals	of	their	mission	in	Eastern	Europe.	The	
cooperative	 agreement	 was	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	 new,	 post-Cold	 War	 guiding	




the	 rationale	 for	 USAID	 aid	 provision	 changed	 radically	 and	 re-oriented	 its	 focus	
towards	institutions.		
Until	 USAID’s	 request,	 the	 international	 exposure	 of	 US	 state	 utility	 regulators	
individually	and	of	NARUC	as	a	whole	was	virtually	non-existent,	except	for	sporadic	
interaction	 with	 Canadian	 counterparts.	 After	 the	 ERRA	 programme,	 USAID	
partnered	with	NARUC	for	regulatory	cooperation	programmes	in	other	areas	of	the	
world,	 including	 Asia	 and	 Africa.	 The	 federal	 grants	 that	 NARUC	 receives	 for	 its	
national	and	international	work	represent	now	over	half	of	 its	annual	budget.	The	
consequences	of	USAID’s	request	were	therefore	far-reaching	and	long-lasting.	In	its	




This	 chapter	 retraces	 the	 history	 of	 ERRA	 to	 unveil	 the	 under-investigated	 link	




role	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 towards	 the	 embryonic	 CEER:	 it	 was	 a	 policy	
partner	placed	at	a	higher	level	of	governance,	pursuing	an	agenda	whose	fulfilment	
was	 dependent	 on	 the	 regulators	 and	 entailed	 the	 strengthening	 of	 their	 policy	
relevance.		
The	emergence	of	ERRA	is	inscribed	in	the	history	of	NARUC	and	unfolds	in	parallel	








the	 task	ERRA	was	 created	 for	was	accomplished	and	 the	multi-level	 structure	of	
governance,	 comprising	 the	 USAID	 and	 national	 governments	 (as	 well	 as	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 the	 European	 Union)	 underpinning	 it	
vanished.	The	ERRA	that	provided	input	to	policy	formulation	for	the	region	vanished	
as	 well.	 Still,	 the	 network	 did	 not	 disband.	 Regulators	 kept	 finding	 value	 in	 the	














US	government.	 The	determinants	of	 recipient	 selection	by	aid	providers	 is	 a	 key	
topic	in	the	literature	on	foreign	aid	provision	(Alesina	and	Dollar	2000,	Berthélemy	
and	 Tichit	 2004,	Neumayer	 2005,	 Bermeo	2008,	 Younas	 2008,	 Bearce	 and	 Tirone	
2010,	Winters	2010,	Bermeo	2011,	Reinsberg	2015,	Eichenauer	and	Reinsberg	2017,	
Findley,	Milner	et	al.	2017).	This	literature	has	converged	on	several	founding	claims.	
One	 of	 them	 concerns	 the	 higher	 politicization	 of	 bilateral	 aid	 compared	 to	 aid	
provided	 by	 multilateral	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 Regional	
Development	Banks.	Bilateral	aid	agencies	are	financed	by	individual	governments,	
which	 have	 biases	 and	 preferences	 concerning	 their	 aid	 recipients.	 The	 most	
important	 bilateral	 donors	 include	 the	USA,	 the	UK,	 Japan,	 France,	Germany	 and	
other	European	countries	(Neumayer	2005).	Of	these,	the	USA	provides	the	largest	
sums	in	absolute	terms.	
During	 the	 Cold	 War,	 strategic	 and	 foreign	 policy	 considerations	 dominated	 the	
allocation	 of	 aid	 (Berthélemy	 and	 Tichit	 2004,	 Natsios	 2006),	 bringing	 USAID	 to	
provide	aid	to	countries	with	dubious	or	weak	human	rights	and	governance	records.	
After	the	Cold	War,	however,	all	Western	donors	began	to	explicitly	condition	aid	on	
the	 quality	 of	 governance	 in	 recipient	 countries	 (Dollar	 and	 Levin	 2006,	 Bermeo	
2008).	Even	though	strategic	foreign	policy	goals	remain	relevant	to	explain	bilateral	






world	donors	 is	 the	 level	of	the	regulatory	burden	 imposed	on	the	private	sector.	
Respect	for	human	rights	and	the	rule	of	law	do	not	emerge	as	equally	important.		
The	quality	of	the	governance	structure	of	a	country	is	recognized	as	an	important	
determinant	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 aid	 (Neumayer	 2002,	 Dollar	 and	 Levin	 2006,	
Dietrich	 2013).	 Donors	 have	 always	 used	 soft	 power	 techniques	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	
compliance	with	their	desiderata	concerning	their	aid	provision:	Neumayer	(2005)	
lists	 persuasion,	 capacity	 building,	 policy	 conditionality	 and	 selectivity	 as	 the	 four	
main	 strategies	 of	 donor	 soft	 power.	 Particularly	 after	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 donor	
community,	and	the	USA	in	particular,	have	shifted	the	targets	of	their	soft	power	
efforts:	 not	 only	 governments,	 but	 also	 institutional	 actors.	 The	 USAID	 has	 been	
found	to	provide	less	aid	to	poorly	governed	countries	(Bermeo	2008)	or	countries	
with	weak	governance	structures	(Eichenauer	and	Reinsberg	2017),	unless	it	could	
bypass	 government	 and	 target	 aid	 at	 non-state	 actors	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 the	
likelihood	that	it	will	achieve	its	intended	outcome	(Dietrich	2013).	This	is	true,	more	





aid	 effectively.	Hence,	 recipient	 countries	 are	 rewarded	when	 they	 show	 signs	of	
increased	 governance	 quality	 (Neumayer	 2003).	 Since	 the	 quality	 of	 institutions	
matters	 (Booth	 2011),	 development	 aid	 has	 become	 increasingly	 targeted	 at	
improving	 it,	 in	 particular	 through	 capacity	 building	 and	 technical	 assistance	
programmes	 (Vandeveer	 and	 Dabelko	 2001,	 International	 Competition	 Network	




Both	bilateral	and	multilateral	donors	have	 routinely	used	policy	 conditionality	 to	
mandate	certain	economic	reforms	 in	recipient	countries.	However,	besides	being	
blind	to	governance	indicators,	during	the	Cold	War	aid	was	also	ineffective	because	
donor	 governments	 could	 not	 credibly	 enforce	 their	 conditionality	 (Bearce	 and	
Tirone	2010).	Afterwards,	the	threat	of	conditionality	became	much	more	credible	
and	therefore	triggered	actual	reforms.	Over	time,	however,	donors	fully	realized	the	



















emerging	 from	 its	 territory.	 It	 was	 also	 assumed	 that	 weak	 and	 poorly	







many	 partners	 around	 the	 world,	 to	 build	 and	 sustain	 democratic,	 well-
governed	states	that	will	 respond	to	the	needs	of	their	people	and	conduct	
themselves	responsibly	in	the	international	system.	”38		
These	 words	 echo	 the	 stances	 of	 Slaughter	 (2017)	 but	 also	 Slaughter	 (2004),	
Slaughter	(2004b)	and	even	Slaughter	(1997)	with	their	emphasis	on	trans-national	
cooperation	and	networks	of	institutional	actors	as	a	promising	avenue	for	fulfilling	






the	 literature	has	overlooked	the	significance	of	networks	 in	the	field	of	 technical	




Raustiala	 (2002)	 represents	 a	 notable	 exception.	 He	 suggests	 that	 trans-
governmental	cooperation	of	experts	and	regulators	via	networks	is	synergistic	with	
government	 cooperation	 via	 international	 organizations.	 This	 author	 adds	 that	
networks	promote	"regulatory	export":	the	export	of	regulatory	rules	and	practices	
from	 major	 powers	 to	 weaker	 states.	 This	 process,	 by	 facilitating	 regulatory	
																																																						









side	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation,	 not	 on	 the	 eminently	 political	 aims	 that	 can	 be	







broader	 reforms,	 what	 we	 called	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 centralized	
economy,	centralized	communist	government	to	decentralized	market	
economy	 and	 decentralized	 government	 required	 very	 fundamental	
reforms.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 economy	 it	meant	 breaking	 up	 centralized	
monopolies,	decentralization,	in	the	electricity	sector	unbundling	was	
the	term	that	was	used,	politically	it	meant	breaking	up	or	destroying	
a	 lot	 of	 institutions,	 procedures,	 processes…	 and…	 creating	 new	
institutions	and	radically	revising	existing	institutions”	(interview	29).	
The	 USAID	 and	 the	 World	 Bank	 played	 an	 enormous	 role	 in	 accompanying	 the	
transition	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	economies	from	the	communist	to	the	







hand,	 the	 reform	 effort	 consisted	 in	 introducing	 new	mind-sets	 of	 economic	 and	
social	organization.		
Indeed,	energy	utilities	across	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	were	not	used	





you	 ever	 allow	 an	 earned	 return,	 if	 you	 need	 more	 money	 you’ll	 get	 it	 from	
somewhere.”	(interview	15).	
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 success	 of	 electricity	 sector	 or	
regulatory	reform	in	CEE/NIS	countries	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	In	actual	
fact,	 the	achievements	of	 the	 reform	period	 in	 the	electricity	 sector	were	 judged	
unsatisfactory	 for	 most	 of	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 area	 insofar	 as	 competition	 is	
concerned	 (von	Hirschhausen	 and	Opitz	 2001,	 Krishnaswamy	 and	 Stuggins	 2003),	
even	though	privatizations	have	improved	the	quality	of	service	(Vagliasindi	2004).	
The	accession	to	the	European	Union	improved	investment	levels	in	Eastern	Europe	
(Vagliasindi	 and	 Izaguirre	 2007).	 The	 countries	 of	 South	 East	 Europe	 have	 been	
struggling	with	electricity	sector	reform	for	longer;	the	establishment	of	the	Energy	
Community	(Deitz,	Stirton	et	al.	2009,	Hooper	and	Medvedev	2009,	Pollitt	2009),	a	












that	 championed	 sector	 reform	 and	 led	 the	 Ministry’s	 transition	 from	
operating	utility	to	the	policy	setting	and	data	collection	functions.	Once	they	
were	 identified,	USAID	provided	these	 individuals	with	 legal	and	regulatory	
technical	 assistance	 to	 draft	 new	 energy	 laws	 and	 shepherd	 their	 passage	
through	the	parliamentary	process”	(interview	31).	
The	 USAID	 organization	 comprises	 different	 regional	 Bureaus.	 Responsibility	 for	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	fell	under	the	remit	of	the	Bureau	for	Europe	and	Eurasia.	
The	 Energy	 and	 Infrastructure	 Division	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 carrying	 out	 the	 reform	
programme	in	the	energy	infrastructure	sector	(US	Congress,	1993,	p.	96).	In	order	
to	 fulfil	 its	mission,	 the	Division	 adopted	an	 innovative	 approach,	 that	 later	went	
under	 the	name	of	“transformational	development”:	 investing	non-state	 (or	para-




“In	 this	 issue,	 we	 focus	 on	 a	 region	 where	 USAID	 has	 deployed	 a	
transformational	approach	to	development	for	the	past	15	years:	Europe	and	
Eurasia	(E&E).	The	fall	of	the	Wall	in	1989	and	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	
in	 1991	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 US	 Government	 decision	 to	 provide	 assistance	
through	USAID	 to	 assist	with	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 and	 free-market	
capitalism.	 (…)	 USAID	 focused	 most	 of	 its	 energy	 sector	 efforts	 on	
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transforming	 the	 economic	 and	 institutional	 foundations	 of	 the	 sector,	
particularly	 the	 independent	 regulation	 and	 commercial	 operation	 of	 the	
electricity	sector.	(…)	The	E&E	region	presented	several	features	that	USAID	
had	not	encountered	 in	other	 regions:	 virtually	 everyone	 in	 the	 region	had	
access	to	modern	forms	of	energy,	and	the	workforce	was	highly	literate	with	
impressive	 technical	 and	 scientific	 knowledge.	 (…)	 However,	 these	 services	
were	 provided	 on	 a	 heavily-subsidized	 and	 non-commercial	 basis	 by	




well	 as	 between	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	 politics.	 The	 connection	 between	
electricity	and	politics	was	particularly	poignant	 in	 formerly	communist	 countries;	
Lenin	 himself	 had	made	 the	 electrification	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 universal	
provision	of	electricity	one	of	the	pillars	of	his	political	message.	
“The	importance	of	power	sector	reform	for	sustainable	economic	growth	is	
widely	 accepted.	 What	 is	 not	 often	 acknowledged	 are	 the	 accompanying	
political	 benefits.	 In	 the	 E&E	 region	 power	 sector	 reform	 is	 essential	 for	
successful	political	reform	as	well.	Power	systems	were	central	tools	of	former	
Communist	 governments.	 (…)	 Power	 sector	 reform	 and	 politics	 are	




undertook	 in	 this	 direction	 consisted	 in	 establishing	 the	 so-called	 “utility	







by	electricity	and	gas	utility	executives]	 to	 form	 the	U.S.-Eastern	European	
Utility	 Partnership	 Program	 (UPP).	 Begun	 in	 October	 1991,	 UPP	 brings	
together	electric	utilities	in	the	United	States	and	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
for	 activities	 focused	 largely	 on	management	 issues	 but	 including	 also	 art	
annual	 regulatory	 systems	 seminar	 and	 dissemination	 of	 information	 and	




budget.	 The	 first	 partnership	 was	 formed	 between	 New	 England	 Electric	
Systems	and	a	Hungarian	power	company	in	April	1992,	and	others	are	being	








to	 improve	 their	 commercial	 viability,	 compromised	 by	 under-investment,	 scarce	
revenue	collection	and	therefore	 inability	 to	 invest	 in	 infrastructure	maintenance.	
The	programme	also	had	a	strong	symbolic	importance:	the	US	government	wanted	










term	 technical	 assistance	 on	 selected	 topics;	 the	 other	 prong	 of	 the	 strategy	
consisted	of	the	innovative	twinning	element	of	the	utility	partnerships.		
“What	that	did	was	give	the	decentralized	utilities	that	were	trying	to	sort	out	









The	 decision	 to	 extend	 the	 partnership	 concept	 to	 the	 regulatory	 authorities	
emerged	relatively	soon	afterwards.	“The	USAID	led	efforts	in	the	region	to	establish	
independent	regulatory	agencies	as	a	countermeasure	to	potential	backsliding	by	the	
ministries”	 (interview	 31)	 in	 order	 to	 remove	 political	 interference	 from	 the	











autonomy,	 separation	 from	 the	 utility,	 separation	 from	 the	 government;	
authority	 to	make	decisions,	 set	 tariffs,	 approve	 licenses,	 and	accountability	
through	open	public	procedures,	removal	for	cause	only,	and	then	the	ability,	
the	training,	capacity	building	skills	and	political	skills”	(interview	29).	






	“So	we	 began	 again	 a	 two-pronged	 assistance	 approach.	 First	 the	 advisors	
located	 in	 the	 country,	 working	with	 the	 regulator,	 for	 passage	 of	 the	 law,	









hear	 about	 each	 other,	 define	 their	 work	 plan	 and	 then	 have	 a	 series	 of	
exchanges	 (…)	 so	we	 did	 that	 for	 3,	 4	 or	 5	 years,	 that	 built	 a	 confidence,	 a	







31).	 Initially,	 the	 regulatory	 partnerships	 focused	 on	 improving	 the	 institutional	
capacity	 to	 manage	 regulatory	 institutions,	 focusing	 initially	 on	 the	 appointment	
process	 for	 commissioners,	 ensuring	 independence	 from	 political	 interference,	
developing	organizational	charts,	uniform	system	of	accounts	and	the	public	hearing	













Following	 the	 decision	 to	 implement	 regulatory	 partnerships,	 USAID	 needed	 to	
decide	whether	 to	manage	organizational	 aspects	 itself	 or	whether	 to	 rely	 on	 an	
external	body.	NARUC	quickly	appeared	as	the	obvious	partner	in	this	endeavour,	for	
three	main	reasons:	the	value	of	the	practical	experience	of	the	American	regulators	
involved	 (their	 cognitive	 authority);	 the	 cost	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 solution	 (as	







practice	 or	 the	 daily	 utility	 practice,	 just	 have	 elegant	 advice	 on	 it,	 on	 the	
economic	 basic	 or…	 and	 they	 [USAID]	 	 followed	 our	 wish	 and	 they	 found	
partners	on	the	utilities	side	and	each	utility	in	the	region	had	a	partner	with	a	
US	 utility,	 and	we	 just	 copied	 this	model	 when	we	wanted	 to	 learn	 the	 US	






management	 fee	 for	 the	 sponsoring	 organizations,	 NARUC	 and	 USEA.	 In	
retrospect	 I	 think	 it	was	 an	 innovative,	 creative,	 largely	 effective	 and	pretty	
cost-efficient	model	for	that	region”	(interview	15).	
“The	obvious	managers	of	this	process	was	NARUC,	they	are	the	association	of	












USAID	 selected	 NARUC	 primarily	 for	 its	 access	 to	 reliable	 information	 across	 US	
states.	NARUC	was	again	called	upon	to	serve	as	a	provider	of	 information	on	the	







































committed,	 well-intended	 people,	 economists,	 lots	 of	 engineers,	 some	
lawyers,	but	no	peer	group…	and	the…	the	EU	model	that	was	emerging…	of	
associations	 of	 regulators	 as	well	 as	 the	 existing	NARUC	model	 in	 the	US,	
where	you	could	have	peer	to	peer	exchange,	you	could	look	at	best	practices,	
regionally,	 nationally,	 globally,	 you	 could	 facilitate	 dialogue.	 That	 model	
helped	shape	the	idea	that	there	should	be	a	regulatory	association	for	non-
EU	member	states	that	were	going	through	this	transition,	for	aspirational	EU	
member	 states	 and	 to	 drive	 an	 ability	 to	 tackle	 common	 issues	 together”	
(interview	15).	
By	 supporting	 the	establishment	of	 ERRA,	 the	USAID	 rendered	 the	 creation	of	 an	
informal	 cooperation	 network	 of	 energy	 regulators	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 its	
operationalization	 of	 the	 policy	 goal	 of	 fostering	market	 institutions	 in	 the	 post-
Soviet	 space.	 The	key	 reason	 for	 the	 involvement	of	US	 regulators	 in	 the	mission	







networking	 among	 the	 national	 regulators	 to	 exchange	 experiences	 and	
information.	 This	 led	 to	 a	 strong	 bottom	 up	 demand	 for	 an	 ongoing	
institutional	 arrangement	 that	 allows	 regulatory	 bodies	 to	 continue	 their	
exchanges.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Energy	Regulators	 Regional	Association	 (ERRA)	
was	 established	 in	 Budapest,	 Hungary	with	USAID	 support.	 The	 regulators	
anticipated	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 reform	process	 toward	 regional	 electricity	
market	arrangements	that	required	cross-border	regulatory	communication	
and	 cooperation.	 To	 support	 the	 establishment	 and	 development	 of	 ERRA,	
USAID	formed	a	Cooperative	Agreement	with	the	U.S.	National	Association	of	
Regulatory	 Utility	 Commissioners	 (NARUC),	 an	 association	 of	 50	 state	
regulators.	NARUC	has	provided	a	valuable	link	for	the	E&E	regulators	to	U.S.	
regulatory	 experience	 and	 practices.	 An	 indication	 of	 the	 relevance	 and	
effectiveness	of	 the	 regulatory	work	 is	 the	 fact	 that	14	E&E	Missions	have	
bought	 into	 the	 NARUC	 Agreement	 to	 complement	 Mission	 bilateral	
regulatory	development	efforts”	(USAID	2007).	
Before	 the	 partnership	 with	 USAID	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 NARUC	 had	
virtually	 no	 international	 exposure.	 US	 regulators	 had	 occasional	 meetings	 with	
regulators	 from	 neighbouring	 Canada	 and	 Mexico	 (interview	 9).	 Besides	 these,	
American	state	level	utility	regulators	were	confined	to	their	state,	and	NARUC	had	
a	 predominantly	 inward	 character	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 with	 federal	
agencies.	In	particular	since	the	de-regulation	period	of	the	1970s	and	1980	(Derthick	
and	Quirk	 1985),	 federal	 agencies	 had	 seen	 their	 authority	 expanded:	 a	 series	 of	
pronunciations	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 greatly	 expanded	 the	 scope	 of	 federal	
regulators’	 discretion	 over	 that	 of	 state	 level	 regulators.	 Therefore,	 when	 USAID	
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proposed	 to	NARUC	 to	undersign	a	 cooperative	agreement	 for	market	 reforms	 in	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	it	found	a	receptive	ear:		




at	 least	 two-fold:	 first	was	 to	establish	a	 regional	association	 that	would	be	





The	 founding	members	 of	 ERRA	were	 the	 energy	 regulators	 of	 Albania,	 Armenia,	
Bulgaria,	Estonia,	Georgia,	Hungary,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyz	Republic,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	
Moldova,	 Poland,	 Romania,	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	 Ukraine.	 Several	
interviewees	recalled	that	 the	 idea	of	a	network	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	
regulators	was	aired	primarily	by	the	regulators	themselves.	Nevertheless,	laying	the	
foundation	 for	 cooperation	 was	 not	 an	 entirely	 smooth	 process.	 As	 emerged	 in	





































tariff	experts	 to	the	annual	 tariff	workshop,	and	your	 licensing	expert	 to	the	
annual	 licensing	workshop,	 and	 your	 commissioners	 to	 the	 annual	 investors	
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having	 to	 assert	 themselves	 on	 their	 national	 scene	 and	 to	 overcome	 national	
governments’	and	constituencies’	resistances.				
“Especially	 when	 you	 are…	 yeah…	 being	 part	 of…	 those	 networks…	 really	
provides	 you	 with	 a	 very	 strong	 professional	 background	 and	 community…	
many	 times	 regulators	 deal	 with	 international	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	






you	 do	 this	 you	 get	 into	 a	 conflict	 and	 you	 have	 to	 argue	 and	 defend	 your	
decisions,	 and	 I	 think	 these	 associations	 what	 they	 mostly	 help	 for	 their	
members	is	that	they…	they	also	provide	that	sort	of…	international	network…	
that	the	regulated	companies	also	have…	you	get	closer	into	a	similar	position	





way,	 then	 my	 position	 should	 be	 good	 -	 this	 strong	 basis	 was	 important,	

























private	 capital	 so	 they	 need	 this	 regulatory	 framework.	 	 The	 details	 were	









the	 restructuring	 and	 establishing	 the	 regulation,	 learning	 from	 other	 ERRA	
members”	(interview	25).	
Funded	 by	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	 foreign	 policy	 goals	 of	 the	 US	 government,	 the	















them	 enough	 confidence	 and	 capability	 to	 try	 to	 pursue	what	 they	 could	 in	




was	 being	 created,	 the	 CEER	 did	 not	 officially	 exist	 yet,	 and	 its	 members	 were	









democratic:	 you	 cannot	 just	 go	 there	 and	 tell	 them	 you	 have	 to	 hold	 free	
elections	otherwise	you	are	not	democratic,	under	conditionality	threats;	you	








experience	would	 be	 helpful	 training	material	 for	 future	 staff	 of	 their	 regulatory	
authorities.	They	envisaged	the	ERRA	to	continue	into	the	future	and	the	socialization	




2003,	 this	 introductory	 course	was	 held	 again,	 organized	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	
Central	 European	 University	 (CEU),	 and	 offered	 to	 all	 ERRA	 members.	 After	 the	
European	 enlargement,	 ERRA	 developed	 a	 comprehensive	 package	 of	 training	
courses	that	comprise	both	face	to	face	and	online	tuition	and	that,	today,	represents	
its	main	source	of	income.		
The	 expansion	 of	 ERRA	 began	 soon	 after	 the	 European	 eastward	 enlargement	 in	
2004,	which	involved	seven	countries,	whose	energy	regulators	had	been	founding	
members	 of	 ERRA:	 Estonia,	 Latvia	 and	 Lithuania	 and	 four	 former	 satellites	 of	 the	
USSR	(Poland,	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary	and	Slovakia).	A	subsequent	enlargement	
took	 place	 in	 2007,	when	Bulgaria	 and	Romania	 became	EU	Member	 States.	 The	
corresponding	energy	regulators	joined	the	CEER	almost	by	default.	The	integration	




the	networked	organization	had	 to	 re-invent	 itself.	 It	 decided	 to	 convert	 its	main	
mission	from	politically	 loaded	role	of	accompanying	the	transition	of	Central	and	
Eastern	European	energy	sectors	to	market	principles	to	the	less	consequential	role	
of	 regulatory	 training	provider,	with	a	 specific	 focus	on	 regulators	 from	countries	
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where	 the	energy	sector	 is	 still	wholly	or	mostly	under	 full	governmental	control.	
Initially,	it	expanded	its	membership	to	include	regulators	from	South	East	European	
countries	between	2002	and	2006	(i.e.	except	Albania,	who	was	among	the	founders,	







fuel	 this	 expansion	 by	 referring	 to	 ERRA	 as	 the	 regulatory	 training	 provider	 for	
emerging	 markets.	 Nowadays,	 ERRA	 explicitly	 refrains	 from	 being	 perceived	 as	
providing	 policy	 recommendations	 or	 from	 aspiring	 to	 do	 so.	 This	 shift	 can	 be	
understood	 as	 aimed	 at	 gathering	 as	 ample	 a	membership	 as	 possible,	 including	
regulators	that	are	not	independent	and	whose	mandate	is	to	oversee	state-owned	




In	 examining	 the	 case	 of	 financial	 services	 regulators,	 Macey	 (2003)	 argues	 that	
national	regulators	become	involved	into	coordination	and	cooperation	with	peers	
from	 other	 countries	 (what	 he	 termed	 “regulatory	 globalization”)	 in	 response	 to	
three	phenomena:	their	potential	irrelevance	due	to	the	opportunity	for	companies	
to	 engage	 in	 regulatory	 arbitrage;	 the	 impossibility	 of	 achieving	 their	 domestic	
mandate	because	of	the	regulatory	practices	 in	other	countries	 (which	trigger	the	
export	of	their	regulatory	standards	to	other	countries	-	what	Macey	calls	“regulatory	





The	 first	 phenomenon	 is	 unlikely	 to	 find	 strong	 application	 in	 the	 world	 of	
infrastructure	 investment:	 regulatory	 stability	 and	 predictability,	 rather	 than	 the	
laxity	 of	 regulatory	 provisions,	 are	 among	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	 foreign	
investment	 in	 infrastructure	 (Spiller	 and	 Tommasi	 2005).	 Therefore,	 the	
phenomenon	of	regulatory	arbitrage	is	unlikely	to	apply	to	this	context.	The	second	




the	 regulators	 from	that	country	 to	adopt	common	rules.	Yet,	 there	 is	hardly	any	
interdependence	between	the	energy	sectors	or	utility	businesses	of	the	USA	and	the	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe.		
The	 third	 of	Macey’s	 hypotheses	 resonates	more	 clearly	 with	 the	 context	 of	 the	
establishment	 of	 ERRA	 (and	 of	 all	 comparable	 regulatory	 networks):	 periods	 of	
radical	 policy	 change,	 in	particular	 in	 sectors	with	direct	 and	 visible	distributional	
consequences,	 such	 as	 the	 utilities,	 create	winners	 and	 losers.	 The	 losers	 oppose	
reform.	Eastern	European	regulators,	exactly	like	their	EU	counterparts	in	the	same	
years,	 faced	 opposition	 from	 all	 sides	 who	 stood	 to	 lose	 from	 reform.	 The	
endorsement	 of	 USAID	 and	 NARUC	 as	 well	 as	 the	 collective	 leverage	 of	 ERRA	
represented	an	important	source	of	legitimacy.			














NARUC	exploited	 this	opportunity	 to	add	a	 layer	 to	 its	 functions	and	 increase	 the	





peers	 as	 a	 source	 of	 epistemic	 knowledge	 and	 legitimacy,	 and	 exploiting	 their	

















during	 the	past	 two	decades,	 the	 study	of	 the	European	external	governance	has	
remained	rather	more	confined	to	its	formal	manifestations.	Moreover,	the	potential	
or	actual	relationships	between	European	regulators	and	regulators	from	countries	





cannot	 be	 achieved;	 a	 “second-best”	 solution	 (Sutherland	 1992,	 Hancher	 1996,	
Dehousse	 1997).	 This	 chapter	 shows	 that,	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 regulators,	
networks	 are	 a	 “first-best”	 option	 for	 regulatory	 collaboration.	 More	 precisely,	
regulators	 think	 that	 formal	 arrangements	 should	 always	 follow,	 never	 precede,	
informal	 collaboration.	 Collaboration	 between	 previously	 disconnected,	 stranger	
regulators	needs	 to	start	 informally,	or	 it	will	be	unworkable.	Regulators	consider	
that	prolonged	informal	collaboration,	not	legally	binding	arrangements,	can	breed	
trust.	 This	 finding	 is	 important,	 because	 regulators	 are	 the	 subjects	 of	 regulatory	








The	narrative	 focuses	on	 	 the	 establishment	of	 the	Association	of	Mediterranean	
Energy	Regulators	(MedReg).	MedReg	differs	from	the	other	three	cases	examined	
so	far	in	several	respects.	Firstly,	MedReg	emerged	due	to	the	initiative	of	an	agent	
(the	 Italian	energy	 regulatory	authority)	who	played	 the	 role	of	 lead	organization	
(Provan	and	Kenis,	2008)	by	providing	for	network	establishment.	Hence,	MedReg	
differs	from	CEER,	which	emerged	due	to	the	collective	initiative	of	a	small	group	of	










Southern	Member	 States.	 Therefore,	MedReg	 gathers	 a	mix	 of	 energy	 regulators	

















The	 EU’s	 external	 energy	 regulatory	 governance:	 top-down	 and	
legalistic.	
Relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 countries	 to	 its	 southern	 border	 have	 a	 long	
history.	The	 first	attempts	 to	 forge	an	external	EU	policy	 towards	 these	countries	
date	back	to	the	1970s,	when	the	Global	Mediterranean	Policy	was	put	forward	by	
the	 then	 European	 Community,	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 oil	 crisis	 (Cardwell,	 2011).	
However,	 it	 was	 only	 with	 the	 Maastricht	 Treaty	 and	 the	 stated	 objective	 of	
increasing	 the	 EU	 presence	 abroad	 that	 a	 structured	 policy	 was	 planned	 for	 the	
Mediterranean	 (Cavatorta	 and	 Rivetti	 2014).	 It	 took	 the	 form	 of	 the	 so-called	
Barcelona	Process,	initiated	with	the	Barcelona	conference	of	1995	and	bearing	the	
official	name	of	Euro-Mediterranean	Partnership	(EMP	or	EuroMed).	The	EMP	was	a	
broad	policy	 programme,	 covering	 items	 from	democracy	 to	 trade.	However,	 the	
centrality	of	energy	issues	was	acknowledged	in	the	only	EC	Communication	entirely	
dedicated	 to	 energy	 cooperation	 in	 the	 so-called	 “Euro-Mediterranean	
region”(European	Commission	1996).	The	EMP	energy	vector	was	characterized	by	a	
two-fold	regional	approach:	political	dialogue	between	Energy	Ministers	from	both	
shores	 in	 the	 Inter-Ministerial	 Conferences	 and	 expert	 dialogue	 between	









Member	 States	 into	 the	 EU.	 The	 European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	 (ENP)	 was	 an	
umbrella	programme	grouping	the	various	cooperation	programmes	linking	the	EU	
and	its	Southern	and	Eastern	neighbourhood.	The	ENP	marked	the	boundaries	of	the	
EU,	 separating	 Members	 and	 Accession	 countries	 from	 countries	 without	 a	
membership	perspective	(Smith	2005,	Cardwell	2011).	Moreover,	the	ENP	combined	
regional	aspects	with	a	pronounced	bilateral	dimension:	the	Commission	proposes	
bilateral	 Action	 Plans	 to	 each	 of	 its	 “neighbours”,	 framing	 cooperation	 around	 a	
series	of	mutually	agreed	issues.	The	Action	Plans	specify	the	extent	of	regulatory	
convergence	that	each	country	is	willing	to	undertake	in	different	economic	sectors	
(Escribano	 2010).	 Energy	 is	 an	 important	 topic	 in	 these	 bilateral	 relations,	 which	
revolve	 also	 around	 the	 harmonization	 or	 adoption	 of	 the	 European	 energy	
regulatory	framework.	Inasmuch	as	network	governance	is	a	characterising	feature	
of	 the	 EU	 (Boeger	 and	 Corkin	 2017),	 the	 external	 dimension	 of	 its	 regulatory	
																																																						
39	 The	 Inter-Ministerial	 conferences	 convened	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 Trieste	 in	 1996.	Other	
meetings	 followed	 in	Rome	and	Athens	 in	2003.	They	were	 then	discontinued	until	 2007	
(meeting	in	Limassol,	Cyprus)	and	2014	(meeting	in	Rome,	Italy).	The	Euro-Mediterranean	
Energy	Forum	convened	for	the	first	time	 in	Brussels	 in	1997,	then	 in	Granada	 in	2000.	 It	
proved	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 retrace	 the	 chronology	 of	 Forum	meetings	 thereafter.	 The	
Athens	meeting	of	2003	appears	 to	mix	 the	Forum	and	 the	 Inter-Ministerial	Conferences	




governance	 is,	 instead,	 highly	 formalized	 and	 premised	 on	 the	 extension	 of	 the	
European	acquis	(Bicchi	2006).	
At	 the	very	beginning	of	 the	2000s,	 the	EU	and	 the	USA	crossed	 roads	 in	Eastern	
Europe.	This	resulted	in	the	creation	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe	
(ECSEE)	in	2005.	The	ECSEE	is	a	Treaty-based	organization,	originally	comprising	the	
countries	 that	 were	 deemed	 unprepared	 to	 join	 the	 EU	 as	 Member	 States	
immediately,	 yet	maintained	 Accession	 status:	 namely,	 SEE	 countries	 and	 Turkey	
(that	only	 joined	as	associate,	not	as	full	member).	The	premise	of	this	essentially	
political	 initiative	was	 to	 extend	 the	 EU	 energy	 legislation	 to	 the	 countries	 in	 its	





the	 Balkans	 into	 the	 Euro-Atlantic	 community	 and	 integration	 into	Western	
Europe,	the	EU…	it	was	a	very	very	staunch	support,	(…)	within	the	AID	but	also	
within	 the	 state	 department	 they	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 that”	
(interview	29).	
The	 political	 rationale	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ECSEE	 was	 two-fold:	 the	 EU	
wanted	 to	expand	 to	 reach	of	 its	market	 framework	 to	 foster	 investments	 in	 the	





also	been	understood	as	a	 sign	of	 the	EU’s	 “enlargement	 fatigue”	 (Renner	2009),	





and	 exporting	 its	 normative	 (Manners	 2015)	 and	market	 (Damro	 2015)	 power	 to	
third	 countries.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Euro-Mediterranean	 Partnership	 was	 embedded	
into	the	ENP.		
The	Energy	Community	Treaty	 foresaw	the	adoption	of	EU	energy	 legislation	 tout	
court	 in	 the	 countries	 of	 South	 East	 Europe	 via	 a	 formalized	procedure	 typical	 of	
accession	 processes	 (Schimmelfennig	 2012).	 After	 2004,	 the	 EU	 policy	 message	




countries.”	 (Joint	 Paper	 2006,	 p.	 6),	 whereas	 a	 decade	 earlier	 the	 European	






In	 the	 following	years,	however,	slow	progress	 in	 the	achievement	of	 the	 Internal	
Energy	 Market	 and	 deterioration	 of	 energy	 relations	 with	 Russia	 increased	 the	
perception	 of	 threat	 to	 the	 EU’s	 energy	 security.	 The	 gas	 disruption	 episodes	








in	economic	 issues	between	 the	 two	borders	of	 the	Mediterranean.	The	 initiative	
should	 have	 concerned	 only	 EU	 members	 bordering	 the	 Mediterranean.	 The	
European	 Commission,	 however,	 opposed	 the	 initiative,	 pointing	 out	 that	 an	
economic	 cooperation	 programme	 that	 excluded	 most	 EU	 Member	 states	 was	
inacceptable.	 The	 idea	 was	 therefore	 repackaged	 as	 another	 re-launch	 of	 the	
EuroMed	 Partnership/Barcelona	 Process;	 its	 full	 name	 became	 the	 “Barcelona	










idea	was	 reiterated	 in	 the	May	2011	Review	of	 the	 ENP:	 “a	 form	of	 EU-Southern	
Mediterranean	Energy	Community.	Extending	the	Energy	Community	Treaty	with	the	
Union's	 Eastern	 and	 South-Eastern	 neighbours,	 or	 building	 on	 its	 experience,	 this	
																																																						
40	At	the	fifth	EuroMed	Energy	Ministers	conference,	held	in	Limassol	(Cyprus)	in	2007.	On	
that	 occasion,	 the	 European	 Council	 jointly	 with	 the	 European	 Commission	 launched	 a	
renewed	Euro-Mediterranean	Energy	Partnership.	An	Action	Plan	 for	 the	 region	was	also	







The	 European	 Commission’s	 approach	 stands	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 assessments	 of	
regulators,	 system	 operators	 and	 other	 technical	 experts	 involved	 in	 Euro-
Mediterranean	 energy	 cooperation:	 according	 to	 recent	 research,	 these	 are	
convinced	that	the	idea	of	extending	the	Energy	Community	is	unworkable	in	that	












to	 anticipate	 the	 Commission…	 We	 will	 invent	 the	 community	 of	 the	
Mediterranean…	and	so	I	created	MedReg”	(interview	4).	
The	only	occasion	when	CEER	collaborated	with	the	European	Commission	to	deliver	














question:	 why	 would	 EU	 national	 regulators	 care	 what	 approach	 the	 European	
Commission	 does	 or	 does	 not	 take	 as	 concerns	 energy	 cooperation	 with	
neighbouring	countries?	Limitations	on	space	do	not	allow	an	exhaustive	response	
to	 this	 question,	 since	 a	 full	 account	 would	 need	 to	 discuss	 the	 institutional	
boundaries	of	national	regulatory	institutions	and	the	ways	in	which	they	understand	
their	role	in	domestic	and	European	politics.	For	the	purposes	of	this	research,	a	few	
details	 concerning	 the	 energy	 sector	 of	 the	 countries,	 whose	 regulators	 led	 the	
initiative,	may	shed	light	on	their	reasons.		
The	 initiative	 to	 set	 up	 MedReg	 came	 from	 a	 small	 group	 of	 EU	 regulators,	 in	
particular	 the	 Italian	 Regulatory	 authority,	 in	 2006.	 Italy	 is	 the	 country	 with	 the	
highest	electricity	prices	in	the	European	Union42	and	depends	on	fossil	fuel	imports	
(particularly	from	Russia	and	Algeria)	for	its	supply.	Moreover,	the	energy	strategy	
developed	 by	 the	 Italian	 government	 foresees	 transforming	 the	 country	 into	 an	
																																																						
41	 The	 CEER’s	 International	 Strategy	 working	 group	 coordinates	 the	 network’s	 informal	























Despite	 the	 clear	 rationale	 for	 energy	 trade	 and,	 in	 the	 longer	 term,	 market	
integration	across	the	Euro-Mediterranean	region,	the	myriad	dedicated	initiatives	
have	lacked	noticeable	progress.	Intergovernmental	initiatives	invariably	collapsed,	
EU	 policy	 programmes	 covered	 many	 issues	 besides	 energy,	 and	 Mediterranean	




















the	 notary	 and	 in	 the	 space	 of	 a	 year…	 there	we	were.	 It	 was	 impressive	
because	sometimes	when	you	begin	these	things	you	can	face	some	lukewarm	
reactions	but	no,	everyone	responded	to	the	invite,	also	the	representative	of	





The	 association	 of	 Mediterranean	 electricity	 and	 gas	 regulators	 (MedReg)	 was	
established	 as	 the	Mediterranean	Working	 Group	 on	 Electricity	 and	 Natural	 Gas	
Regulation	 in	May	 2006	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Euro-Med	 Partnership45.	 In	
																																																						
45	MEDREG,	today	a	Regional	Regulatory	Association,	brings	together	Energy	Regulators	for	
Electricity	 and	Gas	 of	 the	 following	 countries:	 Albania,	 Algeria,	 the	 Palestinian	Authority,	
Bosnia-Herzegovina,	 Cyprus,	 Croatia,	 Egypt,	 France,	 Jordan,	 Greece,	 Israel,	 Italy,	 Lybia,	




2007,	MedReg	was	 legally	 registered	under	 Italian	Law.	Hence,	 the	 time	between	










emphasis]	 to	 constitute	 a	 strong	 institutional	 basis	 promoting	 a	 “bottom	 up”	
approach	 (…)	 to	 guarantee	 greater	 harmonization	 of	 the	 energy	 markets	 and	





when	 discussing	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 CEER,	 for	 it	 aptly	 frames	 the	 context	 of	 MedReg	
establishment	and	the	regulators’	success	in	securing	funds	from	the	European	Commission:	





































“Well,	 you	 know,	 the	 founding	members	 of	 the	MedReg	 all	 had	 the	 CEER	
experience	in	their	background,	as	well	as	the	Florence	School,	so	they	were	
used	 to	 starting	 and	 carrying	 forward	 this	 type	 of	 conversations,	 of	
cooperation”	(interview	10).	
The	mechanism	 leading	 from	CEER	 to	MedReg	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 leading	 from	
NARUC	 to	 ERRA:	 in	 both	 cases,	 a	 previous	 successful	 experience	 of	 regulatory	
cooperation	 inspired	 its	 replication	 in	 a	 different	 context.	 However,	 there	 are	
profound	differences	between	the	two	cases.	The	establishment	of	MedReg	did	not	
derive	from	a	coordinated	European	foreign	policy	strategy,	but	from	the	initiative	























was	 immediately	 successful	 because	 everyone	 needs	 to	 understand	 how	





networks.	 MedReg	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 replicate	 the	 process	 of	 influential	
transnational	regulatory	cooperation	that	unfolded	in	CEER	in	absence,	however,	of	
sweeping	policy	change.	To	the	contrary,	the	rationale	for	creating	MedReg	was	the	
frustration	 with	 the	 protracted	 standstill	 in	 energy	 cooperation	 in	 the	 Euro-
Mediterranean.	More	precisely,	regulators	appear	to	have	conceived	of	MedReg	as	
an	 initiative	 that	 would	 be	 able	 to	 bypass	 the	 political	 deadlocks	 in	 the	 Euro-
Mediterranean	 cooperation	 by	 focusing	 on	 concrete,	 win-win,	 solutions.	 After	
MedReg	was	established,	regulators	pushed	for	the	creation	of	electricity	and	gas	
system	operators,	on	the	model	of	the	European	ones	(called	ENTSO-E	and	ENTSO-





In	 other	 words,	 the	 establishment	 of	MedReg	 was	 based	 on	 the	 conviction	 that	
cooperation	between	technical	experts	 (regulators	and	operators)	could	suffice	to	
deliver	 investment	 in	 energy	 infrastructure	 and	 eventually	 markets	 and	 market	
integration.	This	conviction	seems	to	have	been	based	on	the	assuredness	that	this	







part	 of	 the	 story.	 The	 other	 part	 concerns	 specific	 political	 circumstances:	 most	
importantly,	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 caused	 by	 the	 enormous	
uncertainty	surrounding	energy	sector	reform	across	European	Member	States,	and	
the	parallel	 formation	of	 a	 European	 energy	 policy	 framework	 that	 entwined	 the	
European	Commission	and	the	CEER	into	a	symbiotic	dependence	on	one	another.	
The	 latter	 provided	 information	 and	 an	 impartial,	 technical	 input	 into	 the	 policy	
process	while	the	former	backed	the	regulators’	cooperation	politically.	Moreover,	
the	 Commission	 and	 other	 European	 institutions	 (particularly	 the	 European	
Parliament)	 supported	 regulators	 and	 could	muster	 the	 authority	 to	 pressure	 all	







the	 Southern	 neighbourhood	 appear	 more	 aware	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 network’s	
impact	 on	 domestic	 contexts	 in	 absence	 of	 political	 commitment	 to	 reform.	 The	
quotation	below	presents	a	different	perspective	on	the	rationale	and	the	usefulness	
of	MedReg,	 that	 conceives	 of	 network	 cooperation	 as	 laying	 suitable	 ground	 for	















The	 limits	 and	 the	 potential	 of	 MedReg	 for	 Euro-Mediterranean	
energy	cooperation.		
The	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	of	South	East	Europe	was	perceived	as	
an	 outstanding	 policy	 success	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 exporting	 its	 energy	
governance	 framework	 (Lavenex	 and	 Schimmelfennig	 2009).	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 that	
experience,	there	was	momentum	for	the	idea	of	a	pan-European	Energy	Community	






where	 many	 other	 formal	 policy	 frameworks	 have	 failed:	 building	 infrastructure	
around	 the	EU	borders	 (the	 so-called	“energy	corridors”,	 see	Ahner	and	Glachant	
(2014)	 as	well	 as	 Escribano	 (2010),	 Escribano	 (2011),	Abbasov	 (2014))	 that	would	





The	 experience	 of	 CEER	 had	 shown	 the	 remarkable	 influence	 that	 informal	
transnational	regulatory	cooperation	could	have	on	regulatory	policy	and	even	on	EU	
legislation	as	such;	regulators	wished	to	replicate	that	experience	in	the	context	of	
the	 Euro-Mediterranean	 energy	 cooperation.	 The	 experience	 of	 ERRA	had	 shown	
that	 hands-on	 cooperation	 between	 regulators	 from	 advanced	 and	 emerging	









in	 that	 its	 aim	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 realization	of	market	 integration	across	 the	
shores	 of	 the	 Mediterranean,	 not	 just	 transforming	 into	 a	 training	 providing	
organization	(interview	3).	
Yet,	 the	MedReg	 thus	 far	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 able	 to	 exert	 a	 real	 impact	 on	
regulatory	 policy	 concerning	 the	 region	 (Cambini	 and	 Franzi	 2013).	 Several	
interviewees	 from	 within	 and	 without	 the	 MedReg	 have	 expressed	 scepticism	
concerning	its	ability	to	influence	policy	 in	the	near	future.	They	have	argued	that	
differences	between	the	two	shores	of	the	Mediterranean	are	still	too	significant.		
“For	now,	 the	MedReg	 is	diffusing	knowledge,	best	practices,	 you	know.	 It	
does	 not	 have	any	 influence	on	 legislation,	 however,	 not	 even	an	advisory	
function.	It’s	not	like	MedReg	makes	proposals	that	are	then	discussed…	It	is	
succeeding	 in	 providing	 capacity	 building,	 in	 creating	 a	 shared	 body	 of	





Indeed,	 the	 evolutionary	 trajectory	 of	MedReg	 differs	 from	 that	 of	 the	 networks	
previously	examined.	Virtually	no	time	has	elapsed	from	the	beginning	of	dialogue	to	
semi-formalization.	 In	 the	 other	 three	 cases,	 regulators	 transformed	 the	
accumulated	 output	 of	 their	 cooperation	 into	 training	 courses	 and	 repository	
material	for	future	staff	at	their	regulatory	authorities;	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	
case	 for	 MedReg.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 sort	 of	 radical	 policy	 overhaul	 that	
characterized	 the	 cases	 previously	 considered	 seems	 missing.	 Therefore,	 most	
national	 regulatory	 authorities	 in	 the	 Southern	 neighbourhood	 (as	 shown	 by	 the	
missing	 links	 and	 nodes	 in	 chapter	 5)	 appear	 mostly	 confined	 to	 their	 national	
















important	 for	 exchanging	 experience.	 Third	 one	 is	 exchanging	 experience,	
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which	 is	 basically	 either	 from	 success	 story	or	 failed	 story,	 both	are	of	 the	
same	value.	Fourth	one	 is	 capacity	building	programmes	 (…).	The	 fifth	one	
which	is	very	much	important	is	working	jointly	in	the	working	groups,	actually	
they	 represent	a	 forum,	or	a	 think	 tank	 for	 regulators	 to	 stick	 together,	 to	
come	up,	actually	we	don’t	have	any	agenda	imposed	on	us	by	somebody	else,	
we	 created	 our	 agenda	 and	 work	 plan,	 this	 has	 helped	 in	 developing	 the	
knowledge	of	each	other,	through	developing	these	reports,	and	I	believe	the	




of	 common	 goals,	 sufficient	 uncertainty	 to	 open	 opportunity	 structures,	 network	
entrepreneurs	willing	and	able	to	shape	and	implement	the	network’s	agenda,	and	
partnership	 with	 a	 supra-national	 source	 of	 political	 authority.	 These	 conditions	
were,	and	still	are	lacking	in	the	case	of	MedReg.	The	Parliamentary	Assembly	of	the	








2006)	 and	 overall	 unable	 to	 deal	 with	 countries	 whose	 will	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
European	 legislative	and	 regulatory	 framework	cannot	be	 shaped	by	membership	










conditions	 for	 success,	 the	 regulators’	 perception	 that	 informal	 cooperation	 can	
succeed	in	influencing	regulatory	policy	in	order	for	market	integration	and	trade	to	
take	place	was	based	on	the	reality	of	their	lived	experience	and	in	observation	of	
developments	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 world.	 This	 fact	 alone	 testifies	 to	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 investigating	 transnational	 expert	 cooperation	 using	methods	














social	 networks	 in	 the	 context	 of	 foreign	 policy.	 The	 bulk	 of	 the	 literature	 on	
transnational	regulatory	networks	concerns	regulators	from	economically	advanced	
countries.	In	this	literature,	the	issue	of	network	establishment	is	usually	tackled	in	
either	 functional	 or	 intergovernmental	 terms,	 depending	on	whether	 emphasis	 is	
placed	 on	 the	 advantages	 of	 coordination	 or	 on	 the	 incentives	 that	 powerful	
countries	 have	 to	 set	 global	 standards	 close	 to	 their	 own.	 A	 smaller	 set	 of	
contributions	 focuses	on	networks	of	 regulators	 from	developing	countries;	 these	
contributions	are	usually	descriptive	and	rarely	emphasise	network	establishment.	
Some	mention,	 in	 passing,	 the	 support	 of	 international	 organisations	 or	 financial	
institutions.	 To	 my	 best	 knowledge,	 the	 literature	 does	 not,	 as	 yet,	 feature	










of	 Euro-Mediterranean	 energy	 regulators;	 a	 unique	 case	 of	 strong	 institutional	




The	 reconstruction	 of	 their	 respective	 histories	 shows	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	
regulatory	 networks,	 particularly	 in	 emerging	markets,	may	 not	 just	 follow	policy	
change,	but	rather	accompany	or	underpin	it.	Moreover,	the	chapters	show	that	the	




institutions.	The	 interview	data	 informing	both	chapters	 juxtaposes	the	regulatory	
and	the	donor	perspective,	and	demonstrates	 the	co-ownership	of	 the	process	of	
network	establishment.	Hence,	 in	 these	 two	 cases,	 network	 formation	 involved	a	
dialogic	process	between	donors	and	recipients.		
Seizing	the	window	of	opportunity	created	by	the	European	enlargement,	Southern	






















The	 initial	 aim	 of	 ERRA	 was	 socializing	 regulators	 with	 each	 other	 and	 with	 the	
principles	 of	 the	 market	 economy,	 in	 preparation	 for	 their	 transition	 to	 liberal	
democracy	and	their	entrance	into	the	European	Union.	Once	European	accession	
occurred,	ERRA	lost	its	initial	function	and	had	to	reinvent	itself	in	order	to	maintain	
its	 viability.	 ERRA	 operated	 a	 strategy	 of	 conversion,	 whereby	 it	 substituted	 its	
previous	main	rationale	with	a	new	one.	In	contrast,	MedReg	has	not	yet	reached	the	
point	 when	 its	 initial	 goal	 (promoting	 infrastructure	 investments	 and	 regulatory	
alignment	 in	 order	 to	 foster	 energy	markets	 integration	 across	 the	 shores	 of	 the	
Mediterranean	Sea)	is	exhausted.	While	the	existing	distance	between	the	EU	and	its	









elsewhere	 have	 debated	 the	 rationale	 of	 their	 establishment,	 their	 composition,	
their	stated	aims,	and	their	functioning.	The	literature	has	rarely,	if	ever,	empirically	
investigated	the	evolution	of	 regulatory	networks	over	 time,	 thereby	portraying	a	
static	 image	 of	 regulatory	 cooperation.	 Importantly,	 existing	 literature	 has	
overwhelmingly	 focused	on	the	formal	attributes	of	networks:	statutes,	meetings,	
work	plans,	membership	lists	etc.,	overlooking	the	informal	dimension	of	regulatory	
networking	 which,	 arguably,	 underlies	 and	 sustain	 their	 very	 existence.	 Further,	
existing	literature	looks	at	networks	from	the	outside.	It	rarely	examines	the	inner	
workings	 of	 regulatory	 networked	 collaboration,	 the	 drivers	 of	 the	 choices	 that	
regulators	 make	 concerning	 how	 to	 use	 their	 informal	 ties	 to	 each	 other.	 This	





politics	 of	 regulatory	 networking.	 In	 addition,	many	 empirical	 puzzles	 concerning	
networks	have,	to	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	never	been	addressed.	For	instance,	if	
the	 impact	 of	 networks	 on	 regulatory	 convergence	 and/or	 global	 governance	 is	
scarcely	discernible,	as	extant	literature	concluded,	why	do	they	still	exist	and	keep	





drive	 regulators	 to	 choose	 their	 closest	 network	 partners	 and	 how	 concretely	 do	
regulators	 benefit	 from	 networks.	 Moreover,	 the	 literature	 seems	 to	 implicitly	
assume	 that	 regulatory	 networks	 remain	 confined	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 their	
members	 (like	 organisations	 do).	 This	 research	 shows	 this	 assumption	 to	 be	













the	 spontaneous	 emergence	 of	 regulatory	 networking,	 its	 consolidation	 and	 its	
persistence	over	 time.	 In	part	2,	 I	 investigate	how	regulators	 choose	 their	 closest	
network	interlocutors;	 I	find	that	similarity	 in	the	political	economy,	expertise	and	
resources	 drive	 network	 ties.	 In	 part	 3,	 I	 investigate	 how	 networks	 foster	 the	
establishment	of	other	networks,	as	part	of	their	political	principals’	foreign	policy	
agendas,	 in	 order	 to	 re-invent	 themselves	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 institutional	
entrepreneurship.	The	narratives	of	 the	 four	networks	 I	examine	 inter-relate	over	
time;	 they	 are	 all	 interconnected	 and,	 arguably,	 none	would	 have	 existed	 as	 it	 is	
without	the	others.		
In	part	1,	I	carry	out	a	comparative	historical	analysis	of	the	emergence,	consolidation	





50	 Public	 Utility	 Commissions	 (PUCs)	 of	 the	 USA;	 the	 latter,	 the	 29	 National	
Regulatory	Authorities	(NRAs)	of	the	EU.	I	rely	on	inductive	reasoning	to	identify	the	
conditions	for	spontaneous	regulatory	cooperation	to	emerge,	to	consolidate	into	a	
semi-formal	 networked	 organization	 (this	 is	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 of	 existing	
literature),	 and	 to	 evolve	 as	 their	 initial	 rationale	 declines	 in	 importance.	 The	
historical	narrative	shows	that	networks	emerge	as	regulatory	authorities	do.	In	both	
the	USA	and	 the	EU,	 the	establishment	of	 regulatory	authorities	at	national/state	
level	 represented	 a	 radical	 overhaul	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 energy	 sector.	
Appointed	regulators	have	to	contend	with	many	conflicting	interests	and	learn	the	
ropes	of	a	completely	new	profession.	Being	uniquely	responsible	for	the	regulation	




The	 nature	 of	 the	 ties	 linking	 regulators	 changes	 and	 becomes	 more	 politically	
consequential	as	regulators	face	the	prospect	of	losing	their	powers	or	of	seeing	the	
scope	 of	 their	 authority	 greatly	 restricted.	 The	 fact	 of	 facing	 a	 common	 threat	
cements	 their	 collaboration	 into	 an	 institutional	 structure	 with	 a	 name,	
headquarters,	a	budget,	working	groups	and	a	work	plan;	in	other	words,	with	the	
intention	of	 lasting.	As	federal	agencies	were	established	in	the	nascent	American	
Regulatory	 State,	 they	 faced	 the	 same	 informational	 gap	 as	 their	 state	 level	
counterparts	a	few	decades	earlier:	a	new	profession,	consequential	tasks,	and	very	








state	 regulation.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 state	 level	 regulators	 witnessed	 the	 federal	
agencies’	 progressive	 empowerment	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 their	 own	 control	 over	
utilities	within	the	boundaries	of	their	state.	As	it	became	evident	that	the	tension	
between	 state	 and	 federal	 level	 regulatory	 agencies	 would	 become	 a	 trait	 of	
American	 regulatory	 federalism,	 the	 foundations	 for	 NARUC	 to	 last	 as	 PUCs’	
collective	representation	towards	federal	regulators	and	government	were	laid.	
At	 first	 sight,	 European	 regulators	 had	 no	 supra-national	 contenders	 to	 their	






model	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 across	 all	 of	 the	 EU,	 Member	 States	 had	 to	 create	
independent	 regulatory	 institutions.	 A	 century	 later	 than	 their	 US	 counterparts,	
European	regulators	were	tasked	with	immensely	consequential	market	reforms,	for	
which	 they	had	 to	design	 the	 rules.	They	started	 reaching	out	 to	each	other,	and	
meeting	occasionally	and	informally	in	various	European	capitals.		
As	 the	 market	 reforms	 envisaged	 by	 European	 legislation	 triggered	 societal	 and	
business	 backlash,	 governments	 across	 Member	 States	 sought	 to	 intervene	 in	




informal	network	ties	 into	an	 institutional	structure	with	a	name,	headquarters	 in	
Brussels,	 i.e.	 close	 to	 the	 EU	 decision-making,	 budgetary	 contributions,	 etc.	
Transforming	 their	 collaborative	 ties	 into	 the	 CEER	 provided	 them	 with	 a	 solid	
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regulators	 from	 government	 interference.	 In	 both	 cases,	 however,	 the	 glue	 of	
regulatory	networking	for	their	joint	pursuit	of	control,	and	authority.	The	quest	for	
preserving,	 if	 not	 expanding,	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 authority	 was	 the	 benefit	 that	
outweighed	 the	 costs	 of	 cooperation	 and	 the	 partial	 sharing	 of	 authority	 that	 is	
implied	in	regulatory	collaboration	and	coordination	(Macey	2003).	This	is	the	first	
key	 empirical	 finding	 of	 this	 thesis	 and,	 arguably,	 one	 of	 its	 main	 theoretical	
contributions.		
If	control	was	the	ideational	rationale	underlying	the	consolidation	of	occasional	ties	
into	 a	 semi-formal	 organisational	 arrangement	 with	 a	 name,	 a	 budget,	 and	
headquarters	close	to	the	centre	of	policy	and	power	in	their	respective	jurisdiction,	
information	 and	 expertise	 are	 the	 assets	 that	 regulators	 aimed	 at	maximizing	 via	
their	collaboration.	In	chapters	4	and	5	I	analyse	the	structure	of	the	CEER	network	
as	a	typical	case	of	regulatory	network	with	a	long	history	of	intense	cooperation	and,	
therefore,	 one	 single	 component	 and	 no	 isolated	 members.	 Via	 the	 network	
structure	of	their	collaborative	ties,	regulators	can	reach	any	of	their	peers	in	a	small	
number	of	steps.	However,	regulators	are	unlikely	to	be	regularly	in	contact	with	all	
of	 their	 counterparts	 in	 their	 network.	 More	 plausibly,	 individual	 regulators	 will	
maintain	regular,	frequent	bilateral	ties	with	a	subset	of	their	peers.	The	motivations	
driving	 the	 choice	 of	 that	 subset	 are	 the	 dependent	 variables	 of	 the	 quantitative	
network	analysis	carried	out	 in	chapters	4	and	5.	A	model	of	 the	determinants	of	





with	 regulators	 overseeing	 more	 advanced	 markets,	 as	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 have	
accumulated	more	expertise	as	concerns	designing	functioning	energy	markets.	 In	




the	 relationship	 between	 resources	 and	 activism	 appears	 to	 follow	 a	 quadratic,	
rather	 than	 linear,	 trend:	 active	 regulators	 are	 those	 with	 intermediate	 to	 small	
resources,	while	regulators	with	 large	or	very	small	 resources	are	not	significantly	
different.	This	shows	rationality	in	the	usage	of	networks	and	points	to	the	categories	




it	 is	 seriously	 incomplete.	 Regulators	 possess	 statutory	 powers	 over	 a	 specific	
territorial	jurisdiction;	they	have	no	official	powers	beyond	it.	Hence,	they	use	their	
networks	 to	 improve	 their	 regulatory	 practice	 in	 their	 own	 jurisdiction,	 alongside	
attempting	 to	 coordinate	 to	 achieve	 more	 regulatory	 convergence	 across	
jurisdictions.	This	is	the	second	key	empirical	finding	and	theoretical	contribution	of	

















chapters	 is,	 therefore,	 to	 inductively	 identify	 the	reasons	why	the	US	government	
and	the	European	Commission	financed	the	establishment	of	 regulatory	networks	
modelled	on	their	own	in	other	parts	of	the	globe,	and	why	they	supported	them	for	
a	 very	 long	 time.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 aim	 of	 these	 chapters	 is	 discovering	 why	




of	network	 survival	 and,	 specifically,	of	network	evolution	over	 time	as	a	 survival	
strategy.	As	 the	main	 rationale	of	network	existence	declines	 in	political	 salience,	






–	 or,	 in	 this	 case,	 network	 –	 entrepreneurship.	 In	 this	 case,	 I	 define	 network	
entrepreneurship	as	the	decision,	on	the	part	of	an	individual	regulator	or	a	small	set	
of	 individual	 regulators,	 to	 further	 regulatory	 coordination	 purposes	 by	
autonomously	initiating	informal	networks,	thereby	pre-empting	political	principals	
from	pursuing	those	same	objectives	through	top-down	initiatives,	such	as	setting	up	












were	 created	 in	 the	 first	 recipient	 countries	with	 the	 aid	 of	 external	 consultants.	






by	working	with	USAID	 in	Eastern	Europe,	 it	 gained	a	new,	politically	 crucial	 role;	
moreover,	its	members	obtained	the	possibility	to	travel	internationally	and	diffusing	
the	 principles	 of	 long-standing	 American	 regulators	 to	 the	 formerly	 communist	
world.	 Collaboration	 within	 ERRA	 quickly	 gained	 pace	 and	 regulators	 grew	more	
secure	 in	 their	 role	 and	 in	 their	 decision-making	 authority.	As	 regulators	 on	both	













structures.	 According	 to	 European	 regulators	 (primarily,	 the	 Italian,	 French	 and	
Spanish),	the	establishment	of	the	Energy	Community	as	an	international	legal	treaty	
had	put	a	 straightjacket	on	 regulatory	cooperation	by	stifling	 regulators’	 initiative	
and	tying	their	collaboration	to	Ministerial	decision-making.		
Hence,	they	decided	to	prevent	the	extension	of	the	“Energy	Community	formula”	





literature	 on	 European	 integration,	 which	 saw	 networks	 as	 “second-best”	
instruments	 of	 convergence	 (Dehousse	 1997),	 European	 regulators	 proclaimed	
networks	as	a	“first-best”	option	for	framing	transnational	regulatory	collaboration,	
offering	 regulators	 freedom	 from	 political	 interference,	 confidentiality	 and	 open	
discussion.	However,	this	chapter	also	confirms	the	findings	of	chapters	2	and	3,	as	
well	 as	 chapter	 6,	 as	 concerns	 the	 importance	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 windows	 of	
opportunity	for	regulators	to	leverage	their	network	to	influence	policy,	by	showing	
their	absence	in	the	case	of	MedReg.		








designed	 by	 policy-makers,	 nor	 do	 they	 functionally	 descend	 from	 specific	 policy	
targets,	as	most	of	the	literature	maintains.	There	is	no	external	“mastermind”	to	the	
inception	 of	 cooperation:	 rather,	 regulatory	 networks	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 very	
spontaneous	aggregation	process	driven	by	 the	 regulators’	quest	 for	 information,	
resources,	and	control.	
This	 research	 also	 makes	 a	 statement	 concerning	 the	 research	 approach.	 The	
questions	 guiding	 the	 research	 (What	 explains	 network	 emergence?	 Why	 do	
networks	 last?	 How	 can	 they	 influence	 policy?	What	 is	 the	 agency	 of	 regulators	
within	networks?)	need	 to	be	answered	by	 relying	on	a	combination	of	methods.	
Comparative	 historical	 analysis	 helps	 identifying	 the	 critical	 junctures	 setting	 in	
motion	emergent	processes	of	network	formation	and	appreciating	the	evolutionary	
trajectory	 of	 networks,	 pointing	 to	 the	 lasting	 importance	 of	 sequencing	 and	
feedback	effects	for	determining	which	options	of	network	evolution	are	available	at	
any	 given	 time.	 Understanding	 regulatory	 networks	 as	 interdependent	 sets	 of	
relationships,	 rather	 than	 as	 independent	 observations	 resulting	 from	 political	 or	
administrative	 functional	 calculation,	 allows	 the	 identification	 of	 the	








whereby	 the	 coordination	 within	 networks	 and	 the	 resulting	 policy	
recommendations	or	positions	influence	supra-national	(federal)	policy,	which	is	also	







reasons	 why	 I	 did	 not	 engage	 in	 analysis	 of	 these	 two	 immensely	 important	


















on	 its	 own	 and	 would	 require	 a	 dedicated	 data	 gathering	 process	 and	 research	
design,	or,	in	other	words,	a	separate	PhD	thesis.	The	topic	of	stakeholders’	networks	
links	with	the	recent	emphasis	placed	on	epistemic	capture	(Sebenius	1992,	Dunlop	
2009)	 and	 the	 growing	 interest	 in	 the	 frames	 through	which	 regulatory	 policy	 is	





Finally,	 a	 third	 important	 topic	 that	 is	 missing	 from	 this	 research	 is	 the	 topic	 of	








from	 the	 start	 with	 the	 explicit	 aim	 of	 preserving	 their	 independence.	 Placing	
network	under	political	control	may	weaken	the	mechanisms	of	productive	network	
collaboration,	while	not	necessarily	 submitting	networks	 to	public	 scrutiny;	 this	 is	
what	 prompted	 Southern	 European	 regulators	 to	 establish	MedReg:	 avoiding	 the	






academic	 investigation	 and	 policy-making.	 From	 an	 academic	 point	 of	 view,	 the	
findings	of	the	research	testify	to	the	necessity	of	taking	a	broader	perspective	when	
investigating	 networks	 of	 regulators.	 Functional	 explanations	 of	 network	








cooperation	 as	 needed.	 Regulators	 are	 homophilous	 in	 their	 tie	 choices,	 which	




Moreover,	 the	 creation	 of	 agencies	 paralleling	 networks	 may	 assuage	 worries	
concerning	 network	 accountability,	 yet	 avoid	 the	 temptation	 of	 setting	 external	
constraints	 on	 informal	 networking,	 lest	 potentially	 hampering	 its	 advantages.	
Networks	are	structures	where	entrepreneurial	regulators	can	thrive	and	potentially	
propose	policy	solutions	to	pressing	policy	problems.	At	the	same	time,	the	findings	
of	 this	 research	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	 time	and	 repeated	 interaction	 for	 the	








already	 experiencing	 the	 so-called	 “energy	 transition”.	 The	 shift	 away	 from	 fossil	
fuels	 will	 cause	major	 reshuffles	 of	 winners	 and	 losers,	 and	 is	 already	 proving	 a	





policy	 debates.	 This	 is	 surprising,	 given	 that	 the	 energy	 transition	 is	 already	
technically	possible;	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	it	is	not	yet	accomplished	is	the	
absence	 of	 regulatory	 frameworks	 able	 to	 take	 simultaneously	 into	 account	
technological	novelty,	the	stranded	costs	of	extant	infrastructure,	the	framework	for	






implementation	 of	 the	 energy	 transition	 is	 the	 uncertainty	 it	 entails.	 Making	
decisions	 under	 uncertainty	 is	 difficult	 and,	 as	 shown	 in	 this	 thesis,	 creates	
opportunity	 structures	 for	 shaping	 the	 emerging	 new	 regime.	 In	 this	 perspective,	
regulation	is	not	just	a	set	of	rules	designed	exogenously	and	regulatory	authorities	
are	 not	 just	 organizations	 tasked	 with	 enforcing	 them.	 Rather,	 regulation	 is	 an	




regulatory	 framework	of	 the	 future	will	 need	 to	 keep	displaying	 the	attributes	of	













stress	 than	 it	 currently	 is,	 given	 that	 the	 number	 of	 consumers	 who	 are	 also	
producers	(i.e.	people	with	sufficient	installed	solar	power	to	be	able	to	feed	into	the	
grid)	 is	 set	 to	 increase	 thousand-fold.	Digitalisation	will	 enable	 the	 full	 control	 of	








to	 stand	 to	 exploit	 the	 structural	 properties	 of	 networks	 (reachability,	 flexibility,	
interdependencies)	 as	 well	 as	 their	 relational	 properties	 (trust,	 routinized	
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Interview	number	 Currently	or	formerly	involved?	 Role	 Topic	of	interview	
1	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
2	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
3	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
4	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
5	 Current	 Academic	 CEER	
6	 Former	 Consultant	 CEER	
7	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
8	 Former	 Executive	 CEER	
9	 Former	 Executive	 CEER	
10	 Current	 Executive	 CEER	
11	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
12	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
13	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
14	 Former	 Consultant	 CEER	
15	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
16	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
17	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
18	 Current	 Consultant	 CEER	
19	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
20	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
21	 Current	 Consultant	 NARUC	
22	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
23	 Former	 Regulator	 NARUC	
24	 Current	 Academic	 CEER	
25	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
26	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
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27	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
28	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
29	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
30	 Former	 Regulator	 CEER	
31	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
32	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
33	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	
34	 Current	 Academic	 NARUC	
35	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
36	 Current	 Regulator	 NARUC	
37	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC	
38	 Current	 Regulator	 CEER	
39	 Current	 Academic	 NARUC	
40	 Current	 Executive	 NARUC	








	 	 Generation	 Transmission	 Distribution	 Retail	




Austrian	 high	 voltage	 electricity	 grid.	 Verbund	 AG	 holds	
100%	of	the	shares	in	Austrian	Power	Grid	AG.	There	are	14	
DSOs	 and	distribution	 areas	 in	Austria.	Wien	Energie,	 Linz	
Strom,	Salzburg	Netz	and	Kelag	are	the	main	participants	in	
this	sector.	Of	the	roughly	130	retailers,	many	operate	only	








Belgium	 Traditional	 suppliers,	 notably	GDF	 Suez	 and	 its	 subsidiary	
Electrabel,	 continue	 to	 hold	 dominant	 positions	 for	 both	
generation	 and	 supply.	 Other	 key	 generating	 companies	











Eandis	 in	 Flanders.	 For	 example,	 Eandis	 is	 comprised	 of	
seven	 Flemish	 electricity	 and	 gas	 distribution	 system	
operators,	which	are	also	its	shareholders.	Elia,	the	TSO,	has	
a	legal	monopoly	as	Belgium’s	sole	electricity	TSO.		
Bulgaria	 The	 100%	 state-owned	 company,	 BEH	 is	 the	 parent	
company	of	most	generating	companies	and	owns	the	TSO.	
Electricity	 distribution	 companies	 were	 fully	 privatised	 in	
2012.	Thus	EVN	(Austria)	and	Energo-Pro	(E.On	now	Czech	




NEK	 (if	 they	 are	 connected	 to	 a	 high	 voltage	 grid)	 or	 the	
distribution	companies	(if	they	are	connected	to	a	medium	
or	low	voltage	grid).	











HEP-DSO,	 HEP	 Generation).	 The	 transmission	 grid	 is	
operated	 by	 the	 state-owned	 TSO	 HOPS.	 There	 are	 28	
companies	active	in	the	generation	sector.	The	majority	of	
these	are	privately	owned.	Their	market	share	is	dwarfed	by	








are	 18	 companies	 covering	 the	 supply	 business.	 Three	 of	
these	companies	are	state-owned	and	hold	the	majority	of	
the	market	 share.	 The	privately	owned	 supply	 companies	
with	 the	 highest	 market	 share	 in	 2014	 were:	 GEN-I	
(approximately	 6.07%),	 RWE	 Energy	 (former	 Energija	 2	
Sustavi	 with	 approximately	 4.52%)	 and	 Proenergy	
(approximately	2.32%).	




unbundling	 of	 the	 TSO	 does	 not	 apply,	 since	 Cyprus	 has	
obtained	 a	 derogation	 from	 Article	 9	 of	 the	 2009/72/EC	
Directive.	The	DSO	 is	 responsible	 for	managing,	operating	
and	 developing	 the	 network,	 safeguarding	 access	 to	 the	
distribution	network	and	equal	treatment	for	all	users.	EAC	
has	 unbundled	 the	 accounts	 of	 the	 DSO.	 No	 wholesale	
market	 is	 currently	 operating.	 EAC	 is	 the	 sole	 electricity	
supplier.	
EAC	 EAC	 EAC	 EAC	
274	
	
Czech	republic	 A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 generation,	 distribution	 and	 supply	
segments	are	integrated	businesses	owned	by	CEZ,	a.s.	and	






each	of	 the	distribution	companies.	 In	2014,	 the	3	 largest	










Denmark	 Two	 companies,	 DONG	 and	 Vattenfall,	 share	 70%	 of	
market's	capacity.	Both	grids	are	managed	by	Energinet.dk,	
an	 independent	 public	 enterprise	 owned	 by	 the	 Danish	
State	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Climate	 and	 Energy.	 DONG	
Energy	covers	a	 leading	position	holding	a	21%	of	market	
shares,	followed	by	Energiden	(10%	circa),	Energi	Fyn,	SEAS-
NVE	 and	 Natur-Energi.	 The	 largest	 DSO	 DONG	 Energy	










Estonia	 In	 Estonia	 the	 TSO	 Elering	 AS	 and	 the	 main	 electricity	







company,	 Elering,	 provides	 the	 transmission	 networking	
service,	 but	 also	 acts	 as	 the	 single	 transmission	 system	
operator.	There	are	38	distribution	networks,	the	largest	of	






Finland	 The	 electricity	 market	 is	 dominated	 by	 Fortum,	 whose	
market	 share	 in	 Finland’s	electricity	market	 is	 close	 to	27	
percent.	Fortum	Oyj	is	a	publicly	listed	energy	company,	in	
which	the	state	holds	50.8%	of	shares.	Pohjolan	Voima	Oy	
(PVO)	 is	 the	 second	biggest	 Finnish	energy	 company.	 The	
Finnish	transmission	grid	is	owned	by	Fingrid,	another	state-











France	 In	 November	 2004,	 the	 two	 incumbent	 monopoly	
companies,	Electricité	de	France	 (EDF)	and	Gaz	de	France	




stake	 in	 EDF,	 which	 dominates	 the	 sector	 -	 90%	 of	
generation;	100%	of	RTE	(the	TSO);	100%	of	ERDF	(DSO,	95%	
of	 the	 market);	 91%	 of	 retail.	 The	 remaining	 5%	 of	 the	
distribution	 network	 are	 managed	 by	 local	 authorities	
(collectivités	 territoriales),	 who	 also	 own	 the	 entire	
network.	




owned,	 though	 there	 are	 still	 a	 large	 number	 of	 small	
electricity	 and	 gas	 distribution	 companies	 that	 are	 either	
wholly	 or	 partially	 owned	 by	 municipalities.	 Despite	
reforms,	 the	 incumbent	 operators	 in	 the	 wholesale	 and	
retail	markets	have	retained	large	market	shares.	E.ON	and	
RWE	have	been	among	 the	dominant	players	 in	both	 the	
natural-gas	 and	 the	 electricity	 markets.	 EnBW	 (Baden-
Wuttenberg),	E.On,	RWE,	Vattenfall	 leading	in	generation,	
distribution	 and	 supply.	 There	 are	 four	 TSOs:	 Transnet	


























Greece	 The	 electricity	 sector	 remains	 dominated	 by	 the	 state-
controlled	 Public	 Power	 Corporation	 (PPC)	 and	 its	
subsidiaries.	 The	 PPC’s	 generation	 market	 share	 has	
declined	from	98.6%	in	2003	to	65%	in	2013.	The	company	
continues	to	control	almost	all	electricity	supply	on	the	non-
interconnected	 islands.	 In	 the	 electricity	 transmission	
sector,	the	PPC	owns	all	transmission	lines	and	holds	a	49%	
share	of	 assets	 in	 the	 transmission	 system	and	wholesale	
market	operator	(HTSO)	with	the	rest	owned	by	the	Greek	
state.	




controlling	 a	 considerable	 part	 of	 Hungary’s	 generation	
capacity.	 MAVIR,	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 state-owned	 MVM,	
owns	 and	 operates	 the	 transmission	 system.	 The	
distribution	 networks	 are	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 six	
privately	 owned	 DSOs	 (ÛDSZ	 (100%	 E.ON);	 DÛDSZ	 (100%	
E.ON);	 TITSZ	 (100%	 E.ON);	 DÛMSZ	 (100%	 EDF);	 ÛMSZ	
(54.3%	 RWE;	 25%	 EnBW;	 12%	MVM;	 18.7%	 others(;	 ELM	





















owns	 the	 gas	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 network,	
operating	 the	 transmission	 system	 through	 a	 subsidiary	
ESB	 EirGrid	 BGE	 BGE	
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and	Aem	 Torino	Distribuzione	 (1.4%).	 Enel	 is	 the	 primary	
supplier	with	about	37%	of	the	overall	sales	of	electricity.	
The	 other	 major	 suppliers	 by	 market	 share	 are:	 Edison	
group,	with	a	market	share	of	8.2%,	followed	by	Acea,	with	











Latvia	 Latvenergo	 enjoys	 a	 monopoly	 position	 as	 the	 largest	
producer	 of	 electricity	 in	 Latvia	 and	 controls	 all	 of	 the	
country’s	 public	 electricity	 distribution	 networks.	 The	
Ministry	 of	 Economy,	 via	 Latvenergo,	 is	 also	 the	 ultimate	
beneficiary	 shareholder	 of	 Latvenergo	 subsidiaries.	 The	










concerning	 common	 rules	 for	 the	 internal	 market	 in	
electricity.	
Lithuania	 The	Ministry	of	Energy	exercises	state	ownership	rights	 in	
UAB	 EPSO-G	which	 has	 two	 listed	 subsidiaries:	 AB	 Litgrid	
and	 AB	 Amber	 Grid,	 which	 operate	 respectively	 the	
electricity	 and	 the	 natural	 gas	 transmission	 grid.	 State	
ownership	 rights	 in	 Lithuanian	 Energy	 were	 previously	
exercised	by	the	Ministry	of	Energy	but	were	transferred	to	
the	Ministry	of	Economy	and	then	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	
in	 2012-13	 in	 implementation	 of	 the	 2009	 Third	 Energy	
Package	of	 the	European	Parliament,	which	 required	 that	
the	ownership	of	energy	generation	and	sale	be	separate	
from	the	ownership	of	energy	transmission	networks.		
Lietuvos	Energia	 AB	Litgrid	 AB	Lesto	 AB	Lesto	
Luxembourg	 Creos	 Luxembourg	 S.A.	 (formerly	 SOTEG)	 owns	 and	
operates	 the	 transmission	 system,	 and	 it	 supplies	 the	
majority	of	the	market.	Most	of	Creos's	shares	are	owned	
by	 various	 private	 utilities,	 though	 the	 State	 maintains	








main	 electricity-transmission	 systems	 in	 the	 country.	 The	
other	 main	 electricity	 grid	 operator	 is	 the	 Societe	 de	
Transport	 de	 l'Electricite	 (SOTEL).	Most	 of	 the	 electricity-
distribution	companies	are	owned	by	municipalities.		
Malta	 There	are	no	transmission	systems	or	transmission	system	
operators	 in	Malta.	 The	 distribution	 system	 covering	 the	








Enemalta	 n/a	 Enemalta	 Enemalta	
Netherlands	 Most	 electricity	 is	 generated	 by	 Essent	 (owned	 by	 RWE),	
Nuon	 (owned	 by	 Vattenfall),	 Eneco,	 E.ON,	 Delta	 and	
Electabel.	 The	 electricity	 distribution	 and	 transmission	
networks	 are	 publicly	 managed	 and	 owned.	 The	




















mostly	 publicly	 owned	 participants.	 Around	 90%	 of	
generating	 capacity	 is	 in	 public	 ownership,	 with	 local	
municipalities	 and	 county	 authorities	 alone	 owning	 just	
over	half.	 The	 state-owned	utility,	 Statkraft,	 is	 the	 largest	
generator.	 There	 are	 more	 than	 160	 small	 distribution	
system	operators	(DSOs)	in	Norway,	most	of	them	publicly	
owned.	 The	 dominant	 supplier	 within	 a	 network	 area	 is	








Poland	 State-owned	 entities	 have	 been	 organised	 into	 four	
vertically	 integrated	groups	and	partially	privatised.	These	
groups	 are	 PGE	 Polska	 Grupa	 Energetyczna	 S.A.	 (PGE),	
TAURON	Polska	Energia	S.A.	 (TAURON),	ENEA	S.A.	 (ENEA)	
and	 ENERGA	 S.A.	 (ENERGA).	 All	 of	 these	 companies	




















owned	 joint	 stock	 company	 and	 owner	 of	 all	 the	
transmission	assets.			
Portugal	 During	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2012,	 the	 Portuguese	 energy	
sector	 saw	 the	 privatisation	 of	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 the	
transmission	 operator's	 share	 capital	 (Redes	 Energeticas	
Nacionais	 -	 REN)	 and	 of	 the	 incumbent's	 share	 capital	
(Energias	de	Portugal	-	EDP),	a	former	vertically	integrated	
company,	 which	 now	 develops,	 through	 its	 subsidiaries,	
generation,	 distribution	 and	 supply	 activities.	 Electricity	
suppliers	 entail	 not	 only	 Portuguese	 companies	 (EDP	
Comercial	 and	 Galp	 Power)	 but	 also	 several	 Spanish	
companies	 (such	as	 Endesa,	 Iberdrola,	Uniãn	 Fenosa,	 EGL	
Energêa	Iberia	and	Nexus	Energêa).		











CEZ	 Distribute	 SA;	 ENEL	 Distributie	 Banat	 SA;	 ENEL	
Distributie	Dobrogea	SA;	E.ON	Moldova	Distributie	SA;	ENEL	
Distributie	 Muntenia	 SUD	 SA;	 FDEE	 Electrica	 Distributie	
Muntenia	Nord	 SA;	 FDEE	 Electrica	Distributie	 Transilvania	
Sud	SA;	and	FDEE	Electrica	Distributie	Transilvania	Nord	SA.	
Electrica	 SA	 (owner	 of	 the	 three	 companies	 (vi)	 to	 (viii)	





























wholly	 state-owned	 company.	 Three	 are	 regional	
Distribution	 System	 Operators	 (DSO),	 co-owned	 by	 the	
state	(51%)	and	a	private	 investor	 (49%	and	management	
control).	 E.ON	 indirectly	 holds	 49%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 ZSE	
Distribucia	 a.s.;	 EDF	 holds	 49%	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 SSE	 -	










Slovenia	 The	 key	 companies	 operating	 in	 the	 Slovenian	 electricity	
market	 are:	 Elektro-Slovenija,	 d.o.o.	 (ELES),	 the	
Transmission	System	Operator	(TSO);	SODO	d.o.o.	(SODO),	
the	 Distribution	 System	 Operator	 (DSO);	 6	 distribution	
companies;	 Holding	 Slovenske	 Elektrarne	 d.o.o.	 (HSE),	 a	
generation	 company	 and	 GEN	 energija	 d.o.o.	 (GEN),	 a	
generation	 company.	 All	 the	 generators,	 distributors	 and	
suppliers,	as	well	as	the	TSO,	are	predominantly	or	wholly	
state-owned	 and	 no	 international	 investment	 is	 present.	
Due	 to	 the	 level	of	 state	ownership,	 the	whole	electricity	
sector	is	arguably	fully	vertically	integrated.	
HSE;	GEN	 ELES	 SODO	 GEN-I	





holds	 a	 20%	 stake,	 serves	 as	 the	 transmission	 system;	 it	
owns	almost	 the	entire	400	kV	grid	and	 two-thirds	of	 the	















Sweden	 The	 state-owned	 company	 Vattenfall	 is	 one	 of	 the	major	
players	in	the	Swedish	electricity	market.	Most	of	the	small	
local	 electricity	 distribution	 companies	 are	 owned	 by	
municipalities.	 Three	 companies	 -	 Vattenfall,	 Fortum	
(majority-owned	 by	 the	 Finnish	 government),	 and	 E.ON	
Sverige		-	generate	the	bulk	of	power	in	Sweden,	own	most	
of	 the	 distribution	 assets	 and	 account	 for	 around	 half	 of	
retail	 sales.	 The	 E.ON	 and	 Vattenfall	 groups	 have	 several	
DSO	 areas.	 The	 market	 share	 for	 the	 three	 dominant	
companies	 is	51,4	%	 (E.ON	19,0	%,	Fortum	and	Vattenfall	
16,2	%	each).	The	state	owned	utility	Svenska	Kraftnät	is	the	



















United	Kingdom	 The	 National	 Grid	 owns	 and	 operates	 the	 England	 and	
Wales	 transmission	 system;	 the	 Scottish	 transmission	
system	 is	 owned	 by	 Scottish	 Power	 and	 Scottish	 and	
Southern	 Energy,	 and	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 network	 by	
Northern	 Ireland	 Electricity.	 Licences	 for	 14	 distribution	
areas	 in	 Great	 Britain	 are	 currently	 held	 by	 six	 different	




large	 companies	 (EDF	 Energy,	 E.ON,	 RWE,	
























Country	 Percentage	 of	 government	 ownership	 of	 the	 largest	
company	active	in	electricity…	
	 Generation	 Transmission	 Distribution	 Retail	
Austria	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Belgium	 0	 45.4	 79	 0	
Germany	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Luxembourg	 7.5	 57.3	 57.3	 25.4	
Netherlands	 0	 100	 100	 33	
Bulgaria	 60	 100	 0	 0	
Czech	
Republic	
69.8	 100	 69.8	 69.8	
Hungary	 99.9	 100	 0	 0	
Poland	 61.9	 100	 40.5	 40.5	
Romania	 80	 74	 0	 0	
Slovak	
Republic	
34	 100	 51	 51	
Croatia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Cyprus	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Estonia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Ireland	 95	 100	 95	 95	
Latvia	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Lithuania	 96.1	 97.5	 82.6	 82.6	
Malta	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Slovenia	 100	 100	 100	 50	
United	
Kingdom	
0	 0	 0	 0	
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France	 84.4	 84.4	 84.4	 84.4	
Greece	 51	 51	 51	 51	
Italy	 31.2	 29.9	 31.2	 31.2	
Portugal	 0	 10.3	 0	 0	
Spain	 0	 20	 0	 0	
Denmark	 80	 100	 80	 80	
Finland	 50.8	 53.1	 50.8	 50.8	
Norway	 100	 100	 0	 100	
Sweden	 100	 100	 100	 100	


































	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	
(Intercept)	 -2.00*	 0.97	 0.77	 1.30	 0.60	
	 (0.79)	 (2.12)	 (3.00)	 (2.76)	 (2.19)	
Staff	levels	 	 	 	 	 	
large	 reference	
	 	 	 	 	 	
medium	 3.33*	 2.99*	 3.02*	 2.69	 2.83*	
	 (1.25)	 (1.24)	 (1.29)	 (1.33)	 (1.32)	
medium-small	 2.20	 2.19	 2.16	 1.74	 2.06	
	 (1.32)	 (1.28)	 (1.32)	 (1.36)	 (1.34)	
small	 3.60*	 3.48*	 3.17*	 2.84	 2.83	
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	 (1.32)	 (1.29)	 (1.39)	 (1.44)	 (1.46)	
micro	 2.25	 1.73	 1.86	 0.45	 1.72	
	 (1.42)	 (1.43)	 (1.48)	 (2.02)	 (1.88)	
Independence	(electricity)	 	 -0.95	 	 	 	
	 	 (0.63)	 	 	 	
Independence	(gas)	 	 	 -0.88	 	 	
	 	 	 (0.92)	 	 	
Liberalization	(electricity)	 	 	 	 -0.75	 	
	 	 	 	 (0.60)	 	
Liberalization	(gas)	 	 	 	 	 -0.64	
	 	 	 	 	 (0.51)	
R2	 0.31	 0.37	 0.34	 0.35	 0.36	
Adj.	R2	 0.19	 0.23	 0.19	 0.21	 0.21	
Num.	obs.	 29	 29	 29	 29	 27	


















1	 1	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
2	 2	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
3	 3	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG/ERRA	
4	 4	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
5	 5	 Current	 Academic	 MEDREG/ERRA	
6	 6	 Former	 Consultant	 MEDREG/ERRA	
7	 7	 Former	 Regulator	 MEDREG/ERRA	
8	 8	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
9	 16	 Former	 Executive	 NARUC/ERRA	
10	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
11	 17	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG/Energy	
Community	
12	 18	 Current	 Consultant	 MEDREG/ERRA	
13	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
14	 	 Current	 Executive	 MEDREG	
15	 21	 Current	 Consultant	 ERRA	
16	 23	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
17	 	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
18	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
19	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
20	 25	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
21	 	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
22	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
23	 26	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
24	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
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25	 	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
26	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
27	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
28	 	 Former	 Regulator	 ERRA	
29	 28	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
30	 	 Current	 Executive	 Energy	Community	
31	 31	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA/Energy	
Community	
32	 33	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA/Energy	
Community	
33	 	 Current	 Regulator	 Energy	Community	
34	 35	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
35	 34	 Current	 Academic	 ERRA	
36	 37	 Former	 Executive	 ERRA	
37	 38	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
38	 39	 Current	 Academic	 ERRA	
39	 41	 Current	 Executive	 ERRA	
40	 	 Current	 Regulator	 MEDREG	
41	 	 Current	 Regulator	 ERRA	
42	 19	 Former	 Regulator	 Energy	Community	
	
